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Community b~dget guarantees nil respect of Em lending  ou~side the. Comn10nity ·. 
'j  . 
. , l.  .  When  the  Co~riciladopt~d  'th~ decision co.ncern1ng'the  guarantee  for  t~e EIIl ioan 
· envelope . of ECU: .l billion  in. favour  .of  ceQtral  and  eastern · European  countries  .  in · 
· December 1993,  the C()uncil inVited  the :.Commission to examine  with· the  Era. the  gen.enii 
. questi()n  of w.hether  to reduce the  extent of the .  guaninte~ granted  by  the  Community  in 
re~pect ofEIB external• loans.  .  ·  · ·  ·  · 
The .. Commission  .~nd  the  EIB  presented a·· paper· in 'which  it  was  proposed  t9  adopt a 
guarantee· sclwme .based  on  a  blanket  gUarantee  of 75%  for  all  .EIB  loans  outside  the 
Community  . 
.  I  .. •'  :-- .·  .  .  ,  .  .  .  .  ..  • 
Consensus.··. on .this  proposal  could  not  be· reached  and  the· Ecofin  Council  of 27. 11.95 · 
requested  th~t a -study  b·e· prepared by  the  EIB and the Commission  on  a _new  guarantee · 
scheme 'which  "devra envisager ia possibilite qu'une partie des risques decoulant de l'ad:ivite  .. 
· externe·.de la Banque soit assumee par celle:ci(par exernple le budget corrimunautaire pourrait 
'couvrir les risquespolitiques et non  pas les risques commerciaux).'' . 
'  .  . 
.  '  I  '  . 
2.  .  ··  ·The Effi ·and the Coinmission servic~s discussed- the matter eX:tensively_ and a detailed · 
study (appended to this  report) was  prepa~ed by the.EIB.  It presents a thorough analysis of ·. 
. the·guarantee)ssue and considers a series·ofalternative guarantee schemes. 
~  .  .  .  .  '  .  .  .  . 
The Effi condudes that a solid budgetary guarantee scheme remains a  triticat·~equiremerit for 
· ..  it to preserve  _it~ prime position in capital markets whlqh. is the necessary condition for. the EIB  . 
.  to  carry:  out  its  task withinthe: Union  and  maintain. a.  high  quality  and  diversified  loan· . 
. port(olio.  The EIB _qonsiders  that a gtiarantee scheme. based on a straight blanket coverage  · · 
. remains by far the bestoption for the Effi, Member States· and the Commission .. Such scheme 
' y.rmild be sirriple:and inexpensjve to administer, would involve rio risk' oflitigation and would  . 
be fully consistent with the Effi's Statute, fl1andates  and  c~rrent 111odus operandi.  M()reover, · 
the ~IB considers thatthe leyel of blanket.coverage could be _lowered-to.60%,. wtllchwould 
. reduce by some 35% the. budgetary cost of  guaninteeing Bank loans, thus helping to address 
.•  the budgetary problem-confronting the EC with ·resp~ctto loans outside the Union.  .  . 
•  ,  •  •  •  j'  • 
Ho:wever,  the  EIB  shows  in  the .. Study  that a  .. scheme·- under. which  ~isk; could  be  shared •  . 
between the EC budget and the Bank along the lines  sugges~ed by the Ecofi~. Council, namely  . _  .. 
the .separation  of political  _art&  commercial  risks,  wo~ld also  be  fea·sible  ~ut ·  w<:mld  ertail-
sigruficant operationiil drawbacks.  It woulcf be more difficult and costly to ·administer;  would 
involve risks of litigation,' wo!Jld  imply more labour-intensive-project s~ructuring, and. could 
. result in considerable legal costs iri case ofdefault.  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
~  The Co~ssion;  ·on the other. hand;. is  of  the opinion that a blanket guanmtee ·  schem'e only· 
would not resp~ct the CounCil's -~sh that ·a genuine risk sh-aring between the· EC Budget and 
, ·: the Bank wHJI be implemented.  .  The ·guarantee scheme outlined below implies a  separation of 
commercial  and political  risk  along  the  li1_1es  suggested  by  the.• Council..  This· scheme, 
according~to  'the Gonimission, wouid. pave no 'negative impact, on the credit rating of  the EP3, 
. would be operationaland would ther~fore represent an acceptable compromise solution. · 
'! 
. ' 
.  )  . ,, 
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3.  The guarantee scheme that is proposed by the Commission and could be acceptable to 




The Bank will  assume commercial  risks  in  a  significant  part  of its  lending  outside  the · 
Community for the entire period covered by the new mandates.  In  the recent past, about 
one-fifth of  Bank loans outside the Community would have been amenable to a sharing of 
risks between the Bank and· the EC Budget.  The share of such loans can be expected to · 
vary in accordance with the content of new mandates to ·lend outside the Community and 
the availability of  suitable projects and gl.Jarantees.  But the Bank will seek to develop such 
oppo-rtunities wherever possible.  In such cases, the EIB will  no~ requir.e guarantees from 
governments in recipient countries in order to 'avoid additional budgetary burdens on these 
countries.  · 
for those loans involving risk sharing, the EC Budget would assume only selected political 
risks, namely the risks of currency non-transfer, expropriation, war and  Civil  disturbance  . 
. All other risks would be taken by the Bank and be covered by. adequate guarantees;. 
the remaining part of the lending as well  as  the ab.ove  mentioned political  risks  ~ould be 
jointly covered  by a  budgetary blanket guarantee of 50% of all  loans  signed  with  the 
deduction of  repaid and cancelled loans, on a world-wide basis; 
o  . the adequacy of  guarantees would remairt a matter of professional judgement by the Bank; 
- ' 
•  the. ceiling for the renewal of  on-going Effi mandates would remain subject to: 
0 
• 
the decision on the internal-external split of Bank operations as defined by the 
· Bank's and  the Unioil's decision-making bodies so as to maintain the essentially 
European focus of  Bank lending;  · 
the resources available in the Reserve associated with the Guarantee Fund for 
external  operations,  once  adequate  amounts  have  been  set  aside  to  make 
provisions for Euratom and possible balance of  paymen~s loans; 
•  the  new  guarantee  scheme  would  be  applicable  to  new  mandates  for  Bank  eXternal 
lending. 
Annex:  1  (Doc.BEI  96/189 - klnexes  1 a 11> -in-
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Exec~tive Summary · 
. The attached report is a preliminary version of  the study on the budg~tary guarantee 
scheme for Bank  loans outside t11e EU whic}:l was requested by the ECOFIN in N9vember 1995 -
and that might be presented to the COREPER and, ifpossible, the ECOFIN by Jmie.  It has been 
prepared by the Bank after extensive discussions with the services of  the Commission. 
The background to the study is presented in Part 1.  The budgetary guarantee issue is of 
utmost impor1ance to the Bank and the Union both over the long run (decisions on this issue  . 
· could have profound implications on the Bank's activities both Within and outside the Union) and 
in the s~orter term because this issue is an important element in the tiniely ren~wal of  the three 
mandates ending in 1996.  · 
The main analytical conclusions of  the study are presented iri-Part2.  It shows that the 
current guarantee scheme has worked satisfactorily, has served the Union and the Bank well, and 
has been, for the Community, a least-cost solution to carry-out ari important componeqt of  the . 
EU's aid and co-operation policy.  Strong budgetary guarantees have been necessary to ·ensure.the 
compatibility between the Bank's highly leverageq financial structure (which i~ different from that 
of  other international finan~al institutions which effectively have 100%.equity/guarantee C'over), 
lending to developing country borrowers (which involves significant risks) and access to capital 
markets on the finest terms, which is a necessarY condition for the Bank t9 be· able to fulfil its  · 
mandate within the Union. 
· . Regarding future operations outside the EU, a solid budgetary guara.iltee scheme re.s  a 
·. -cri~cal requirement for the Bank because of:·  ·  ·  -
•  the critical.need to avoid any deterioration of the Bank's ranking~ithin the AAA 
category  ..  Weaker guarantees could result in higher borrowing costs for the Bank in capital 
markets, which would make Bank lending rates less attractive and would make it very difficult · 
fo~ the Bank to maintain a high quality and.diversified loan portfolio 'Within the EU. 
'  .  .  . 
•  · the significant ri~ks inherent to lending to developing country borrowers (as illustrated, .inter 
alia, by the increase in arrears on Bank loans .outside the EU); 
•·  the decline in the average quality of  Bank borrowers outside the EU that would result from the 
eventual enlargement of  the Union.  · 
•  the possible erosion of  the de facto preferred creditor status that has protected Bank loans to 
d~:  .  .  . 
The operational conclusions ofthe study are present~d in Part 3.  It concludes that·ofthe 
four guarantee schemes that have been thoroughly analysed. iil the study, only two schemes would 
be consistent with the Bank's Statutes and lending policie~ as well as with the preservation of  the 
Bank's role within the E(J.  These two schemes are based respectively .on.'a 60% blanket covetage 
or on a bombinatiort of  the separation between political.and commercial risks (sugges-ted by the  · 
ECOFIN) with a blanket coverage{§ 3.4}· Both schemes would reduce·by 35% the budgetary 
cost of  guaranteeing Bank loans.  In contrast, a loss-sharing arrangement.project by project or a _ 
. fixed budget¥)' coverage could have considerable adverse implications for the Bank  ..  The minor 
immediate budgetary benefits to be gained from these schemes are dwarfed by the considerable 
risks they could imply for the Bank in its. operations within theEU  and the necessary upheavafin 
. the delicate balance of  responsibilities between the various European iristitutions and Member 
States for policy outside. the EU.  - , ·  ,  . .  _  ·  · .  ·  ~  ,  ·  · 
_; .. 
Vi 
1.  Ba~kgr~und  · 
The ECOFtN asked the Bank and the Coil1111lssion, in November 1995, to report before 
the end o~  1996 on a new guarantee system. The study was requested because of:  · · 
· •  · a growing awareness of  the need to reconcile pressing budgetary constraints with the 
expansion ofBan]_(  o~erations outside the EU to support the Union's external policy. 
•  ·.the feeling by a few Member States that the system under which all risks involved in Bank 
lending outside the EU are covered fully by a budgetary guarantee should evolve, and that 
the Bank could take part of  project risks on its portfolio . 
.  ,  As mentionned at the January 29, J996 Board mee~g,  the Management ofthe B3.nk 
considers that the budgetary guarantee issue is of  utmost importance to the Bank and the 
·union.  Over the long run, any decision in this regard could have profb)Jnd implications on the 
Bank~s  ~ctiVities both within and outside the Union. In the short run, this issue is-an irnpo~ant 
element that conditions the global renewal of  the three mandates ending in· 1996 (Central and . 
Eastern. European Countries-CEEC-, Mediterranean countries-MED-, and Asia and Latin 
America-.AJ,.A).  Indeed, the Co~ssion  stated repeatedly that-programmed appropriations for 
the Guarantee Fund together with the current provisioning rules do not allow the renewal of  the 
various Bank mandates to lend outside the Comrtlunity a_t their current level.  In any event, the 
·overall level of  Bank lending outside the EU, and therefore the country rpix of  its loan pprtfolio, -·. 
wiU remain a matter for the Board and the Council to.  determine.  .  · 
.  Two overriding concerns have led the efforts of the B~  iJ1 .drafting the Snidy and  . 
identifyi:rig -solutions s~itable to the EC and the Bank:  · ·  · 
• . . Optimise the budgetary guarantee scheme. to limit its cost to the EC budget  while 
preserving an adequately strong protection of  the Bank's assets.  . 
•  A  void that the new guarantee scheme result in a fundamental change in the role of  the 
· Bank in the EU as a central financial institution and minimise its overall costs to the Bank. 
The attached report is a preliminary version of  the study the Bank and the Corpmission 
might present to the ECOFIN, possibly in June.  1  This draft study was discussed extensively with 
the services of  the European Commission, but represents the Bank's conclusions. 
2.<  . 1\;lain Analytical  Conclusions 
.  Preserving the competitiveness of the Bank in capital markets is a critical 
requirement .  · 
.  . The Bank was given the dual mandate (almost unique among supranational finaricial·  . 
institutions-SFis) to finance investment projects both inside and outsiqe ofthe European Union, it 
1 . The annexes. mentionned in the Study are  availab~e upon request. - V'lt- ·.·, 
being unde!stood that operations insid_e_ the Union are the Bank's d~  priority and shouid :-not be 
affected by lending activities outside the Union.  The Bank has a unique cu~tomer  base that ranges 
from prime European borrowers_ (bank and  corpora~e  AAAs who are in a position to  comp~e  ,  . · 
systematically the teml.s offered by the Bank to those of  clltemative s·ources of  finance) 'to. weaker. 
borrowe~s both within and outside t~e Union.  Th~refore, more than other SFis, the Bankhas,  to 
be competitive in international capital markets, i e. ,has to be able to raise resources ori 'the finest 
· terms possible, if  it is to carry out successfully its task witllln the Union in full  ~ornpliance with itS 
Statutes and the subsidiarity principles, while main~g  a high quality and balancect por.tfoliQ,. 
,_.  1_·_  .  .  •  •  •  •  •  •  _f..  '  •• 
The Bank's high ~set quality has been one.ofthe factors that have enabled theB~  to be 
seen as one of  the. best .credits in the world within the AAA category, arid make it  possible to raise 
funds at terms· often more attractive than other AAA credits.- A necessary condition for the Bank 
to be able to continue to raise resources on such· attnictive terms is for its finanCial strehith to 
remain unqUeStioned.  ·  ·  ·  "  ;  - ··  · 
Any notable weakening of  the budgetary gtiai-antee scheme for Bank loans outside the' ·: 
Union could result in a deterioration of  the B;mk's ranking within the AAA c~tegory  (negative~--· 
implications on the perception ofEIB bondhqldets and the assessment of  credit rating agencies)'; 
which would result in higher borrowing. cost  .. This wollld matce it difficult for the Bank to'  · -·  ., ;  · 
maintain a high quality. and balanced loan portfolio ·within the-EU, and woUld jeopardise tile·  _  ·: · · · 
.  fulfilment of  its mandate.  ·  '·  . ,  · - .. 
I  ;,  J ···,  ~ _,;•  '. : •  '.•  L 
The Bank's financial structure is cost-effective to shareholders but is not  ·coi:ts~tent with-
inherent risks o~leilding to developing countries  _ '_  · ·  ·  ··  ·  .  . 
.• :  .- i, 
. .  The Bank was given a geanng policy significantly less restrictive than tha,t of  most other· 
·  ''·  SFis~ 2 reflecting the nature of  riskS to be taken by the inStitution (most of  its lending is ~o be 
extended in Member States), thus limiting the budgetaiy cost of  the' institution for: its shareholders. 
However, the resulting balance sheet structur~ is not  consistent with the significarit.risks inherent 
to lending to developing country borrowers, in particular .the cataStrophic risks such as those that 
occur, for instance, on the occasion of  debt crisis which affect developing countries on a more or 
less regular basis.  ·  ·  ·  '· 
The necessarY condition to ensure the compatibilitY between a highly leveraged· balance 
sheet structure, operations in developing countries (which involve significant risks) and•accessto 
. .  capital markets on the finest terms is therefore the a:vailability ·of solid budgetary gua.Fantees to  '· .. 
· cover loans outside :the territory of  member states.  .  ·  ·  ·  · 
The Bank's unique modus  ope~~mdi  ~titside the EU is predicated on the ava:ilabilitY of 
strong budgetary guarantees  ) 
Uri.like· other SFis, the Bank ~onducts its operations outside the Union unde~  politically-
motivated mandates and operates in countries that are not its shareholders.  Indeed,.Bank lending 
, outside the Union is based primarily on decisions taken by the Council of  Ministers. 'The ·choice of 
•  . ,  •  ~  I,  . :;. :  < <· )  '  ~ ' ' 
2 By statute;.the Bank's loan and  g~_wantee cotmitiunents cannot. ex~  250% ·of~bscribed  ~ita!,  whlch is 
considerably· higher than for most other SFis whicl} are limited to lending no ·more _than i  00% of  their ~d-iri  and 
.  callable capital and therefore in effect benefit from a 100% gu3i-3ntee.  .  .·  ·  ·  ·:  ·· ·  ·  ·  ·.  · beneficiary COUI!tries is not oruy subject to the Bank's financial and economic criteria, but first and 
foremost, the result of  political consid~rations that ofteri expose the Bank to'signi.ficant sovereign· 
risks.  Also, the Bank is almost the only SF! that operates in countries that are not its shareholders 
and are not directly interested in the financial well-being of  the institution.  The necessary corollary 
of  these essentially political decisions has been the availability of  strong budgetary guarantees to 
protect ~e  Bank from the significant risks inherent to its. activities outside the EU and to obviate 
the-politically-sensitive need. for the· Bank or the Commission to discriminate among countries 
according.to their creditworthiness.  ·  · 
'Another specificity of  the Bank is that its operations outside the EU are very diverse in· 
nature and include IBRD-type .o.perations (loans to .middle-income developing countries, mostly to 
the public sector with sovereign guarantee), IDA-type operations (loans to low-income developing 
countries, mostly to the public sector) and IFC-type operations (loans and equity funding for 
priv~te sector entities generally in middle-mcome countries).  '!he availability of  a full budgetary 
· guaiant.ee on loans outside the EU has made it possible to handle these diverse operations iri a 
.single institution with limited staff  resources.  (Of  note, turnover per head in the Bank for 
·  operations outside the EU was, in 1995, about seven times as high a.S.in the IFC and the EBRD). · 
. UsiilgtheBank to support investments outside the EU with a<iequate budgetary guarantees has 
been the least ccist solution to the EU.  Any new guarantee scheme will-have to reflect the unique 
diversity ofBarik operations outside the Union ~d  preserve the "least-cost" feature of  the present 
arrangement.  · 
The statutory require~ent  for adequate guarantees 
The Bank's Statutes and'lending policies, as well as previous decisions made regarding-
Budgetary guar~tees  reflect the general awareness of  the need to protect the integrity _of the 
B~'s  b3.iance sheet to preserve the Bank's role within·the Union.  .  .  . 
By· its Statutes, the Bank has to require adequate guarantees for each loan.  Article 18(3) . 
of  the Statutes provides that when lendingto a body other than a Member State, the B~  shall 
make the loan conditional either on "a guarante.e from the Member State·in whose territory the 
project Will be carried out or ... on other adequate guarantees." . When alloWing by way of 
derogation the Bank to finance under Art. 18(1) qfthe Statutes proje¢ts outside the Union in 
dev~loping countries, the Board of  Governors has, in analogy to Art. 18(3), always made.such 
derogation conditional upon the availability of  a Member ·State or a Union guarantee a.S most 
lending' outside of.the Union was extended ~o public sectors borrowers with sovereign guarantees, 
none ofwhich could be considered adequate as per Art 18(3).  ·  · 
The  curre~t guarantee scheme has served the EC an<J the Bank weU 
The study shows that the current guarantee scheme has -been fully justified; has been used 
· in a responsible manner by the Bank, and has served the Union, the Bank and its cuStomers well. It 
has functioned  satisf~ctorily both from an administrative standpoint (it has been simple and cost:. -!'X-
effective to_ operate int~e  Bank and the Commission) and from a  budgetary point of  view (Bank. 
calls on  ~e  budgetary guarantees have been rD.inor}' 3  .  ·  .··  _ 
* * * 
A solid. t>udgetary guarantee scheme r~mains a critical requirement for tbe Ba~k  .• 
In view of  the above, and .as the Ba:ruc's loan. portfolio within the Union is chaiacteris¢<1 by 
greater exposure to the private sector, the Management of  the Bank considers that any new 
guarantee scheme will have to continue to provide strong hac~g  to Bank loans outsi~~ the EU 
because of:  ·  · 
•  the critical need to avoid any deterioration of  the Bank's ranking within the AAA ~tegocy;  . 
•  the significant risks inherent to lendirig to developing country' borrowers (as illustrated~ i"ritet 
alia, by the increase in arrears on Bank loans outside the EU; 
•- -the decline in the averaie quality of  Bank  borrowers outsid~ the EU that would r~sult.frci~ the 
ev~~al  ~nlargement of  the Union; 
•  ·the possible erosion of  the de facto preferred creditor status that has protected B'ank loans_ to  .. 
date:  ·  - · ·  . 
..  _._ 
.  -
3.  Main Operational Conclusions on Alternative G-..a:_rantee,  Schem~s· 
_  The main criteria to assess guarantee schemes should be their consistency with the Banl<!s 
Statates and lending policies, their effectiveness in the sense that th_ey do not jeop~dise  the Bank's 
role wi~hin the EU, an~  their operational effic~ency.  In view ofthese policy requirements, four. 
different guarantee schemes have been analysed on_the basis of  the Bank's current oper;ations ~d 
risk weighting outside the Union. ·  · ·  · -
· 3.1  ·Scheme 1:  Sharin$1osses on a project by project basis 
During the 1995 discussions on the Guarant~e Scheme, a few Memb_er States'suggested 
~hat the-possibility that the Bank and the Budget share risks· on a project by project basis should  be 
considered ..  Under this scP,eme,-the B~mk"would benefit-for instance from a 75% budg~tary  :  · -
guarantee, loan by loan regardless ofthe nature of  the borrower/guarantor.  In 'the event of 
default, the Bank wouid be entitled' to call on the budgetary guarantor up to only 75% pfthe 
·arrears, while it woul4 have to bear the remaining amount of  the loss.  In faCt,  such a scheme 
would be a plain loss-sh~g  arrangement  . 
. . The study shows that a project-by-project loss sharing 'scheme w~uld  most·lik~ly-be . 
. perceived as a weakening of  the guarantee scheme--and of  the Bank's balanc:e  sheet~-and.couid · 
result .in hi~er  borro~g  costs in capital markets.  This would jeopardise the Babk's activities 
. 3  Since the beginning of  Bank activities outside the EU. 1~  for about ECU. 1i billion ~ere signed while the net 
cost of calls on guarantees bas been limited to ECU 105 mn as' of end-1995.  ·  · within the EU and make it very difficult t6 maintain a high quality and diversified loan portfolio. 
Such a scheme would not be consistent with normal banking practices because it would result in 
certain losses whenever a debt service default occurs, forcing the Bank to bear'significant 
. sovereign and other p~litical risks that cannot be covered by adequate third party guarantees. 
Moreover, it would. not be consistent with the Bank's Statutes and lending policies because a 
partial budgetary coverage project-by-project cannot be deemed adequate:  This scheme would 
lead the ~ank  to Concentrate its operations in the. least vulnerable countries and discontinue 
operations in the  ·more risky ones, which could have profound political implications (transfers of 
responsibilities from the Council to the Bank). 
3.2  Schem.e 2:  A fiXed ceiling of budget commitment 
Under this scheme, the Budgetary Authority w~mld  fix the amount of  the budgetary 
guarantee at a certain specified level.  Within the given volume of  budgetary guarantee, the Bank 
would decide the level oflending and guarantee it deems appropriate in view ofthe risks involved 
in various countries and projects. 
The S!1Jdy concludes that this option has severe drawbacks that more than .of;fset its · 
possible benefit~:  it would be more costly to operate than·the current scheme, could harm the 
Bank's effectiveness ·as an essential tool of  the EU's economic policies, and would not be 
consistent with the Bank's Statutes (were it to be expected·to yield significant .budgel;a.ry savings) 
nor with the spirit of  the various mandates which give all co1.mtries concerned .access to Bank 
loans.  At any rate, a.S in scheme 1, it would  transfer to the Bank the responsibility of  choo.sing 
·betWeen countries and regions, which would not be compatible with policies so far. 
·. 
3.3. ·  Scheme 3:  The Bank's Pre.ferred  Guarantee Scheme 
The study concludes that. the most cq~-effective guarantee scheme that optimises the EU 
financing instruments is based on a blanket coverage ofBank loans outside the EU by the EC._ 
Budget.  Compared to the guarantee scheme· discussed last year, it could featUre a lower level of 
coverage proVided the· blanket coverage is globalised world-wide;  as proposed last ye_ar,  the 
blanket guarantee would cover only all loans signed minus loans cancelled and minus 
· reimbursements.  ·  ·  · ·  · 
The appropriate method to identify an adequate level ofblanket coverage ist.o do a 
· comparative analysis of  the Bank's gearing policy with that of  other SFis.  'rn that regard, one way 
to reStore for Bank loans outside the EU an equity ba.cking of 1: 1 typical in multilateral 
development banks would be for the budget to cover at least 60% of  risks, since under the Bank's 
g~g  policies, the capital of  the Bank can cover only 40% (1/2.5=40%) of  the overall risks of 
lending outside the Union.  · ·  · 
The. 60% globalised scheme would present considerable advantages compared to 
. alternative schemes;  ·  · 
•  it would help to solve the budgetary dilemma by limiting the bu,dgetary expenditure 
required to support Bank loans outside the EU.  Indeed, reducing the blanket coverage ~o ·-- ><.  i 
..  , .·; 
60~  from.the current 100%/75%, would reduce by 35% the budgetary co~t of . 
guaranteeing Bank loans;·  · 
.  .  .  .· 
•  it would safeguard the effectiveness:ofthe Bwik as -an essential instrument to promote the 
balanced development within the Union while lliniting at a rillni.mum the equity 
con~ributions by Member· States; 
•  it would be efficient from. an operational standpoint~ it would be as simple and 'inexpensive 
to operate as the current scheme;  ·  · 
•  it would be fully consistent with the Bank's statutes, mandates and current modus 
operandi:  . 
3.4.  Scheme 4:  Combining a separation of  politi~l and c~mmercial risks with a 
blanket coverage 
The Bank has. also given thought to the possibility· of  a guarantee scheme under- which, in 
· appropriate cases, risks could be shared between the EC Budget and the  Bank along the lines. 
suggested by the ECOFIN (political versu~ commercia.lrisks) .. The Commission sees attractions in 
such an. approach.  ·  · 
However; experience in political risk .·insurers has shown that se~al-a~g p6litical and 
commercial risks is most difficult and contentious, and that basing a guarantee scheme.o~  this 
distinction·could result in sigilificant operational .difficulties.  Mqreovei, the l3ank is exposed to a 
broad and complex series ofpoiitic'al risks because it lends to public and p'rivate 'sector borrowers.  · 
Given this background ~d  to be consistent-with the Bank's Statutes and leridrng policies; any 
. scheme based. on the separation of  political and commercial'risk~ should be ~tructured  as  follows: 
'I  •  I  '  '  '  '  ·• 
•  Case 1:  When adequate third party gu~antees can be secured.by the.Bank (this would be. the 
• 
• 
··case in general for loans to private sector.borrowers, which accounted for over 30% of  total 
Bank loans outside the EU in 1995), the budgetary guarantor wouid cover only the risks of 
currency non-transfer, expropriation, war and civil disturbance;  ail other risks would be taken 
by the Bank, and be covered by adequate guarantees by  first ·class banks or corporates. 
Case 2:  When no adequate third party guarantees can be mobilised by the Bank (this would ~e . 
the case essentially for loans to public sector entities), the loan would be covered fully by the 
budgetary guarantee.  In this case, the budget would cover essentially the nsk thatthe 
sovereign/public sector borrower/guarantor default on its obligations to the Banlc.  ·such a risk 
is in .fine exclusively political for the Bank (as expiained in§ 3:4 of  the study)..  .  .  .  '  " 
The overall coverage of  th~  Bank's total loan portfolio outside the EU could be. lowered to 
60% (down from the current 100%/7S%), as under the Bank's·preferied.sol).ltion, with the 
same favourable budgetary impli.cations as under Scheme 3.  However, it has to be kept in  ( 
mind that.  such a reduction  ·m the level Clf global coverage could be considered· only on the 
basis of  the average country creditworthiness resulting froin the current mandates. 
•  · Were such a scheme to be-adopted, appropriate loan-loss provisions would have to be 'made by 
.the Bank.  The cost of  these Would have to be'bome by the  Bank, .and uitimately by  the recipients of  the loans.  As a corollary, this type of  risk sharing may allow a iower proVisioning 
in the Guarantee Fund.  (This,would be a matter for the Budgetary ~uthority to decide). 
•  .In any event, judgement on the adequacy of  guarantees would have to be a  matter· of 
professional judgement by the Bank and its Board of  Directors. However, one could envisage 
that the p~rformance of  the new guarantee scheme be monitored. ex post.  · 
.  It is obvious that such scheme would, compared with the Bank's preferred s.olution.as 
described in§ 3.3., involve several operational drawbacks.  It would be more difficult and costly· 
. to administer, would involve risks of  litigation, would imply more labour-intensive project 
structuring, and could result in. considerable leg~ costs in case of  defatilt.  ·  · · 
· 4.  Proposals 
Given the urgency and importanbe of  the matter for the Bank's future activity ~utside the 
Union, in particular for the timely renewal of  important mandates and for .the Bank to be able to 
prepare these. new activities, the Management Committee Seeks the Board authority. to negotiate, 
in consultation with the Commission, a new guarantee scheme as follows: 
•  the Bank gives preference to a guarantee scheme on a globalised basis along the lines oi, and 
for the reasons given under, § 3 .3. above; ·  · 
" ..... 
•  however, the B~  should not exclude the possibility of  developing a vanant  under which the 
Bank  .could share risks withthe EC Budget along the iines ~xp~ained  unde~  §· 3.4  .. ·above; · : · 
. The Board would be kept infcmned on the development of  these negotiations  . 
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.  Introduction 
.  .  The.ECOFIN asked the Bank and the Commission, in Noyember 1995, to report b~fore 
the end of 1996 on a new guaniritee system (see ECOFIN decision in Annex 1  ). The study waS·;·  · 
launched because of:  · 
•  ' a growing aw~eness  'or'the n~ed to 'reconcile 'pressing budget~  constraints with'the  '.\ 
· .expansion of  Bank lending outside the EU to· support the EU's_extemal policy.  ·.  r:·:·  ..  ·'  ~' ·  Y: 
•  the feeling by a fewM~mber.States that the system under which all risks involved, in Bank 
lending_ outside the EU are covered fully by a budgetary guarantee should evolve,' and that. 
the Bank could take part of  project risks on its portfolio.  ·  · · 
. ·., 
The budge~  guarantee·~ssue·is of  utmost impo~nce  to the Bank and the Union. · · 
'  Over the long run, any decision. on this issue could have profound implications on the Bank's 
.  activities both within and outside the Union.  In the short run, the guarantee issue is an unportant 
element that conditions the timely and global renewal ofthe. three mandates ending in·l996  . 
(Central and Eastern Europea.ii  Countries~CEEC-,  ·Mediterranean countries-MED-, and Asia· and 
Latin America--ALA),  Indeed, the Comrilission stated repeatedly that programmed appropriati9ns 
for the Fund together with the current provisioriing rule are not consistent witl1 the renewai of  the 
various Bank maridates to lend outside the Community at their current level,  ~d  would ·anow no 
new macro-economic assistance loan from 1997 onwards.  .  . 
.  .  .  .~·  - .~ ..  ~':.,.~ . . _  ....... ·  ·;  ·..- ...  ,  '  ,  .  . .  .  ··.  .  .  .  ,.·.··:·<:':-~r~·~-
.  The present report is a  prelimiriary version of  the stiidy the Bank and the CommisSion. 
might preserit to the ECOFIN'.  It aims at' proposing soiutions predicated on a rigorous and 
thorough analysis of:  '  ·  :  '  f  . 
• 
• 
.  ' 
Bank lending outside: the' E:l./m' the ~ontext of the Bank's giobal. activity an~  th~'  ~~ridated 
risks/constraints;  ·  .·  ·  .  .  ·  :  ·  · 
current· practices in other financial institutions (in particular Supranational. Financiai . 
Institutions--SFis- and Expo'it Credit Agencies--ECAs--) as well as in institutio'ris /· 
specialised in risk coverage,. to identify the relevant "state of  the art" practices in a rapidly · 
evolving business  enviroll.ffi~nt.  .  ·  · 
·The report features three Parii  ·Part 1 presents the specificities qf  the Blmk that explain 
the need for strong budgetary guarantees on Bank loans outside the,EU.  Part 2 Presents tpe 
structUre, operations and performance; of  the current budgetary guarantee ·Scheille .. Part 3. provides 
a critical-assessment of  various guarantee schemes alte·rnative to the current scheme.  . ·  · . 
;  :; .  .;  :  .  ~ :'.' ~:  ·.~  ' 
The BanlC's  p~eferred'  option is presented in.§3.3. arid consists: in a guarantee ~Cherne based. 
· on a blanket. coverage of  Bank loans outside the EtJ (with the blanket coverage being lowered 
'possibly to 60%, from the present 100%175%}and that would operate broadly along the lines of 
the present scheme, thus preserving its simplicity and cost-effectiveness.  In contrast, the services 
·  . of  the Commission favour another guarantee scheme, co.mbining a risk sharing between the Bank · 
. and,the budget along the commercial versus political lines with a blariket coV:erage (see§ 3.4). 
While the Bank considers that the latter guarantee scheme is feasible and consistent with its: - 2 -
Statutes and policies, it would nonetheless have operational drawbacks that make a gl.iarantee 
scheme based oii a straight blanket coverage preferable. 
·.·. 
l.  . .  .. The Specificities of the Bank and the Need .for .Strong 
·Guarantees on Loans outside the EU 
:_J_ 
1.1  The Bank's tiered dual mandate imposes a uniqu·e· competitiven~s imperative 
The Em is the "house .bank" of  the European Union provid.ing long-term loans for capital 
investment to further EU policies with r~sources raised in the international capital markets.  As 
such, the Bank has been given a dual ma·ndate that is.almo.st unique among supranational 
financial institutions  ·(SFis) to finance investment projects both inside ~d  ~utside of  the European 
Union.  While the Bank was created to promote ~conomic  development and cohesion within the  . 
EC, it has also been agreed since the early 1960s that using the Bank as an instrUment of  the EC's · 
aid and external policies was the least-cost solution for the Community (see §  1.2). 
However, the.re has always been a general. agreement that the ·Bank's main rerillt is the 
promotion of  economic development and  cohesi~n  within the Union, and that financial co-
operation with third countries should not interfere with· the Bank's main task.  This was 
stressed·again in the November ECOFIN decision~. Because ofthis'tiered du.al mandate, the 
Bank-has a unique customer base that ranges from prime European borrowers-(bankand..  · 
corporate AAAs who  ·.are in a position to compare systematically the terms "pffered by the Barik to• .. 
. those of  alternative sources offinance) to weaker borrowers both within and outside the lJ.nion. 
. .  Therefore, the Bank is, more than any other SFI, ·subjected to the imperative to .be·.·:··-
competitive in international capital markets, i.e., has to be able to raise ·resources in  · 
international capital markets on· the finest terms possible, if  it is to carry out successfully its task . 
within the Union in fuU  compliance with  Its Statutes and the subsidiarity principles.  Excellent 
asset quality, solid financial structure and strong membership support have enabled the Bank to 
secure a AAA rating from all rating agencies and to be uruversally seen as one of  the best credit iri. 
the world within the AAA category.  This has enabled the Bank to se.Gure the best possible terms 
in international capital markets, and to raise funds at terms often more attractive than other 
AAA credits.  This has been an essential asset to the  .Bank given its customer base and has 
enabled the Bank to maintain a high qualitY and balanced loan portfolio.' The imperative to 
offer very attractive ierms to its customers is reflected also in the Bank's on-lending margin, which 
is the finest of  those practised by SFis (See Annex 2).  · 
A necessary condition for the Bank to be able to continu~ to raise resources in 
capital markets at the. best possible 'terms is for i.ts financial strength to remain 
unquestioned.  An important factor influencing the  perception~ofthe  ~ank's financial strength is 
the quality of  its loan portfolio, which is essentially determiried by'theJinancial viability of  its 
borrowers and guarantors. The perception of  the strength of  the Bank's loan portfolio outside the 
EU depends in part on the budge~  guarantee. 
·.  ~ ·'  ,. Th~efore, the perception that the guarantee scheme for -the Baruc's operations outside the 
Union ·is weakened would most likely have negative implications on the perception ofEffi 
bondholders and :the assessment of  credit 'rating agencies and could result -in higher borrowing 
co~. This wotiid jeopardise the Bank's role in its core markets, make it very difficult for 
tb~  Bank to maintain a high quality·and balanced loan portfolio, and jeopardise the 
fulfdmentofthe Bank's m·anda:ie within the Community, which would be detrim.ental to the· 
Bank, its shareholders. and its ¢ustomers·.  .  . ·  ·  .  ..  .  -.  ..  ·  .·  .  '  .  ·· · . .  .  .  ,  · 
1.2  .·  ''l:'b~ :Bank's rmancial. structure is cost-effective to shareholders but is not 
consistent with inherent risks oflending to-developing countries 
·  Tlie Barile ·waS Siven a gearing policy  sigru£c~tly  less. restrictive than that of  most other 
~upranational financial-institutions (SFis  ), reflecting the nature·. of  ris~ to be taken by. the  · 
· iristi~tion (most'  of~ts  :lending is to be· extended in Member States), thus limiting the budgetary  . 
cost  of'the insti~~on  fodts shateholde~s. By statUte, the Bank's loan and guarantee cOmmitments 
cannot exceed 250% of  5u~sCribed capital, which is considerably higher than for most. other SF Is 
which are limited toJending no more than 100% of  their paid-in and callable 'capital.  (see Annex 3 
. for a  comparison of-SFI'sfinancial structure).  The;only o~er  notable exceptions to the 1:1 
gearing ratio ru.Ie are the Nordic InvestmentB3.nJ:c (2.5: 1 as for the Bank) and the IFC (with an 
implicit g¢aring ratio' of 3.3: 1 resulting from the rule that the sum of  paid-iri cap~tal;  re~ed 
earning and.genern..lloss:reserves must· be at least 30%.ofrisk assets).  · .  -·· 
.  ..  .  '  .. 
. ·.Being ina:naged  coil~I'Vatively, all SFls tend to maintain thefractualgearing_at a much  · 
· lQwerJev~l than _allowed. under their statutes.  The:Bank and  the.Nordi~ Investment Bank O'n.B)· 
nave the high,es(a¢tual gearing ratios; measured either with paid-in capital or subscrib~ capital, 
·  which reflects u.ilarge paifihe higher average quality of  their loan portfolio:  Despite hiiber  · 
.gearing:ai)d le~erage limits; iFC has. been more equity.:.intensive than the Bank, with a gearlhg ra:tio 
measu~ed·  on paid in:capital atl47%, compared to-427% for. the World Bank, some'600% for NIB 
andsome'660%.for tl_ie Bank (See Annex 3),  1  Other  S.FI~ tend tohave_very conservative gearing  · 
ratios and'Yh~·lenclmg aCtivities are therefore more equity-intensive (i.e.; more costly in budgetary 
tetms fer th.eir  sharehold~s)·than in the Bank, due  tO'.t~e inherent riskS oflending to developing 
c<;m~tJies.  ·  ·  .  1  ·  ••  ·  ·  · 
.  .  . 
SUJ:Iranational Financial Institutions;  Gearing Ratios 
. -
1  This refieets lFCs statutocy requirement that subscribed capital be largely paid in, which distinguishes the rFC ·  from all other SFis that J:lave c3pital bases consisti.Dg largely ofcallable capital.:  · 
.J. 
:'-
.  I -4-
-
In sum, the Bank's financial structure requires considerably less budgetary support 
from, and represents a smaller contingent liability on, its shareholders than in other SFis. 
At present, only ECU 4 of  paid-in capital (ECU 13 of  paid-~ capital and "reserVes) are needed to 
support every ECU 100 lent·by the Bank while ECU 8 (respectively ECU 21) are necessary in 
typical Multilateral Development Banks (MDB including AfDB; AsDB, IADB and ffiRD) and 
some ECU 34 (respectively ECU 50) in IFC and EBRD, the very high equity-intensity of  the latter 
institutions reflecting the high risk inherent to their lending and equity investment activities  .  . 
targeting the private sector. 
Were the EU to set up a new European Development Bank taking over the Bank's 
activities outside the EU (or to create a special section within the Em with its own balance sheet 
and capitalised separately) with a financial structure comparable to other SFis, the necessary paid-
. in capital (and reserves) would be in the range ofECU 2 billion (based on the average actual 
gearing ofMDBs) to ECU 5 bn (based on the IFC and EBRD actual gearing).  Therefore, the use 
of  the Bank to carry out lending mandates outside the EU  with strong budgetary guarantee~ 
results in substantlal budg~tary savings in terms of equity contributions by Member States  · 
(between ECU 0.8 billion and ECU 3.6 billion), which more than offset the budgetary ccists of  the 
current guarantee scheme. 
Capital-Intensity of  ~FI  Lending Activity (U94) 
.«c.J• .,  ..............  ..,..,.ICC' Ita ...  , 
• 
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However, the Bank's.  balance sheet structUre that results from its gearing policy is not 
consistent with the significant risks inherent to lending to developing country borrowers, in 
particular the catastrophic risks such as those that occur, for instance, on the occasion of  debt 
crisis which affect developing countries on a more or less regular basis.  The necessary · 
. condition to ensure the compatibility between a highly leveraged balance sheet, operati.ons 
in developing countries and access to capital markets on the finest terms has been the·. 
availability of verj solid budgetary guarantees to cover loans outside the territory of 
member states.  Rating agencies have repeatedly ~ted  that a high geanng ratio at the Baclc is 
not a material weakness because of  strong asset quality (  aJ!d firm shareholder_  support).  For  .its - 5-
operations !n member states, asset quality is predicated on the strong creditworthines~ of  Bank 
borrowers/guarantors, while for its operations outside the EU asset quality is, from the standpoint 
of  rating agencies, largeJy predicated on the strength ofthe budgetary guaranlee.  (See ~eetion  2 
for. a presentation of  the BaTik's current budgetary gtiarantee scheme. Of  note, NIB has a similar·. 
·financial structure ·and its operations.outside the Nordic area are-covered by very strong budgetary 
guarantees. ·2)  ·  ·  · 
·.,. 
1.3  A Unique Modus Ope~andi  Predicated ori the Availability of Strong Guarantees 
.  .  - . .  '  . 
1.3.1.  ~olitical nature of  Bank mandates to lend outside the EU 
•  .  .  •  1 
. Bank  lending outside the Union is politically motivated and is based primai1J.y on . 
decisions taken by the Council ofMinisters (see Annex 4 for a sum.rilary of  the various mandates 
.  to lend outside the EU).  The .choice ofbeneficiary countries is not only subject to tfie Bank's 
financial. and economic criteria, but first and foremost, the result of political considerations 
· that often expose the Bank to significant sovereign· riskS.  lri MED and CEECs, the .Bank 1s 
' expected to lend to each and every country of  the area with' own resources, whatever t4e· .  . 
creditworthiness of  the country.  In the ACP region, some flexibility is. provided by the availability 
· ofbudgetary funds managed by the Bank: on  behalf of  the EC (risk-capital), which.enables the· 
Bank to use own resources only in those countries with the highest relative creditworthiness. 
Regarding the ALA mandate, more freedom was given to the Bank which is not under form3.I  . 
obligationto lend to each and every eligible country,  .  .  .  . 
Also, the .Bank  is almost the only SFI that operates in coun~ries that are not 'its 
shareholders. These countries are not directly iriterested in the financial well-being.ofthe :Sank 
and cannot be subject to the same ki.q.d of  pressure than countrie~ in default to institutionsin which· 
they have a stake.  .  · 
The necessary corollary of  these essentially political decisions~  has been the availability of 
strong budgetary guarantees which have obViated the politically:.sensitive need for the Bank or the 
·Commission to di.scriminate among countries according to their creditworthiness.  Any 
significant weakeningof  such guarantees would necessitate a radical  ·shift in the' 
:geographical allocation of loans outside the·Union to protect the integrity of the B~nk's 
balance sheet, which would be' necessary to enable the Banlc ·to carry qut ,its main task within the 
Union.  It would imply a drastic limitation of  Bank lending 'outside the EU to projeCtS/couf}tries 
where the Bank can secure guarantees deemed adequate as per Art, 18 (3) ofthe.Sta~tes  .. (see· 
§1.4)  '  .  . 
Such a limitation resulting from sound and norm;U banking principleS would have. two 
main implications:  ·  ·  · 
•  it would prevent the Bank from implei'nentirig its mandates as· defined and interpreted to 
date; 
. 2  Loans under the Baltic Investment Facility and the Baltic Investment ProgrcuDme are fully guaranteed by NlB. 
:members for princip3.l and interest repayments. NIB lending· in other developing cotintries benefit frbii;~·a 9o% 
guarantee from member states ofboth principal and intetest_payments. ·  ·. 
.  ' - 6 -
•  it would -shift the essentially political decision to lend in.  certain countries from the P.olitical 
Authority to the Bank. 
It is important to note that institutions with gearing ratios similar to that of the Bank 
have much less constraints on their geographical asset allocation, whlch results in a heavier 
concentration of  loans in a limited number of  developing countries that rank high in terms of 
creditworthiness.  About half of  NIB loans outside th~ Nordic area ·is concentrated in Asia (NIB 
would not normally lend in countries rated below B+/B 1) while·  IFC concentrates two-third of  its 
;  . 
lending in only 15 countries (out of  some 120 countries in which IFC operates) and undertakes the 
bulk of  its lending in countries  rated·  B+ and above.  Given that the Barik has. had to allocate loans  · 
in developing countries as per its various mandates, the average quality ofborrowers and·ofthe 
first-line guarantors tends to be lower than fqr IFC and NIB. (see Chart below and Annex 8) 
I  Geographical Asset Allocation 
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·  One of  the specificities of  the Bank is that its operations outside the  EU include ffiRD-type 
operations (loans to middle-income d~veloping countries, mostly to the public sector with .· 
sovereign guarantee); IDA-type operations (loans tolow-ineo.me developing countrie's with risk-
capital, mostly to the public sector) and IFC-type operations (loans and equity funding for private 
sector entities generally in middle-income countries).  For all these operations, a  flat and narrow 
margin of25 bp over borrowing costs·is·  charged, regardless of  the nature of  the borroweL  The. 
availability of  a full budgetary guarantee on loans outside the EU has made ·it possible to 
handle these diverse operations in a single ~stitution with limited staff resources .and to 
price loans to all b~rrowers uniformly.  · 
The Bank's interest·margin on Joans outside the Union 1s comparable to the ffiRD's lending 
. terms ·and principles.  Other Multilateral Development Banks either adopt similar pricing schemes 
with higher spreads (50 bp +a 1% commitment fee at the AfDB, 40 bp at the AsD:S, 50 bp at NIB, ...  see_ Annex 2) or, particularly in these institutions that lend essenti&lly to  the private ·sector, 
price their loans individually based on their risk analysis and in line with market prices. In  the latter 
institutions that target private sector borrowers, interest margins are typically higher than in other 
SFisto make the high loan-loss proVisions that are required to match the ri~kiness of  their 
portfolio.  (The average lending spread at IFC is of  some 300 bp). 
.  . 
Despite the Bailk's uriiform pricing policy, Bankloans to the private sector can still be.· 
deemed to be priced in line with the market because when a sovereign guarantee is not 
available (which is increasingtythe case"forprivate sector projects), the borrower is asked to set 
up an adequate gu~antee  for- the Bank loan and to bear the correspond~g costs.  In this con~exi; . 
the Bank has acted in good complementarity with its commercial guarantors (first class·_  ... 
· banks or corporates), sharing responsibilities to structure the fina~dng  package· and 
assessing/pricing credit risks.  Thereby, the Bank has ensured that ~sks  were priced explicitly in 
line with the market; thus avoiding undue subsidies..  Also, this provides an appropriate protection 
to the budgetary guarantor (see §  1.4).  .  ·  · 
. 
The Bank's unique modus operandi is predicated on the availability of a strong 
budgetary guaran~ee  scheme. The latter has enabled the B~  to operate fleXibly in extremely 
diverse situations.  It has provided the equity-type backing that has made it possible for the Bank 
. to· enter mto IBRD-type operations with public sector borrowers in developing countries.  Also, it 
· has been sufficiently flexible to allow the Bank to  finance private sector borrowers (1FC-type 
operations) and to put in place, inthese cases~ ~rigirial gUarantee structures urider·which·  : 
commercial guarantors cover all credit  risks (thereby protectirig the budgetary guarantor) except 
. the currency non-transfer ris~~-es$entially a political'risk  .. -, which is covered  ·m most c:ases. by the . 
·budgetary guar3:flt6r,  (see §  1.4.afici Annex 5).  ·  .  · .  .  · ·  ·  · · _ _  .  ··_ 
In the absence .of adequate gu~raritees for. these ope'rations, the Bank would most 
likefy have to limit drastically its geographical presence anp inqease its interest: margin on  ; 
loans outside the EU to make loan-loss provisions. Of  note, the Bankwould most likely have to 
make higher loan loss provisions than other multilateral development banks because of  its lower . 
relative equity base.  The increasingly competitive situation faced by the-Bank within. the EU and 
in_ a fey; .countries outside the Union  would rule out any uniform increase in the margin, which  . 
. would confront the Bank (and .the EC) with the politically sensitive issues of  ranking countries, 
·setting country exposure limits, and differentiating lending rates according to perceived  ..  · 
creditworthiness.  .  ·  · 
· Without appropriate budgetary guarantees, it would. be virtually impossible to  ·c~ntinue to _ 
conduct. the Bank'~ broad range of  operations outside the EU in the present structures and with.the 
· limited staff resources allocated currently in the B.ank to lending outside the EU.  9ther SFis  ·are. : 
endowed generally with considerably more human resources than the Bank where turnover per 
head in 1995 (for operations Ol!tside the EU) was about .seven t~es  ~  high as in the: IFC  and th~ 
EBRD (see Chart bdow).3  (Such comparisons should not be seen as judgements on-the relative. · 
efficiency of  the various SFis but are· aimed only at putting in perspective the st~gloperating . 
.  '  ' 
3  Operations outside the EU amount~.  to ECU 2.8 billion and mobilised only  ~me  200. staff. members in the Bank 
(some 100 P  A staff and about the same number of  ass~ated  staff from the various other. Directorates); while IF<:: . 
.  employed 1,224 persons in FY 1995 for a total turnover ofECU 2.2 bn and tb,e EBRD employed"964 persons for a 
total turnover ofECU 2.0 bn.  ·  /'  ·  ·  · -------- ,----------------------------------
. 8. 
cost implicatio~ of  the kinds of  modus operandi of  the various SFis that result from their specific 
mandates, statutory constraints and market environment.  In its lending activities outside the EU, 
the Bank works closely with the EBRD and lFC and values their contribution.) . 
Turnover per head 
n'iiiOn s of s:::u 
EIB (PA)  EBRD  IF  C. 
.  . 
1.4  The statutory requirement for strong guarantees 
.  . 
Given this background, as and when Member States have calleq on the_  Bank to assume 
responsibility for certam aspects of  the Union's co-operation policy, they have always agreed to -
introduce, for its loans from own resources outside the Union, arrangements under which such 
loans are covered either by the joint and several guarantee .of  the Member States (ACP) or  by a 
guarantee· given in the name ofthe Union (MED, CEEC, ALA, and South Africa).  This has been 
seen right}y as .a necessary corollary to protect the Bank against the risks assoCiated with lending 
operations in non-Union countries to.whichthe Bank would not have exposed itselfwithout a 
·. · mandate from the Community instructing it to take part in the Union's external activities.  . .  • . 
.  . 
The Bank's statutes and the various decisions made regarding budgetary guar~tees reflect 
the awareness·  of  the need to protect the integrity of  the Bank's balance sheet to ensure that the 
institution can continue to borrow on the finest terms in the international capital markets to 
preserve the attractiveness of  Bank loans within the Union. 
By its Statutes, the Bank has to require adequate guarantees for each of  its lending 
operations.  Article 18(3) of the Statutes provides that when lending to a bOdy other than a 
Member State, the Bank shall make the loan conditional either on "a guarantee from the Member 
State in whose territory the project will be carried out or ... on other adequate guarantees." 
When allowing by way of  derogation the Bank to finance under Art. 18(1) of the Statutes 
projects outside the Union in develqping cou.ntries, the Board of Governors has, in analogy 
to Art. 18(3), always made such derog.ation conditional upon the availability of a Member · 
State or a Union guarantee as most lending-outside of the Union was extended to public 
sectors borrowers with sovereign guarymtees, none of  which could be consid.ered an 
adequate guarantee as per Art 18(3). 
This being said, the Bank  ·has always done its utmost to protect its budgetary 
· guarantors by selecting appropriately strong borrowers and setting up satisf(l.ctory first line - 9-
guarantees._ requiring for each and every project additional security from developing country 
governments and/or project sponsors. Until recently, the bulk of these first line guarantees 
were provided by sovereign guarantors, which reflected the fact that most of borrowers 
outside the EU were public sector entities.  · 
Ho~ever, this situation is changing rapidly as several large operations in the various 
regions outside the EU have involved non-sovereign guarantees for project sponsored·  by private 
sector borrowers.  In 1995, 31% of  the Bank's new loans outside the EU. were guaranteed by 
a non-sovereign entity ~ at end 1995, ECU 1.1 bn (over 10% of  the total loan portfolio outside . 
the EU) was covered by a non-sovereign guarantee.  (see Annex 5 for the detail on the type of 
non-sovereign guarantees secured by EIB). 
I 
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Such a shift in the structure of  the Bank's first-line guarantees is in line with global m~ket 
trends and basically reflects the world-wide privatisation drive and the increased reluctance on the 
part of  governments to grant sovereign guarantees as they strive to implement sounder fiscal 
policy. (This is reflected in particular by the recent incl':lsion oflong-term loans under the IMF. 
external credit ceilings).  The rapid increase in the use of  non-sovereign guarantees results also 
from the Bai11c's ability to carve out non-transferability.  and currency non-convertibility risks from 
the coverage of  third party guarantors.  ·  · 
2.  Structure and Use of the Current Guarantee ·scheme 
2.1  The current guarantee scheme 
To date, two kinds of  budgetary guarantees have been granted in support ofBank loans 
outside the Union:  a joint and several guarantee hy Member States for ACP and OCT mandates, 
and Community budget guarantee for all other mandates (see Table below; Annex 4 provides a 
complete presentation of  the guarantee schemes associated to the Bank's various mandates  ,to lend 





Current Guarantee Schemes 
ltegion  Budgetary  Level ofblanket 
·guarantor  coverage · 
ACP  Memb.er States  75% 
1\fED·  .EC  75% 
CEEC  Ec·.  . 100% 
ALA  EC  10:0%· 
., 
South Africa  EC  100% 
.  ·.  For the MED and ACP mandates, budgetary guarantees'have b:een~provided as blanket 
guarantees, meaning that, up to the stated\percentage ofl_oans gra.nted·under each mandate, the 
guarantor (Membei.States or the t,Jnion) covers. 100% of  all repayment defaults on individual 
Ioaris, until Ute 75% threshold is reached on a cumulative basis~  the Bank would have to assume 
the losses. above. the threshold.·  ·  ·  · 
::'.  2.2  The Guarantee Fund:  Structure an4 Implications  _for the Bank 
... 
' 
To ·ensure 'a greater budgetary discipline; and transparency, the Edinburgh Co:uncil. decided 
41· December 1992  to set up a Guarantee Fund to cover the risks resulting from the guarantees . 
granted by the EC or. loans extended. directly by the EC. · The Guarantee Fund is essentially a  · 
financial bUffer·airned at helping the·EC proVide forrisks and limit the fiscal implications of  . 
possible ~alls on the budgetar)' guarantee; but does not  limit the contingent liability of  the Budget. 
The Fund covets Community guarantees granted to the EIB and Euratom, loans  for macro- · 
economic assistance granted by  the EC to  third countries, and EC guarantees for commercial · 
~~~;  .  '•  . 
·  · :  ·  .  Th~  operational rules c;>f th~ Fund  provide that thes~ annual transfers should normally be 
equivaienfto 14% of  the principal of  operations covered by the EC guarantee or extended by the 
· EC.  (See  Annex 6)  (Transfers to the Fund forJoans extended under the MED mandate that 
benefit from a 75% globalised guarantee are equivalent to only 10:5% of  the amount of  the loans 
extended under this mandate).  The percentage is to remain at 14% until the amount Qfthe . 
Guarantee Fund is equal tc;>  10% of  total.loans extended by the EC or covered by an EC guarantee 
("montant objectif').  ·  · 
The 'Fund exists legally since October 1994 and the :first disbursements to me. Fund were · 
Il)ade in De~ember 1994 (ECU-294 million).  In 1995, the budgetary reserve available fodhe  · 
proVisioniitg. of  the Guarantee Fund amounted to ECU 323 million.  For the-following years and 
· until1999, ECU 323 million at 1995 prices will be available by the Bildget each'year for· 
provisioning the Fund.  ·  ·  · 
The Guarantee Fund acts effectively as a  credit ceilh:~g on EC lending operations and  · 
puts a quantitative restraint on ~he Commuruty's capacity to grant and/or guarante~ loans in  . \  .  .  - 11  -
re'spect of  t!_llr~ countries.  ·Given th~ Fund's provisioning rules, the progran1med appropriation 
provide for an annual ceiling of  some ECU 2.2-2.5 billion during the 1996-99 period. 
2.3  Bank Experience with Arrears and Calls on Budgetary Guarantees 
Despi~e the very significant .increase m  Bank lendmg outside the EU, Bank  calls-on the 
.budgetary guarantee have been minor (see Annex 7).  The present systerri of  guarantees has 
functioned very satisfactorily:  ·  ·  · 
•  From an administrative Staridpoil)t, it has been very simple and cost-~ffective to operate  .  .  . 
in the Bank and the Commission. 
•  From a budgetary point ofview, Bank calls on the budgetary guarantees have b~en 
minor.  Since the beginning of  Bank activities outside the EU and up· to the end of  199~, 
loans for about ECU 12  billion were signed while the_ net cost of  calls on  guar~tees  has; 
been limited to ECU 105 mn as of  end-1995, which represents 0.8% o"ftotal creditopeii~d 
(and 1. 5~  of  disbur~ed loans) sinc;,e the beginning of  Bank operations under the v¢ous  -~ 
Conventtons,_ Protocols and Agreements.  ·  .  ..  ·  -- .  · 
I  ' 
The small amount of  arrears and the resulting limited calls •  on guarantees are all the  .more 
remarkable that the  Bank operates in countries .with a relatively weak  creditworthiness.  (82% of 
loans·outside the EU.are in countries rated below investment grade and one third ~e  in countries 
_ · rated Band below, i:e., the-lower tier of  the soveieigri risk spectrum).  ·  - · 
:  The particularly low level of  calls on guarante~s results from: 
.  · •  ·the financial soun.dness ofthe Bank's borrowers and th~ ecoriornlc and technical 
soundness or  the projects financed by-the Bank; (Rating agencies and all  insti~tions met · 
,·during the _preparation of  this report insist on the paramount importance of  these aspects). 
•  The first-line gua~ntees secured by the Bank that hav~·  effe~tively protected the .  . 
EC/Member States budgets.  As mentionned in§ 1.4, the bulkofthese first line guarantees 
have been sovereign guarantees granted by gov~rrunents  .on the territory ofwhichBank 
· financed projects were located. · This is evolving rapidly, as the Baitk is increasingly  .... 
mobilising stronger non-sovereign guarantees to protect the budgetary guarantor. ' 
I  •  •  . 
•  Althougli the average sovereign guarantor has a relatively low creditworthiness, the.Bank · 
has experienced few defaults because ofthe continued willin~ess ofborrowers· and 
guarantors to accord de facto preferred creditor  st~tus to. the Bank.  · 
·•  When arrears emerged and guarantees were called upon, the Bank has done its utmost to 
recover these arrears and refund the budgetary guarantor.  To date, the rec9ve:ry rate has 
. been of  some 52%, which is broadly in line with o_ther SFis  ..  To date, the Barlk has rie~er 
had to write loans off  its books.  .  ·  ·  · 
Nonetneless, arrears to the Bank have trended upwards and. calls on guarautees have 
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To date, defaults have been recorded only in the ACP and Mediterranean regions, 
and have· resulted essentially from difficulties arising from politiall and  .macroeconomic · 
problems, not from typical project risks falling more directly within the Bank's responsib.ility.  As 
of  31/12/95, arre¥S to the Bank amounted to ECU 69 million in A  CPs and ECU 74 million in the 
MED region, which is equivalent to respectively 3.9% and  1.8% of  loans disbursed in each region 
{respectively 2.9% and l.2% of  credit' opened) since the beginning ofBank operations under the 
respective Mandates.  ·  · 
InStalments settled by guarantee calls and still owed to guarantors by defaulting debtors 
were respectively ECU 41 million and ECU 63 million as of  end 1995.  These accounted for 2.3% 
· and 1. 6% respectively of  disbursed loans in the ACP and MED regions.  For operations in Central · 
'and Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin America and South Africa, there have been, up to now,.no calls . 
.  ·  ~n  the budget guarantee. 
The following table shows the existing defaults as at 31/12/95. 
Covered by Me11,1ber States  . Risks covered byE<;:: budget 
ECU 68.9 million, of.which:  ECU 74.0 million, ofwhich: 
-
Nigeria  58%  ex  .. ,yugoslavia  100% 
Congo  12% 
Liberia  6% 
Zai're  8% 
Togo  2% 
·In ACP countries, arrears h~ve·increased steadily sinee 1987 owing to poor performance 
by 'several countries, reflecting poor macro-economic management and ·political inst.ability. 
Countries mentionne~ in the Table above account for the bulk of  defaults to date; some other '- 13-
countries h~ve come' in and out of  the li_st of  defaulters to the Bank  It is unclear that the situation 
will improve under the ACP mandate.  Regarding the arrears under the MED mandate, two_cycles. 
have been recorded with the Lebanon crisis in the late 1980s when arrears reached some ECU 37 
'million before being cleared in  1991;  since then, the Yugoslavia crisis has led to the accumulation 
of  arrears, which as ofend-1995 ha~ reached ECU 74 million.  · 
In sum, the current guarantee scheme has. been fully justified, has been' used in a 
responsible manner by the Bank which has never used it as a cover to accept unreasonable. 
risks, and has served the Union, the Bank and its customers well.-. 
3.  Analysis of alternative guarantee schemes 
This chapter provides an analysis of  the various-gucrrantee schemes that were envisaged. 
during the discussions that led to the ECOFJN decision to launch the study.  In' each case, the  -
·principle, struCtUre, pros and cons of  the-scheme and its implications for the Bank (risks; balance 
sheet structure, pricing, etc.) are discussed: in view of  the basiC policy considerations that result 
from the_ analysis presented in Parts· 1 a~d 2.  -·  · 
These various guarantee schemes w~e  judged in light of  three basic p_olicy  r~quirements: 
•. Consistency with the Bank's Statutes andlending policies:  The scheme 
must be fully consistent with the Bank's Statutes, in particular Art. 18(1) and Art.  18(3).  Art. 
18(3) provides that any loaq has to carry ... a· guarantee from the Member State in whose ' 
territory the proj~ct will be carried out or ... other.adequate guarantees·."  When allowing by 
way of  derogation the Bank to fiilance -under Art. 18( 1) ·of the _Statutes  project~ outside the 
_ Union; the Board of  Governors has, in analogy to Art. 18(3), always inadesucli derogation 
conditional upon  the availability of  a Mereber State (for the ACP mandates) or an EC 
guarantee. 
•  Effectiveness:  The scheme should ·safeguard the effectiveness. of the Ba11;k as an 
essential instrument to promote the balanced development within the Union and to finance 
investments in third countries.· More .than any other SFI, the Bank has to borrow in capital 
markets on the most favourable terms to be in a position to fulfil its mission ~thin  the Union 
and to meet_ the requirements of  its customers which are very different from-:and much more 
• 
. demanding than--the customers of  other SFis.  Were rating agencies arid investors to fear a 
weakening in the Bank's balance sheet, ihe Bank's ability to finance investment's within the . 
,Union on attractive conditions could be severely jeopardis~d,_ . 
Operational efficiency:  The scheme should be efficient from an operational 
standpoint.  It should be simple to operate in the Bank and the Commi~sion  and imply no 
significant change to the way the Bank is stru_ctured and operates outside the Union. 
''  '  •.  ~  .  .  '  .  .  .. - 14-
-
3.1 .  Scheme 1:  Sharing losses on a project by project basis 
•  Structure of the scheme 
During the 1995 discussions on the Guarantee Scheme, a few Member States suggested 
that the possibility that the Bank and the budget share risks on a project-by-project basis· should be 
Considered.  They. argued that such a sharing of  risks could provide a better framew6rk for the 
· Bank's management and the Board of  Directors to make decisions ori individual loans  .. (It should· 
be noted in that :regard that up to now, debt service defaults have been entirely due to political 
risks, .which invalidates the argument that an indiscriminate risk s~aring in all projects would ·  · 
· improve incentives.)  ·  · 
Under this ~heme,  the Bank would benefit for Instance from a 75% budgetary guarantee, 
loan by loan, regardless of  the nature of  the borrower/guarantor.  In an event of  default, the Bank 
would be entitled to call on the budgetary guarantor up to only 75% of  the loss, while it would 
· have to bear the remaining amount of  the loss.  In fact, such a scheme is better characterised as a 
. loss-sharing arrangement. 
•  Pros 
This scheme would be simple to operate and result in a smalF iitcrease in the guarantee.  . 
·.potential of  budgetary resources (resulting from the move to 75% ~overage of  all projeCts) and m  .· 
a somewhat slower U$e of  the guarantee fund in case of  d~faults.  Whereas  ·under the current 
guarant~  schem~  ECU 12.8 in:. the Guarantee Fund are needed to support ECU 100 lent,.the ·. 
alternative scheme would necessitate only ECU 1  0.5, resulting in a 22% increase in the giiarantee 
potential of  budgetary resources.  Tt.Us gain is quite modest compared to the increased'·leverag~ of 
budgetary resources that would result from the 'schemes proposed in§ 3.3 and 3 .4. of  the Study. 
•  Cons 
• .  This guarante~  scheme is not consistent with normal banking principles because it 
would result in certain losses whenever a debt service-default occurs.  It would force the-
Bank to bear some of  the significant sovereign risks that resuli·from the political nature of 
the various Mandates under which the Bank-operates outside the ~nion., Mandates that 
give the Bank little latitude to select its countries of  operation.  · 
•  This alternative is not consistent with the. Bank's statutes that call for adequate. 
guarantees on each and every loan extended by the Bank.  hideed, it would imply certain 
losses on some projects for which the Bank could ~ot mobilise appropriate guarantees, in 
particular, in operations with the public sector for which adequate commercial guarantees 
are generally not available.  ·  .. :  ·  · 
•  Rating agencies would most likely stress that the new guarantee scheme is much weaker 
than the previous scheme, which could result in an increase in the Bank's relative. 




It i; doubtful that the schem~  would. result in any budgetary savings at all over the . 
inedium term.  Indeed, any loss incurred by the Bank on loans to developing country 
borrowers would deplete Bank reserves and accelerate the need for a Bank capital · 
increase.  The scheme would merely shift the burden from the EC budget to the 
· budget of Member  .states.  ·  ·  ' 
Were the Bank notto be given the latitude to allocate assets as it deems fit, the quality of 
.  \  .  . 
the Bank's assets would deteriorate. 
•  Were Member States.willii1g to give the Bank the latitude to adapt the-geographical 
allocation of  loans according to borrowers and guarantors' creditworthiness--a necessary 
condition for this option to be consistent. with the protection.ofthe Bank's asset quality--, 
this would result in a radical departure in· the way the Bank's mandates to. lend 
outside the Union have been defined and in:terp~eted to date. 
'  . 
• ·  ·In that case, the scheme would. result in a major transfer of power from the Political 
Authority to the Bank, which would most likely be unacceptable to Member States and 




institutions, Member States, and third countries.  · 
This would force the Bank to broach the delicate.political'and ·techriical questio'n of  , 
distinguishinglranking·colintries outside the Vnion. To protect the quality of  its assets, the 
Bailk. would likely have,to concentrate its lending activity. outside the· EU  in. C:ouJltries  · 
. ·ranked in the upper creditworthiness tier (in liite With IFC and NIB lending poljcy); which  . 
.  would be a major departure from the EU current policy.  .  · 
This scheme would requu-'e major changes· in the Bank's balance sheet struct~re and 
· pricing policy.  Higher risks would require making proVisions·for developing country 
risks, which could be financed only on the basis.ofa higher interest margin on loan:s 
outside the EU. Activities outside the EU could not be cross-subs~dised further by 
activities in EU countries, which rules 'out a uniform increase in the Bank's interest margin. 
Also, it would be very difficult to charge a unifo~y  higherinterest·margin on all loans 
outside the EU, because this could price the Bank out of  some important markets (in 
particular, in countries,with an investment grade rating).  ·  ·  · 
•  Conclusion 
The. project-by-project'l~ss sliaringoptiorrentails -considerable risks for the Bank while it 
would yield only minor ~ediate  benefits for the EC budget.and, over the. medium-tenn, would 
merely shift the burden from the EC budget to Member States.  Therefore, this optiort is 
inappropriate. - 16-
3.2  Scheme  J: A fiXed  ceiling of budget commitment 
•  Structure of the scheme 
.  Under this scheme, the Budgetary Authority would ·fix the amount of  the budgetary 
guarantee at a certain specified level, this amount remaining frozen for a certain period oftime. 
A$ the Bank executes the new mandates for loans to trurd countries decided by the Council (and 
as the volume of  outstanding loans grows), the effective cover provided by the budget guarantee 
would decrease accordingly.  ·  ·  · 
The necessary corollary of  this scheme is that the Bank ~hould be free to decide how much 
it would lend globally to third countries and to choose the countries and borrowers it wants to 
lend to (within the limits imposed by the-<;::ouncil's decisions).  Thus, the Bank could vary its 
effective rate of  protection and take more or less risk by selecting countries, borrowers and 
amounts according to its own criteria and prefe~ences. 
This scheme would require a major change in the way mandates and lending targets 
are given-by-the Council-to the Bank  One possibility would consist in fixing both a minimum 
am.e.unt carrying a full 75% budget guarantee and a maximum amount with the result that the 
effectiye cover for the Bank would vary in function of  the volume ofloans granted.  Another 
ppssibility would be for the Bank to decide loan by loan the level of  budgetary coverage it.deems 
appropriate and modulate the imputation of  its operations to the. Guarantee Fund, bas~d on the·. 
strength of  the borrower. 
·  ·  .  .  ..  The Bank's operational freedom combined with the ace~ptance of  ri'sks woUld lead to. a:  · 
situation wher~  the limits imposed by the Council's decisions wouid be merely .credit ceilfugs 'arid 
. there would be no "almost certainty" that Bank loans reach the authorised ceiling.  Loans granted 
wou~d  remain well below targets (defined by external policy considerations)· if  the risks involved 
.  were consi~ered unacceptable ~y the Bank.  · ·  ·  · 
•·  Pros 
· This scheme could present some benefits for the Budgetary Authority, but none for the 
Bank.  It could help the Budgetary Authority to address the budget.constraint issue while enabling 
the Political Authority to expand the Bank's mandates to lend outside the Union by reducing 
gradually the level of  globalised guarantee, on the assumption that the ~ank  could accept aJower 
guarantee coverage.  The gain in the guarantee potential of  budgetary resources would result 
eventually from the willingness/capacity of  the Bank to accept a lower guarantee coverage and . 
.  cannot be computed in advance.  . 
•  Coos 
. •  A signipcant decline in the effective rat~ of  coverage of  loans outside the EU would not be 
consistent with the Bank's statutes (Art. 18(3)) that call for an adequate guarantee. on 
ea,ch and every loan. . 17. 
•  Thi~ scheme could result eventually in a sigpi:ficant reduction in the level of  effective 
protection of  the Bank's loan portfolio and in a significant increase in the Bank's 
exposure to credit risks outside the EU.  Rapidly, this could be perceived to weaken:the 
Bank's financial strength and have adverse implications on  the Bank's borr.~~ing costs. 
•  For"the scheme to be consistent with the pro~ection .of its financial strength, the Bank_ . 
should be giveri the responsibility to select the countries to which it d~ems  prudent  'to·h~nd 
and to decide on how much. to leverage the budgetary guarantee.  This option would ; 
leave the Bank with the political decisioos on the overall level of its operations  .. 
outside the EU and country/region allocation, which are fundamentally political 
decisions that ought to be left to the Politic3.1 Authority.  It is ·quite unlikely thafthe ·· 
Political Authority would acceptthe transfer of power that ought to be associated to 
this scheme.  ·  ' · · ' 
f 
··<· .....  ;' 
•  Under such a scheme, the Bank would be led to concentrate its operations in the· most 
cred~tworthy countries and the gapbetween·authorised ceilings ~d  loans actually signed 
-could widen.  ·  ·  ·  · · ·  ·  · 
-· •'  These trends would most likely be perceived negatively by the various Political Authorities· 
within the Union and ~y  the third. countries concerned;  this nl.ight result iii increas~d : :  ·  . 
political pressures on the J;Jank. 
..  Were the Bank to have to modulate the coverage of  the various loans. by the Guarantee:--
Fund, and impute a specific percentage to the Fund loan by loan, the scheme might prove 
quite costly to ,operate .and involve potenti~y divisive discussions in the Board of 
Directors on the guarante~ issue for each  and every loan..  ·  .. 
.  ( 
i 
•  ;The loan loss provisions made necessary by explicit exj,osu.re to credit risks.ou~·side the EU 
would reduce accordingly the reser-Ves. the Bank would have accumulated (out ·of its-:··· 
·operating surplus) to help postpone the next capital. increase. ·This scheme could -qltimately 
·only shift the burden of  supporting financially Bank operations outside the EO from the EC 
budget to the Member States.  ·  · 
1  • 
•  Conclusion 
. -, 
·.  :• 
- I. 
This option has severe ~rawbacks'that more than offset its pos~ible benefits and is' qot ·.  ·' 
appropriate:  ·.  ·  ·  ·  ...  · · 
.  .' 
3.3.  Scheme 3:  A Guarantee Scheme Based on a 60% bla~ket coverage 
The following section presents the possible structure and benefits of  a budgetary guarantee 
scheme based on a blanket coverage, which is the Bank's preferred option. ·under this proposal, 
the essential benefits of the. current guarantee scheme for the Bank, the Commission and 
Member States would be preserved whikthe budgetary constraint would be· ea:sed to a 
considerable extent.  ·  · - 18-
•  Structure ofthe scheme 
In essence, this option is an amended version of  the sche~e  that was proposed by ilie Bank 
and the Coriunission d1;1ring the 19.95 discussions.  It would feature: 
•  a lower blanket cove~age (  60%  ),. 
•  a world-wide globalisation of  the blanket coverage: . the same l:!lanket guarantee 
would cover all developing countries (at least ALA, CEEC, MED and South 
Africa; the ACP mandate would be considered in due course).  · 
· •  the blanket guarantee wouJd cover only all loans signed minus loans cancelled and · 
minus reimbursements.  ·  · 
The scheme would operate as the current guarantee scheme and thus enable the Bank/EC 
to continue to benefit from the cost-effectiveness of  the current scheme.  The main difference with 
the current scheme is thatby moving to a 60% blanket' coverage: 
•  the budgetar.Y cost of  guarantees would drop by 35%, which would ease to a considerable 
extent the budget constraint; 
•  a considerable ampunt ofBank assets would be "at risk" to the eXtent that th~y.wouid·  no 
lqnger be covered by a· budgetary guarantee (as shown in the graph below, which is based on 
the portfolio simulation presented in Arme~  9).  .  . 
. ~ount  at Risk Under tbe.60% 
muofECU 
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.  . 
Reasons for considering a level ofbla!Jkel coverage lower. than 75% 
During last year's discussions, the.Bank and the Commission hadjointly defended the need 
to .maintain a very strong guarantee scheme based on a high level ofblanket coverage (75% of  all 
loans signed minus loans cancelled, and minus reimbursements).  The lower level of  blanket 
· coverage proposed in this study is deemed pqssible because: - 19-
•  whereas during last year's discussion a regional segmentation of  the budgetary guarantee 
1..  ·  had been. envisaged, the Bank now proposes, ~  a counterpart to the lower level of  global 
coverage, to globalise the blanket coverage on a world-wide basis to exploit genuinely. 
·the benefits of  international portfolio diverSification (a basic principle of banking 
and .insurance).  ·  ' 
• .  During the  ·laSt two years, the Bank has exploited new market opportunities to mobilise 
adequate third party guarantees instead of  the traditional sovereign guarantees (see § 1.4). 
In so doing, the Bank has set up guarantee structures that provide stronger protection to. 
the budgetary guarantor and that make it possible to reduce, in the future, the level of  ' 
, budgetary gtiarantee needed_to support any given level of  Bank lending outside the Union. 
Reasons for not going below 60% 
In the absence of  reliable numbers on debt service defaults in developing countries and the 
·inherently unpredictable ~e.ofpolitic3.1  ris~  as well as.thetypi~ contamination effect that 
charactepses the occurrence of  debt crisis, the appropriate level ofblanket.coverage·has to be 
derived from a comparative analysis of  the Bank's balance sheet structure with that of  other SFis. 
More specifically, the principle for sharing  .ris~ betw.een the Bank and its budgetary ·. 
guarantors can be derived fro  in the ge~ring pQlicies of the various SFIS.  ·  · 
Most SFis benefit from a 100% equity backing of  their lending operations because. of  the 
high risks inherent to  ·lending in developing countrie~.  Given the Bank's much higher gearing ratio 
· (2:5:1), the B1Ulk's capital  can cover ofl}y 40% (112.5=40%)"ofthe overall risks oflending outside 
the Vnion.  For the Bank to have a  balance sheet strength similar to that of  t)ipical Multilateral 
Development Banks (which are the relevant comparators given the.nature of  risks involved in 
lending to developing countries), the budgeta{y guarantee should fill the gap and cover.60% of  the 
risks.  Considering the budgetary guarantee as a quasi-equity backing,. the de facto g'earing of 
lending operations outside the EU would be reduced to·  a 1: 1 leyel consistent with the typical risks 
oflending outside the Union:·  .·  .  ·  · 
.  . 
In  addition, the b~dgetary guarantee should b~  suffi~ien.t to cover not only usual risks 
but also catastrophic risks~such as those that occur,· for instance, on the occasion of  debt crisis 
· which affect developing countries on a m<;>re or less regular basis.  One of  the main features of 
debt crisis is their contagious nature:  defaults bunch together during' debt crisis 'caused ·by global, 
. systemic factors so that when a country defaults, other countri~s of  the region tend to experience· · 
severe fiscal. and ·b~ance,  of  payments· difficulties.  If  anything, the recent globali~ation trend makes 
the contagion quicker and more broadly based, as illustrated by the recent Mexican crisis. 
'  \  ,  .  '  .  \  . 
Given the geographical conc~ntration of  risks in the Bank's loan portfolio outside. the EU, 
it would not be prudent to lower the level ofworld-:wide blanket coverage below 60%.  Given the 
concentration of  the Bank's portfolio in a few countries in each regio~ a regionaiisation or'the 
blanket coverage with the proposed lower percentage would leave the Bank ~xposed to 
unacceptably high risks·and should not ·be considered as a reasonable option._·  For ~stance, 
..  : -20-
existing loans to the three largest borrowers in Eastern Europe and the  ·MED region account for 
respectively 68% and 57% ofBank exposure in each region. 
20% 
10°.4 
Portfolio Concentration by Region (sum 
of  the three largest exposures) 
68% 
ACP  AlA  MED  CEEC 
Any new guarantee scheme should .be consistent with the possible entty in the Union of 
several large borrowers outside the EU (CEECs and MED). In  parti~ulai-, a sufficientlY, high level 
.of  protection should·be maintained to anticipate the decline in the average quality of Bank  · 
borrowers outside t~e EU resulting from the eventual enlargement of the Union.  For 
instance,_the adhesion of  these countries to the EU would'have a dramatic impact on the average 
credit rating ofBank borrowers/guarantors outside the EU, with a  concentration·of  exposure m 
countries ranked in the lower creditworthiness tier (as suggested.  by the graph below, which .can be 
compared with the current portfolio structure shown in§ 1.3.1.).  the four Visegrad countries are 
rated in ihe upper creditworthiness tier of  countries in which the Bank operates-Czech Republic 
with a A rating, Hung~  BB+, Poland BB and Slovakia BB+.  These four countries account for 
28% of  total loans outside the EU signed as of  end 1995--ECU 2.7 bn (see Annex 8)):  .  .  .  . 
Geographical Asset Allocation (excluding 
VJSegrad countries for Em) 
~~------------------------------------------------
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Last but not least, any new scheme should enVisage the possibility that the B~nk's (and 
other SFis') de facto preferred creditor status could be eroded in the future.  The share of · 
debt to SFis in developing country total,  external debt ha$ tended to increase, in particular in 
Eastern Europe, so that there is an· increasing possibility that severe. fiscal and balance of  payments  .  ·· 
p~oblems in the future might affect more than in the past developing countries' ability/'Yiltingness 
to service their debt to SFis in a  timely manner.  In a sense, this risk is illustrated by the recently-. 
proposed Multilateral_ Debt Facility;  ·  ·  ·  · 
• ·  Advantages of  the scheme 
• 
• 
The lower risk coverage under this option would ease considerably the budgetary 
constraint:  lowering the level of  blanket coverage to 60% would reduce by 35% the 
budgetary resources needed to cover a given amount of Bank loans under the  q.~rrent· 
arrangements for the Guarantee Fund.  ·.  ·  · 
This scheme would be fully consisteQt with.the Bank's present Statutes, 'mandates, 
structures (financial and staffing) and practices (appraisal techniques).  · 
'  '  . 
·•  ·It would. maintain an adequately st~ong protection of  the Bank's balan~e sheet, .pt:oViqed · 
the blanket coverage is world-wide.  Under this option, the financial structure of  the Bank's 
operations outside the EU would implicitly be similar to that in typical Multilateral  · 
DevelopmentBank.  This would preserve the Bank's status in intemational.~~~Qil· · 
markets at a oiinimum.costto the-Community budget.  · 
•  The guarantee scheme would _continue to operate' as a _simple and low cost scbejne. 
•  · This scheme involves no litigation ri~ks. 
•  This scheme would be consistent with the trend tow~ds  inereased .reliance on  n~~­
sovereign third party guarantees:  the Bank would continue to use the latter to protect fhe 
.  budgetary guarantors while exploiting the additionality made possible, it:t  pat1, by ~e 
· budgetary guarantee through carving out the risk of  non-transfer and non-convertibility 
of  currencies from the coverage of  its third party guarantors (see Annex 5).  · 
•  . Conclusion 
The 60%  'globalised scheme is ·the Bank's preferred option because it would be fi41y . 
. consistent with the Bank's statutes, mandates and ·current modus ·operandi, would sa£:eguard the  . 
effectiveness of  the Bank as an essential instrument to promote the :balanced de-Velopii1~nt Witlijn 
the Union and would be efficient from an operational standpoint while it would help to solve the . 
budgetary dilemma by limiting the budgetary expenditure required to support B~  loans outsi~e 
theEU.  .  .  .  ·  . .  , -22-
3.4  Scheme 4:  Combining a separation between political and commercial risks  -
with a blanket coverage 
•  Structure of  the scheme 
The ECOFIN requested in November that the Bank and the Conuilission envisage the 
possibility that risks be shared between the Bank and the budget along political versus commercial 
lines, with the budgetary guarantee covering only political risks for all projects while the Bank 
would assume commercial risks.  In an event of  default, the Barile could call on the budgetary 
guarantee only if  the mability of  the borrower to service its debt to the Bank results from non-
commercial risks.  - ·  ·  ' 
This option can be appealing from a conceptual- ~tandpoint.  Indeed, the Bank, as a 
·financial institution, is well equipped to assess and handle co~ercial  risks.  For its part, the 
Political Authority would cover political risks that result from the mandates given to the Bank to 
lend in countries wJJ_ere the Bank would not have been active otherwise.  (This would be in line 
-with general practice in most ECAs where selected political risks are borne in fine by the state. see 
Annex 10 for a ~resentation of  the va,rious instruments of  politi~ risk investment insurance). 
This being said, defining political risks has always been a difficult and contentious exercise· 
and basing a guarantee scheme on this distinction could result in si~cant  operational difficulties. 
Moreover, the Bank is exposed to a broad and complex series of-political risks given tl\e_nature of 
its operations that implies exposure to public and private sector borrowers_  Given this · 
bac~ground and to be consistent with the Bank's Statutes and lendirig policies, ariy scheme ba~ed  _. 
on the-separation between politiCal and commercial risks should.be·structured ~follows:  _-• 
•  When  ·ad~quate  third party'  guarantees can be secured (this would be  ·the ca,se in  · · 
gt!neral for loans to private sector borrowers, which accounted for over 3 0% of  total P A 
loan$ in 1995), the budgeiary guarantor would cover only selected political risks (currency 
non-tr'!Jlsfer, expropriation, war and civil disturbance as defined in the :MIGA Convention); 
other project risks would be taken by the Bank, and be covered by adequate guarantees 
from first class banks or corporates.  The thir~ party guarantor would commit to 
guarantee the Bank's cash flow in all circumstances except iftl)e inability of  the borrower 
to service its debt to the Bank results from the o~currence of  those selected political risks-
covered by the budgetary guarantor.  The Bank would bear the risk. that its third party 
guarantors be unable _to  comply with their obligations. 
•  When no adequate third party·  guarantees. can be mobilised by the Bank (this would 
be the case essentially for loans to public sector entities), the loan would fall only under the 
coverage of  the ·budgetary guarantee.  Indeed, for those loans extended to public sector  . 
borrowers, risks are in fine exclusively politi~ for the Bank because the Bank can incur 
losses on such loa:ns only when the sovereign guarantor defaults, which is a typical 1=ase of 
political risk._4  For loans falling into this category, the Bank would continue to mobilise 
4  To be sure, public sector borrowers can default for commercial reasons.  However; in such cases, the Bank would 
·  call on its sovereign guarantors;  therefore, arrears could be incurred by the Bank only were the latter not to comply 
with its guarantee obligations, whicl!- is a typical political risk.  Mor~er,  it would be impossible for the Bank to -23-. 
-·  sov~reign guarantees from developing countries with a:n ultimate backing by the budgetary 
guarantee.  ·.  ·  -
For loans featuring an adequate third party guarantee, the-Bank could cai"Ve qut from the  · 
coyerage of  third party guarantors those risks covered by the budget (currency non..,transfer,  · 
expropriation; war and civil disturbance as· defined in the MIGA  Convention-see Annex 11 ).  All 
other risks would be covered by third party guarantors.  Thls.carving-out strategy is far better  · 
than the alternative approach that would consist in listing the _risks. that are' covered by  third party . . 
guarantors, which would be. very difficult to achieve and 'Yould expose the Bank to endles~ 
litigation.  ·  . · ·  ~  ·  ·  ~ 
Breach of contract risks s~ould be left to the third party guarantors, although this risk  ' . 
_js often political in nature.  This is essentially to minimjse the·risks of  litigation (and the contingent 
liabilities on the ~udget). Experience shows that it is extremely-difficult to separate effectively the· 
risk of  breach ofcontract from the typical commercial risk.  The issue has often been· decided  , · · · 
through litigation. s  This issue could be revisited in a few years when experience has been gained 
in the possibility to effectively carve out breach of  contract risks from the coverage ofthird-party• 
guarantors.  Moreover, carying out breach. of  contract risks from the  guarante~ obligations of  third 
party-guarantors would create a considerable moral hazard. since the.Bank's guarantors would 
have no incentives to analyse-properly the project and the documentation. 6 
'.''. 
Under this ~ption,.  in addition to the sharing of  risks me~tionned aqove, the  ove~all  · , 
coverage of.the Bank's totaUoan portfolio outside the EJJ could be lowered to 60% (down ·. · 
· · from the current 100%/7  5%  ),:.provided this .is on a· world~Wide basis to enable the Bank/the Union 
to benefit from .international portfolio diversification (see §3:32 and § 3.3.3).  This would reduce 
. by 3_5% the budgetary resources needed to· cover a given .amount of  loans under·the current 
arrfngements·for the Guarantee· Fund.  Moreover; because certain risks would not be:covered 
by the budget, the pace of  use of  the Guarantee Fund could be slower than under the straight 
blanket coverage option.  · .  ·  · 
.  Relations with the Guarantee Fund:  All Bank loans. outside the ED would be.imputed to the 
Guarantee Fund ( 60% of  the amount of  loans ·signed, minus repayments and cancellations), 
whoever. the guarantor is.  'Indeed, the budget would con~inue  .to cover selected political risks in all 
· ·.cases, which-~  have to be provided for, and it is impossible to quantify satisfactorily a priori the 
political and commercial riskcompo_nents project by project.  This being said, the  Budgetary  · 
Authority could envisage a distinction ofprovisioningrates according to the quality of  the 
guarantor, which would enable the Budgetary_Authority to leverage further the-resources invested 
in the Guarantee Fund.  ·  -
mobilise adequate cominercial guarantees from acceptable baDks  ~r other first-Class guarantors to ~ver  _ri$ 
mvolved in lending to public sector entities outside the Union.  .  .  .  .  , · 
5  Moreover,. one should be aware that market experience to date with limited or non-recourse :finanee:...which raises 
the issue of  breach of contracts more than other types of :financing-has been very limited.  Political risk insurers are 
generally reluctant to cover breach of contract risks.  Insurer who provide beach of contract coverage generally 
guarantee only limited aspects of risks.  Experience m MIGA and other political risk insu!ers \\ill be discussed 
more fully in the final version of  the paper and in an annex. ·  ·  . 
6  The Bank's thlrd party guarantors would bear the "documentation risks", as in the various P;A operations:  .'.  ,  ... 
involving a non~sovereign guarantee structured to date. -24-
Calling on gua_rantees:  Whenever a debt service default occurs, the Bank would call on its 
guarantors to ensure the continuity of  its cash flow. 
•  When the loan is covered by an adequate third party guarantee, the Bank would call 
on the latter, who would have to ensure the debt service to the Bank unless the 
inability of  the borrower to service its debt to the Bank results from one of  the political 
risks that was explicitly excluded from its coverage.  It  .would be for the third party 
guarantor to provide the evidence that the borrowers inability to service its debt to the 
Bank results from the occurrence of  one ofthe political risks excluded from its 
co.verage.  If  the debt service default results from one of  the risks excluded from the 
·co':'erage ofthe third party guarantor, the Bank would askthebudgetary guarantor to · 
pay. 
•  Iri all other cases, the procedure would be identical to the current procedure:  the Bank. 
will call :first on the sovereign/public sector guarantor and would call on t~e budgetary 
guarantee only if  the sovereign guarantor does not honour its commitment. 
Recovery mechanism:  In all cases, the.Bank would continue to ensure the recovery.ofarrears on ' 
behalf of  tpe budgetary guarantor, as at present.  The sums recOvered .would be transferred back 
to the Guarantee Fund. 
•  Pros.· 
.  . 
•  .·  This scheme features a geriuine risk sharing that is consist~t  with the Bank's .statutes; 
financial structure and practices.  ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
•  It would maintain an adequate degree of  protection of  the Bank's assets and preserve the 
strength of  its balance sheet. 
•  . It  would require no fundamental change in.the Bank's modus operandi. 
•  It would help to ease the budgetary constraint.  The budgetary resources needed to cover a 
given amount of  Bank loans outside would be reduced by a~out one third,. and the use of 
. th~ Gt.larantee Fund would be reduced by the externalisation of  part of  the risks from the 
budgetary coverage. 
.  . 
•  If  could enhance the additionality ofthe Bank's operations outside the Union and the 
complementarity between the.Bank and potential guarantors (first class banks and 
corporates).  The thrust of  this additionality is that the Bank/EU budget would cover 
. selected political risks while other risks (more commercial in nature) would be left to·third 
party guarantors. • 
-25- . 
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Unlike the 60% globalised scheme, Scheme 4 could result in-litigation.  It. could im~ly 
trilateral.disputes between the Bank, theCom.missio~  and the third party guaraJ].tor. • This 
could result in high legal fees and be.detrimen~al to the image of  the Bank/the:Corn.Tnission 
arid ~our  the business relaiiorrships _between. the Bank and some of  its working 'partners. 
This scheme would be more difficult and ~~stly to adminis'ter than th~  pres~~t guarantee 
scheme and than the 60% globalised scheme. proposed py the ~ank  ' 
It would introduce credit risks linked to  .Bank_ lending outside the EU on the B~'s 
balance.sheet  .. This would require the constitution ofadequ·ate loan-loss provisions Ciri the 
Bank's books, which might require an increase in the Bank's interest margin_ori loans 
-outside the EU, or be financed out of  the Bank's operating surplus, ·which would.reduce  . 
accordingly the reserves the Bank would ~ve  .allocated to reserves 'to help to p'ostpone the 
next capital increase.  · · 
•  it could result in additional difficulties to mee~  turnover targets:  as governments are  ,, , ,  .,  -
-increasingly reluctant ~o grant sovereign guarantees, the Bank's ability to. meet  .. its ~~oy~r. 
targets (set in the various mandates to lend outside the EU) would be condition~ on  ..  _ . 
obtaining adequate guarantees in the market.  This should not be taken for granted ~since it 
would depend on commercial. banks' appe~ite for· d~veloping country risks. 
.  .  .  .  . ,  ~- ~- .:. 
•  This scheme could result in endless discussions in the Board and with the Commission on a 
,case by case basis on the adequa~  of  the guaraptee· scheme_ selecteci by the B~  apd t]le 
·resulting contingent li~bility onthe Budget.  ·  .. 
•  The mobilisation of  third party guarantees for operations O"L:ltside the EU would a~crelerate 
the use of  exposure ceilings to individual banks/  corp  orates defined in the  13 ank _iiS . .  · 
experience shows that the guar~tors  used to guarantee loans outside the EU are 'lri general 
institutions to which the Bank is already expos~d as a. result ·of its lending opera~ior;ts within 
the Union or its treasury operations.  ·  ·  _.  _  .  ·  - ·  · ·  -
.  ~~  ,·:·: 
•  Conclusion  ,,, 
t. '~  •  •I· 
In sum, this scheme provides for ~icr~economic risk:.sharing between· the Bank,and the-
budget as it externalises from the budgetary guarantee certain categories. of_ risk (tn~inly 
commercial risks):- It would meet the request by some Member States that the Bank share risks  .. 
with the budget and enable the budgetary authority-to increase the guarantee potenti~ ofresources 
invested in the Guarantee Fund, while allowing the B,imk., tb_ protect the integrity of  its  b~ance 
_sheet.  However, this scheme would have sign'ifi_ca,nt, operati~al drawbacks and,  i~ ,l)ot the , 
Bank's prefery-ed scheme.  · EUROPEAN  INVESTMENT  BANK  CA/297/96 
7 May 1996 
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Annex 1 
COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS (ECOFIN) 
OF 27 NOVEMBER f995 
Ref. :  Community budget guarantees in respeCt of EIB lending outside the Community 
1.  The  Council  considered  the  nature  and  level  of  the, guarantees  provided · from  the 
Community budget for EIB lending inthird countries. 
•  1 
,2.  The  Council  noted  that discussions  had. thrown  up  a number of problems  requi~ng closer 
examination before a final decision could be taken. Wrth this in mind, the Council asked the 
EIB  and  the Commission to  begin  looking· into ,a new guarantee system.  lp  so  doing,  they 
should consider the· possibility of. part of the risk entailed by  th!=l  Bank's external operations ·  .  .  .  .  •' 
being  borne  by  th,e  Bank  (e.g.  the  Community  budget  might  cover  ·political  but  not 
.  commercial risk). 
·- 1 -Financial cooperation with third countries must not,  of course, detract from the EIB's task of  .  .  . 
'  t  ' 
granting loans within the Union. 
The  new system  must be  consistent with  the  Bank's  operating  rul~s as ·laid  down  by  the 
Treaty and must, in particular, respect the sole  powers conferred on  its Board of Directors by 
Article 11  of the Bank's Statute. 
The. Council asked the EIB and the Commission to submita re:port to it as soon as possible. 
The· Council undertook to consider the new system and to take a decision on· it by the ehd  of 
next year. 
3.  Pending a new system, the Council  acknowledged the  importance  ofenab~ng existing· and 
fresh  lending  to  go  atiead  in  orderty  fashion  ov~r a  transitional  period._  The  Council  , 
accordingly  agreed  that  new  decisions  to  grant  Community  budget  guarantees  for  EIB 
lending in third countries would be based  on the existing model. 
The Council also agreed that the new system would be  appli~ble to the new decisions to be 
taken_ during the transitional period in respect of loans not yet granted. 
- 2-Annex 2 
SUPRANATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: LOAN PRICING POLICIES 
African Oevelopm·e.,t Bank 
Asian Oevelopmei1t Bank 
Corporaclon ~ndlnd  d~  Fomenlo 
,, 
; 
European Bank fo;, Reconstruction and 
Development  -
' 
.  '  .. 
European Investment Bank 
'. 
Inter-American Otwelopment Bank 
'. 
International Finance Corporation 
-
\· 






V~rlable lending rate _adjusted  ~omt-annually to-:malntaln a 50 basi~ point spread. Annual comr 
fee of 1 % Is charged on undish,trsed loans. A 200 basis point feo Is being considered.  __ -
nitment 
Variabl_e  l~ndlng r_ale  adjusted  semi-annually  based  on  cost  of borrowing  plus  a spread  of 4 
points. Commllment fee of 75 basis points lcviod on Increasing percentage of undisbursed loan ll 
0  hasls 
mount. 
Variable .lending rates set atliBOR plus 85  - 400 basis points, depending on the  tenor and  ris~ 
-tr~nsactlon. Fixed-lending .rate 5et at cost of funds plus a profit margin of 100 - 225 basis points, 
- risk  premium of 75 basis points nnd  a surveillance  fee  of 100 hasis points. ·on proAccl  loans, 
origination fee  ol 1 o/o  of I  he loan !JRlount  and a commil~lent fee  or  0. 75  %  per year on  undis 
· loan balances are cliar_ged.  '  ,  _  -_  -. 
_ For private  sector _loans,  variable  and  fixed  rate~ lo  be  based on  prevallli1g  market  ratef 
considering cQst  of funds and IDan risks.  For public sector loans a new pricing scherne,  mainta 
uniform  1  o/o  margin  over  UBOR  was  Introduced  In  April  1994.  Annual  commitment  h 
undisbursed loans of between 0:5 ·1 % for fixed and  varl~blo rate loans, respective!\. Front .end 
0.5 - 1 'lfo  will typically be chargnd at signhlg. · 
Fixed, lending rata based on actual funding cosi of the currency lent plus a spread nf 15 basis 






•cs  «in 
roe  of 
points. 
Variable rate loans-ore reprlcftd quarterly at  a spread over the effective average cosf of funds. C•irrent 
policy Is under revision lri or!Jflr lo_ unsure greater flexibility.  -
loans are priced semi-annually at a rate based on effective funding costs oyer the prf,vious six 1 
plus a spread covering admlnlstrot,ve and other costs to meet Income targets. Charnes, which 
waived, InClude ati annual foe of 0.1·5 %·or\ tho convertible currency pot lion of undistnuscd  loan~ 
1  -%  one-time charge on the principal iunounl. Included In lhe lending rate Is a 1 %  £tnnual  com 






Lending .rates are  based on  pmvalllng ·market rates while considering cost of fund~- and  loan  1 
front-end fee of 1 % of  slgnln'iJ: Annual commitment fees on  undisbursed loons of 1 %  and  U 
sks.  A 
%for 
fixed and variable rato loans, res.peclively.  . 
Market based lending rates aro set at  disbursement. Loans are offered, on averag6,  at  50 basi~ 
over borrowing costs. Commitment fees are usually charged on undisbursed loans. 
'  - .. 
Variable lending rate adjusted semi-annually lo maintain a 50 basis point spread (ri;duced to 2 
points  for  at  least _the  curran~ nscol  year reduced  by way  of waiver .to  eligible  borrowers)  O' 
weighted average  cost  or outstanding  bank  borrowings  (excltldlng -those .to  fund  liquid  Invest 
slrice Jtme 30, 1982. Annual r.ommilmenUee on undisbUrsed loan balances has hnon  rcdttce'J 
1993 fiscal year for the fourth ~!~!l~~cullvo year to 25 basis points  from 75  basls_e~!~.S-
poinls 
!i'basls 
er  l~e 
ttenls) 
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Actual 1994 {in %} 
INSTITUTION  BY STATUTE  Disbursed loans/  Disbursed loans/  Paid-in capitaV 
paickn capital +  subscribed capital  subscribed capital  ..  reserves  +reserves  ... 
African Development Bank  Loans outstanding plus undisbursed·  289  40  9 
commitments and guarantees cannot 
exceed 1  00 % ohubscribed capital, 
reserves,  and surplus. 
Asian Development Bank  . Loans outstanding plus undisbursed  203  46  9 
i  commitments, equity investments, 
and guarantees cannot exceed 100 % 
of subscribed capital and reserves. 
Corparacion Andina de  Loans outstanding limited to 450 %  235  86  I  31 
Fomento · '  of paid-in capital, reserves, and 
retained earnings.  .  . 
EurC)pean.Bank for  Loans outstanding plus g.uarantees  52  . 11  20 
Reconstruction and  plus equity investment eannot exceed 
Development  ·  100 % of subscribed capital, reserves 
and surplus.  .,. 
Euro~ean Investment Bank  Loans outstanding plus guarantees  664.  135  7  ' 
cannot exceed 250% of subscribed 
. capital. 
Inter-American  Loans outstanding plus guarantees  289  36  5 
Development Bank  cannot exceed paid-in eapital plus the 
general reserve and the callable  .. 
capital of non;.borrowing members. 
Also, target reserves-to-loans ratio at  .. 
20-25%. 
tntemati.onal Finance  Paid-in capital, retained earnings,  147  130  80 
Corporation  and general loss reserves must be at 
least 30·% of ris.k-weighted assets 
!(on- and off-balance-sheet). 
Nordic. Investment Bank  Loans outstanding plus guarantees  598  139  '10 
cannot exceed 250 % of subscribed 
capital.  ·' 
World Bank  Loans outstanding plus guarantees  427  ,.  61  5 
cannQt exceed 100 % of subscribed 
capital, reserves, and surplus. Also 
target reserves-to-loans ratio at 13-
14%. 
- .. 
Source: Standard and Poor's Annex 4 
PRESENT SYSTEr\1 OF COMMUNITY 9UOG:i  .A.ND EU MEMBER STATE GlJARANTEES IN 
.  ?.ESP=·:: ~;: ::::: :._o;..NS  It-: TH!RD C~UNTRIES 
0perations outside the European· Union are conducted essentially on  th~ basis of various deciSions taken 
. by the Council of Ministers and .act;epted by the Bank,  These decisions differ-from one region to another 
and are ::iccrpo:cned in the Conventions, Pr9tocoi's and AuthOrisations g~veming  the Bank's activities. 
This annex comains: 
1.  a summary .  of the  Bank's  operations  froJ:Tl  own  resources  outside  the  EU  under the  relevant  . 
Conv~ntions, Protocols and Agree~nts:  .. 
. .,. 
2.  a· description of the present system of guarantees for operations outside the EU: 
1.  EIS  OPE~ATIONS ~OM  OWN  RESOURCES  OUTSIDE "!"HE  EU UNDER THE RELEVANT 
CONVENTIONS. PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS  .  . 
1.1  ACP States and OCT. 
The Fourtn Lo~e  Convention. th~ oriains of which date ba'ci  to the First ·Yaounde Convention conduded  ·· 
. in 1963. curremty encompasses 70 ACP Ste:ues wnicn have historical links with the EU.  It  runs for a period 
of ten years and has appended to .it the First Financial Protocol eo:vering the first five years (1990-1995) . 
which provides. inter alia. for a maximum of ECU .1200 million in loans from the Bank:s own reSQurces.· .· 
.  .  - .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .. 
.  AlongSide  the  ~onvention. a CounCil ·.Decision·also· provides for aid f(; .the  20 Overseas  Countries  and  , 
T.erritories (OCT) whiCh enjoy special'  ties with EU Member States.  Under this .decision, the EtS may grarlt  . 
lOans from its .own resources up to ECU 25 million.  ·  ·  .  . 
:Linder 'the  Second Financial Pfotocot d  996-2000)  WhiCh  was signed in  November 1995 and. iS. currenUy  · 
~der ratification.  the  Bank  can  advance  loans  from  its' own  resources  for up  to  ECU  1.693  million 
, (inc:tuding ECU 35 million·.for the OCT).  ·  ·  .  · 
1.2  Mediterranean 
·  ..  The E15's  initial.operations in ·the ·non-member Mediterra.i'lean  countries date back to the:1960s.  At·the 
moment. the Bank advances itS loans under the framewo~  of:  . 
the fourth generation of FlnanCial  Protocols conctuded  between  the Community and  each  of the 
'  Maghreb and Mashreq coumnes and  Israel. covering the period ti-om '1992 to 199E) and providing . 
for a total of ECU 1300 million  ·in loans from own resources: to this figure st'lould be ad~ed  ECU 80 
million .tor Malta and Cypi'\1S (19S4-199S); · .·  •  ·  ·  ·  ·  · .  · 
financial. cooperation ..  referred to  as  •horizontal' since it is deployed as an  adjund to the above-
~entior:ted bilateral aid. for tne  region as a whole  covering the same period and providing for a 
total of ECU 1  BOO million in loans from own resources:  .  .  .  .  .  · 
a mandate for ECU  250  million  in  favciur  of Gaza  and the West  Bank  (1994-~998) to  be  set. 
against the ab!)ve horizontal fin<i'ndng· ciomponent expiring in 1996 and subsequently aQainst the 
. nell:t mandate for the Mediterraneai'L  This mandate is based on the EU's fnitiative in support of 
the o~ace  process and economic development in this region:  .  .  ·  ·  · 
financial assistance for Slovenia (financial protocol allowing for an zmount of ECU 150 n-~~o:. fc; - . 
the period from 1993-1997);  .  ·  ·  ·  · 
financial assistance provided under previous protocols. 
j 
· 1.3  Central and·~em  Europe 
Since.1989. the Bank has been called on to  operate in  an increasing number o~ cecs in the -cCnt~. of 
the .EUs efforts to support the process of reform in these  countri~ and  .. to contnbute towards establishmg 
dose links between them and the community.  Following decisions taken  in  1$89 and  1991, the Bank 
'  .  .  '  ' advanced loans.totalling some ECU 1700 million.between 1990 and  1993.in Poland.  Hungary,  Bulgaria.' 
the Czecn Repubiic. SlovaKia and Romania.  A new ceiling of ECU 3 billion in  loans from o:wn  resources 
has now ~en  set tor ten CEECs (the six mentioned above plus the three Baltic States and Albania) for a 
three-year oeriad from 1994 to  1996.  This  mandate excires in Oecemben996 but will be  automatically 
:=xtenaaa oy six r::omns if f;.Jncs suii :-e~am  •o· =s !:!ep!oyed. 
1.4  Asia and Latin· America 
A  recent  extension  of EIS  operations outside !he  EV ::or.C-'"'mS  so~e thirty  countries  in  Asia  and Latin 
Amelica wnich have  concluded  cooperation  agreements with  the  Community and which  ~re eligible for 
EIS finance.  In 1993, the Bank was autholised to grant loans from its own. resources up to a total of ECU 
250 million per annum over a period of three years. which expired in February 1996  •.  for projects of mutual 
interest and  likely to strenathen links between the EU and the AJ..A countries.  Discussions on the renewal 
of the Bank's manciate for  Asia and Latin America are underway.  · 
1.5  Republic of South Africa 
The  most  recent  extension  of ·  Banlc.  ocerations  outside  the  EU  relates  to  South  Africa  where  it was 
authorised.  in  1995. to provide finance ·of up to  ECU  300 million over a- two-year period for investment 
forming pan of the country's reconstruction and development programme.  This ·new area  of ~IB activity 
falls within the context. of the recent cooperatioo  ag~ements between the EU  and the Republic of South 
Africa.  ·  · 
1.6  Developments in operations outside the EU (own resources) 
An·overview of trends in contract signatures for E!S  loans from own ·resources o_utside  the EU under the 
various Protocols. Conventions and Decisions covering the past twenty years is set out in Table 1. 
Table 1 :Finance contracts signed outside the European Union 
{figures in  ECU million)· 
Year  I  CEEC"  IMm 
~  &:a  ~ Total  1 
lQ£I  ntemal 
loans  I 
1976  : - I  90.0  l  52.4  ! - - I  142.4 
19n  - I  85.0  I  67.0  I ~  I-..  152.0  I 
1978  - I  83.0  I  90.9  ! - I - I  1'73.9  I 
1979  - I  347.7 1  73.2  i - I - I  420.9·  I 
1980  - I  247.0 I 124.4  I - I - I  371.4 
1981  - I  238.0 I 158.4  - I - l  396.4  I 
1982  - I  288.0 I 122.2  I - .  I ~  I  410.2  1 
1983  - I  337.2 I  90.0  I - - I  427.2 
1984  - I  541.6 I  79.1  - 1- 620.7·. 
1985  - I  416.5 I 167.8  - .I  - 584.3 
1986  - I  231.1  I 150.7  - I.  381.8  . 
1987  - I  27.7  I 161.1  - - I  188.8 
1988  - l  391.0 I 129.1  - - 520.1. 
1989  ..  I  330.8 I t55.1  - - 485.9 
1990  215.0  I  336.5 I 117.5  - - 669.0 
1991  285.0  I  227.0 I 269.5  - - 781.5 
1992  320.0  I  313.8  I :130.5  - I.  764.3 
~··•'" ...  ;;.-;.,-.·,_  .•  •-::--:-
1 807.4  I  ' 19S:i  '  67S.C  l ,47.4  I  99.0  I - wo..:..w  I 
1994  I  957.0  I  579.0 I 222.5  220.0  I - 1 978.5  I 
1995  I 1 005.0  I 1 014.5 I 204.7.  288.0  145.0  I 2557.2 
•  including operations in Slovenia 
. . :l'f 
2.  PRESENT SYSTEM OF EXTERNAL GUARANTEES, 
2.1  General aspects 
As anc:: when !he Mernber St;;tes have decided to inviie !he 3ank. to take on  certain ascieC:s of Commur::tv 
cooperation  poiicy,  they  have  aiways  agreed.  along  io the  requiremem  oi the.  StatUtes  (Art.  1~)  •. to 
·establish. for EIB loans from own resources outside the Community, systems underwhid'l these loans are 
covered  eith-er. cy their joint  anq  several guarantee  or  by  a  guarantee  provided  in  the  name  of the 
Community.  .  .  ·  - ·  .  ·  ·  · 
~2  ACP StateS and OCT 
Lome I  ':  In  view of the  amount  and. geographic ·scope  of .Lorn~ I (1975)  compared  with  the  Preceding 
Yaounde  Conventions  .. the  Bank.  obtilinea a· blanket guarantee for the ACP  States and OCT.  ·This  is a 
guarantee  from the  EU  Member States equal. to 30o/o  of .the total  arho.um  of credit  advance~ under this 
. Convention  and covering any risk which·could a,rise  from these operations.  ·  ·  .  '  .  . 
Lome II to IV : As the perception .of risks  expand_ed. the blanket guarantee was ,increased· to  7So/o  of the· 
total amount of creait advanced under each Convention and continues to cover any risk .which could arise 
from tl'lese  operations. The guarantees. newly established for each Convention or Financial Protocol and 
thus not cumulative as in the case of the Mediterranean (see below). are furnished directly by the Member 
States and not by the Community budget.  ·  · 
.  ' 
2.3  Mediterranean 
· 2.3.1.  From 1963 (first protocol with Greece) to 19TI (exceptional aid for. Lebanon) the Bank obtain!d a 
100% guarantee for its operations in the Mediterranean.  In 1978 a blanket guarantee equal to 75% Of total 
credit opened  and  covering ·any  risk wl:lid'l  might arise tram these .  operations was  introduced for au  its 
loans ·from  own  resources ·in  the  Mediterranean  countries  (induding  operations  in  Spain.  Greece  and 
Portugal prior to their accession and. in ttie former Yugo51aviaJ.  In  contrast to the guaranteE$· provided for 
operations under the Lome Conventions. this is a guarantee given in the name of the CpmmtJrlity whiCh  is' 
cumulative in the sense that. when new protocols are signed. it is extend~  to loans advanced under these 
proto  co is.  This system  .. introduced in i 978. has .been c;onsistemly renewed.  .  . 
2.4  Central and Eastern Europe; Asia and Latin America; South Africa 
In view of the panicular risks involved in financing operations in these regions. the Bank obtained a 100•1. 
guarantee from the Commun'rty.  - ·  .  .  · ·  ·  .,.  ·  . ·  ·  ·  ·.  · Annex 5 
Anaiysis of  the P  A Portfolio with Non-Sovereign Guaiantees 
lntroductarv rem.ark 
F9r this analysis all  PA loans  on  own resources  signed  and  not completf!IY  reimbursed 
have  been  considered.  The ·list of  loans  dates  back  until  1985.  Loans  with  Non-Sovereign 
guarantee  made  before that date  can  be  considered  as  marginal  and .  would  not influence the 
results of this analysis. The amounts taken into consideration are the amounts for which a loan 
agreement has  been actually signed  and a Non-Sovereign guarantee has  been  approved by the 
Bank's  Board.  Guarantees  by CFO.  KfW,  Member·Countties of the  BOEAC  and the  Palestinian 
Authority  were  considered  as  Sovereign  guarantee.  For  the  purpose  of  this  analysis  only 
· guarantees  have  been  considered  which  cover  at  least  part  of . the  period  after  project 
completion~. If several  guarantees  exist  in  cascade,  only the  "guarantor· of  Ia~ resort"  was 
considered2. 
. Growth of lending with Non-Sovereign guarantees 
The  proportion  of  Non-Sovereign  guarantees  was  only· marginal  and  never  exceeded 
10% of the total signatures of PA  loans  on  own resources  up to 1994. However in 1995 this 
proportion increased suddenly to 3 1 %. The increase is  even more impressive ·in .absolute terms 
where  the signatures  of'loans with Non-Sovereign  guarantees. during the vear  1995 represent 
more than twice the total amount signed in the ten previot,JS  years {782 mECU  in  1995 against 
.  312 mECU from 1985 to 1994; see the ·following chart_ and attachment 1 for a compre:e iisti. 
·Use of Non-Sovereign Guarantees (cu~ulative) 
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Geographical distribUtio~ 
The analysed portfolio consists of  25 loans for a total amount of 1  094 muuon ECu. 14 
loans concern ACP countries (128 mECU  or 12%), 2 loans Mediterranean countries {226 mECU 
or 21 %).  4  loans Central  and  Eastern  European  Countries  1520  mECU  or 47%)  and  5 ·loans 
ASian  and Latin American countrieS  (2~0 mECU or.20%). 
· 1 'For instance if the European shareholder has given a  com~etion guarantee and after ·project ,comptetion 
the loan is guaranteed by a local bank.. only the latter has been talc.en into consideration  • 
2 For instance the project MIDOR in Egypt is ·guaranteed by a local bank:,  but a letter of credit is available 
from an imematiOnat bank which can  be used in case  of default bV the local  bank..:  This was c:onseQUendy 
considered as ~ P,qect guaranteed by an intemational bank. S!ruc-...u:! ot the guarantee co.rri'c:io 
The bulk of the loans analysed are guaranteed by international banks. International bank 
means for the purpose this analysis  one  or a group  of banks  from either the  EU,  Syvitzeriand, 
Canada.  the US  or Japan which represent an  acceptable risk for EIB. These loans represent 80% 
of the total ;  ·  · 
(see attachment 2. f9r C\lmplete listl. 
.  . 
Duration of the guarantee 
•  International bank-
EI International Shareholder 
•  Local bank 
mi  Collateral security 
. .. 
Commercial· banks often have  difficulties to .j:lrovide  a· guarantee for periods longer than 
5 to 8  yea.rs.  In a number of cases therefore the guarantee covers  only part of the duration of 
the loan  ~ith the possibilitY to roll-over or to provide an  alternative guara. ntee at the expiration 
of this period. Otherwise these loans would become due. 27% of the total am'ount concerned is 
covered by this type of roll-overguarantee. 
Coverage of Convertibility and Transferability risk 
Whenever  an  international  ban" covered  in  the  past  the  complete  political  risk  of  a 
project it can be assumed. that arrangements have been made to counter.:guarantee the risk by 
deposits of the· shareholders or ether kind  of special  relationship  between the bank concerned 
and the project promoters. This kind of full guarantee has always been an.  exception. It was only 
in 1994, when commercial bank guarant~  in emerging markets became. more frequent that the 
issue  of political  risk coverage  was  raised.  It does  in fact increase  the· cost  ~f the  ·~uarantee 
extraordinarily  because  Central  Bank  regulations  in  most ·Of  the membe.r  countries  reQuire  the 
: immediate  provisioning  of  a  political: risk  in  the  portfolio  of a  commercial  bank  unless  it is 
insured: or ~·'!"  .. ~  ':-"  ,..,~>  "•.•rnbre''"""  of a multilateral nnance institution. The willingness of the 
Bank  to renounce  to me coverage  of the  risk  of  convertibifrtv  and  transferability  of foreign 
exchange  by  the  commercial  guarantors  is  considered  as  such  an  umbrella.  The  Framework 
Agreements concluded  by the  Bank  with the governments of third  countries  which cover this 
risk put the Bank in a position tl:)  regard this specific risk as  being covered by the host coumrv 
QOvemment. This became practically the rule since  1994 and  althougt) only 6  loans have been ,, 
signed with this particularity, their large amounts bring about that these loans represent 56% of 
the total (see attachment Jl.  . 
.I Attachment 1  " 
Outstandin~ Loans with Non-S~Yvereign Guarantees  •  sorted by date of  signature 
Amount 
Date  in  Durabon 
Cou~  ..  ~ 
~  - ...  . 
~..e!".atU!"e  ~::'!E::u  ; ;:; v:::rs; 
COTIV  ISACO  851121  3.01  12ltntemationat Bank 
·  WithJWithoL:t 3 
Coverage  ; 
Convertibility 
and 
Duration  Tcansterability 
I  Full  I  with 
,,  SuQ-total 1985 
COTIV  lsONACO II  ·  861215  I 
3.0 
4.51  12l1ntemational Bank  I  Full 
.Sub-total 1986  4.5 
COTIV  IUTEXtll- 870730  1o.ol  12ltntemational Bank  Full  lwrth 
iAFRtE  IEADa GL  871215  ·s.ol  · 1oltn~emational Bank  Roll-over  lwrth 
Sub-total 1987  16.0' 
SWAZI  lsFINTEX SWAZILAND!  891122  4.ol  1.oltntemational Bank  !Roll-over  lwith 
Sub-total 1989  4.0. 
GAMER lseM Bananes A  911031  1.51  10l1ntemationai Shareholder I  Full·.·  I  with 
AFRI·  IA:;Ec·NA rr  A  911114  14.01'  ·1oltntemationat Bank:  JR~II-over Jwith 
Sub-total 1991  15.5 
MAURC IMaurilait Production  ··  ·  12!Loca1 Bank 
5.5! ·  ---10!!ntP.rnational BanK 
Sub-total 1992·.  7.5 .. 
EGYPT IJardins du Nil  930624  s.ol·  12 International aank  !Full  Wrth 
ITcH:alsKooA  930726  70.0  15.  International Shareholder I  Full  .  Without 
JAMAl.  l:rosJ GL II A  930922  5.0  10 International Bank  I  Full  Wrth 
Sub-total 1993,  81.0 
· ARGEN !Gas Natural BAN  941031  46.0  12lrntemational Bank·.  Full  With 
PHIL!  Davao Cement  941214  23:ol  8 International Bank  Full  Without 
GUINE  lsGHIA  941216  1.5  10  Local Bank  Full  Wrth. 
.. 
CHILl  CTC  941220  75.0  8 International Shareholder  Full  Wrth 
MALl  SAO lOLA  941222  35.0  8 Collateral security  Full  With 
. S_Ub-totat 1994  180.5 
' 
COTlV  PETROCI  950502  30.0  7 Collateral Securrtv  Full  · With 
EGYPT  MIDOR·  950629·  22o.o  18  International Bank  ·Full  Wrth 
HONG.  Hunaarv Fin. See. IGL  .  951122  150.0  15  International Sank  Full  Without 
lARGEN 
'  . 
AGUAS ARGENTINAS  .  951201  . 70.0  15  International Bank  Roll-over  Without 
I  I  100.0 I  ~"" .  POLOG  ~fo'oianc t!1n.  8ec. GL  951207  i5iintt:nai2U(,n,c: :a.-.k  ~uil  Without 
ITCHEQ  CE'Z  951214  . 200.0  ·15  International Sank  Roll-over.  Without 
lARGEN  AlLIN  CO  951214  6.0  10 LOcal Bank  .  Full  Wrth  . 
COTIV  SACO II  951218  '6.0  '10 Collateral s·ecuritV  Full  Wrth 
Sub-total 1 995  782.0 
,. 
Total  1094.0 .S<i?  -- Attachment 2 
Outstanding Loans with Non·Sovereign Guarantees  •  sorted by Guarantor category 
'  .  Wit:v'VV;trlot.,  1  4 
Covercige 
Convertibmty 
..  -- Amount  and 
Date  in  Duraton  Duration  T  ransferabi!ity 
Countrvi  Proiect  sionat.Jre i :-ni:uu  i :h ·,.ears i  .::>u.arant~ .:ateaorv  : =:.;arontee!  ·  ~  ·  .-SutHotats 
MALl.  iSADIOLA·  I 
I 
9412221  3s.ol  8 Collateral security  Full  I  with  I 
COTTV  IPETROCI  I 9505021'  3o.ol  7  Collateral Security  Full  lw!th 
COTIV  lsACO II  I 9512181  s.ol·  10 Collateral Security  Full  I  with  '  71.0  .. 
lsACO  .I  8511211  3.ol 
I 
J 
International Bank  I  with  COTIV  12  FUa 
COTIV  ls~NACO  II  ·.  I 8612151  451  12 InternatiOnal Bank  Fun  I  with 
COTIV  luTEXIII  I 8707301  .  10.01  12 International Bank  Fui  lwr!h 
I  I  9212161  s.sl  COTIV  !SCODI A  10 International Bank  Fun  With 
EGYPT  IJardins. c:iu  Nil  I 9306241  6.ol  12 International Bank  FuD  With  · 
JAMAl - ltosJ GL II A  I  9309221  s.ol  10 International Bank  Full  lwrtti 
I  I 9410311·  46.01  lwrth  ARGEN  !Gas Narurat BAN  12 International Bank  FuD 
I  I"  9506291  lwrth  I  . 
EGYP'i  'MIDOR  ·220.0  18 International'  Bank  Full 
I  Davao Cemem  I 
I 
23.ol  lwrthout  PHIL!  9412141  8 International Bank  Full 
HONG  ·jH~rv  Fin.  Sec. GL.  I  9511221  15o.ol  15 International Bank  .  F-ull  .  lwrthout  •.  J 
I 
I  9512071  1oo.ol  . .  ·  lwrthout ·  ,.  ·'J  POLOG  !Poland Fin. Sec.  GL  15 International Bank  Full  .. 
AFRIE. I  :ADs GL  I 8'712151  6.ol  10 Jnte:r~onal Sank 
I 
RciJ..over -IWrth. 
SWAZI  lsPINTEX SWAZILAND  I  8911221  4.01  10 International  ~nk  ·  . R~r  lwrth 
' 
IASECNA II A  I 9111141  i4.ol 
...... 
R~~r  lwrth  _  IAFRI  . )  10 International Bank  ) 
'  iARtSEN  IAGUAS ARGENTINAS  I  9512011  7o.ol  15 International Bank  Roll-ovei  Wrthout 
iTCHEO  lcE'Z  .  I 9512141  2oo.ol 
.. 
,5 International Bank  R~er Without  S67.C 
CAMER  SBM Bananas A  I 
I 
9110311  1.51  10 International Sharehoider  Fun  With  ,. 
CHILl  I  eTC  ~12201·  1s.ol  8 International Sharenoldier  Full  Wrth 
TCHEO  lsKODA  I  9307261  1o.ol 
\  I  without  1<16.5  15 International Shareholder  Full 
MAURC IMauniait Production.  ·  I 9207271  2.ol  12 L.ocai Bank  Full  lwrth. 
GUINE  lsGHIA  9412161  1.51  10 Locat Bank  FuJi  Wlttt 
ARGEN  IAIUNCO  951214  6.ol  10 Locat Bank  Full  Wrth  '  .9.5 
-I 
I  I /  I  ,_ 
Total  1094.0  1094:0 
.,. 
' Attachment 3 
Outstanding Loans with Non-Sovereign Guarantees  - so~ed_by·Coverage of 
- - ConvertibiHty arid Transferability Risk  · 
.  ~o.overage 
I 
Conveitibility 
Amount  and 
Coun~l 
'  0:1ie  j  ir.  'L:iurattonj  ;  D~:atior. , T:-anste!'ability 
~=~~oieet  ·lsianature  mECU I  in vears  . Guarantee ca!eaorv  I  ouarantee I  ·  .  risk  Sub-totals! 
COTIV  lsACO  . 851121  3.0  12l1ntemational Bank  ·  Full  Wrth  ' 
lsoNACO ll  I 8612151 
'  COTIV  4.5  12  International Bank  Full  With  ~ 
i 
COTIV  IUTEXtil  87o73ol  10.0  12  International Bank  F-ull  With  f 
AFRIE  lEADs GL  8712151  6.0  .1 olt.ntemational Bank  Roll-over  With  i 
SWAZI  lsPtNTEX SWAZILAND·  . 10itntemational Bank 
I 
891122  4.0  Roll-over  With 
I 
· CAMERiseM Bananes A 
: 
911031  1.5  10  International Shareholder Full  With  : 
AFRI  ASECNA II A  91111141  ~4.0  10  International Bank  Roll-over  With 
MAURC IMauriiait Production  9207271·.  2.0  12  Local Bank  Full  With 
COTIV  lscOOIA  9212161  5.5  10l1nternational Bank  Full  With 
EGYPT IJardins du Nil  9306241  5.0  12  International Bank  Full  With 
JAMAl  ITDBJ GL II A  9309221  5.0  10  International Bank  Full.  . Wrttl 
ARGEN  Gas  N~tural BAN  ~1031  .46.0  12 International Bank  Full  Wrth 
GUlNE  .SGH! A  ~  .. ~.~=:1  - ~.=:.!-.  ~.5  ..  10  Local Sank  '  Full  ·With. 
CHILl  ·  CTC  941220  15.0  sl I  ntemational Shareholder Full.  Wrth  .. 
MALl.  SAD lOLA  •  941222  35.0  B Collateral securitv  •  Full  wrtta· 
COTIV.  PETROCI  950502  30.0  7 Collateral SecuritY  Full  Wrth 
EGYPT  MIDOR  950629  220.0  18 International Bank·  Full  Wrth 
ARGEN IAIUNCO  9512141  6.0  10  Local Bank  Fun.  ·With 
conv  SACO II  951218  6.0  10  Collateral Securitv  Full  Wrth  481.0 
TCH.EQ  lsKODA  9307261  70.0  15  l~ernational SharehotderiFult  Without 
PHILi  loavao Cement  941214  23.0  altntemational Bank.  Full  ·Without 
.• 
HONG·.  Hunaarv Fin. Sec. GL  951122  150.0  15  International Bank  Full  Without 
ARGEN !AGUAS ARGENTINAS  951201  70.0  15  International Bank  Roll-over  Wrthout 
PO  LOG  Poland Fin. Sec. GL  951207  100.0  15  International Bank.  Full  Wrthout 
TCHEQ  ' 
.-
Internatio-nal Sank  CE'Z  951214  .  200.0  15  Roll-over  Without  613.C 
. 
,. 
Total  1094.0  1094.C -'-\-0-
,j  Annex 6 
GUARANTEE FUND  ._,  '  ....  ' 
Purpose of  ttie Fund 
1.  The  European  Council  in  Edinburgh  on  11  and  12 December  1992  concluded  that 
considerations  of  prudent  budgetary  managem~nt  and  ,financial  discipline.  called  for  the 
establishment of a new financial mechanism, and that accordingly ·a  Guarantee Fund shou!d be _set · 
up  in  order to  c6ver the  risks  related  to, loans  and  guarantees  eovering  loans  granted  to: third 
countries  or for  projects  carried  out  in  such  countries.  _  The  Fund· is .  mainly  concerned  wit~ the · 
following types of oper~tion :· 
'  ' 
•  · Commu.nity loans for providing macro-financial.assistance; 
·•  Community  guarantees ·on  loans .  advanced  by  the  EIB  and  EURATOM  for  micr~ecor10mi9,  · 
~~;  .  ' 
•  Community  guarantees for operations  of a commercial· nature,  such  as  guarantees for.  loans 
made by financial institutions to fund purchases offoodstuffs ormedicines. ,  ·  ·  · 
\  '"  I 
2.  ·The.  fund's resources are  intended to  reimburse the  Community's creditors in  the .event of 
default on the part of the beneficiary of a loan granted or guaranteed by the Community. 
Provisioning of  the  ·fund 
,  ..  .  '  ..  ·'  .. 
3.  The. Council  regulation establishing the  Fund  provides for a d·ual  mechanism _comprising  a· 
·  !eser.ve entered in the general budgeUmd a Guarantee Fund provisioned by the reser\te;  ·Payments  • 
equal to  14% of the principal amount of loan  orguar~ntee.operations shall  be  made into the func;l 
-until .the  target  amount  is  re.ached  of 10%  of the  Community's total  outstanding capital  liabilities, 
increased by unpaid interest due.  The provisioning rate is 'to  be reviewed when the Fund. reaches 'its  · . 
target amount and,  in  any case,  rio  later than the el}d of  .1999.  The Fund  is also to be etidow:ed. ,by  -
interest on  Fund resources invested and amounts recovered from defaulting debtors wher~  the Fund 
has already honoured the guarantee.  ·  ·  '  ·· · 
4.- ~ayments into the Fund are made in accordance with the following terms and conditions :  .  .  ~  ' 
4.1.  For Community l;lorrowingllending  op~rations or guarantees,to financial bodies1,  Wh~the~ in. 
one  or more tranches;  with -the  exception  of those  covered  in  section 4.2.  below,  the  Commission 
initiates the procedure for payment into the Fund as soon  as the Council  has  formally adopted the 
underlying decision.  The .amount to  be  paid into the  Fund  is  calculated  on  the basis ofthe _oyer.all 
· amount ofthe operation decided by the coun?iL  · 
4.2.  _  For  Community  borrowing/lending  operations  or  guarantees  to· financial  bodies ·under. a · 
fram~work facility, ·spread  over  several  years,  with  a  micro-economic  or  structural  purposE;!2, 
payments into the Fund  are ·made  in  ttie form of annual  instalments calculated  on  the~·basis of the 
·annual amounts jndicated in the .financial statement attached to the Corhmissiori  propos~!.. .  · _  · 
4.3.  As from  the  second  year,· the  amounts_ to  be  ·paid into ·the  Fund  are ·corrected  by  the 
_difference  r~corded as at 31  December of the previous year between the ·estimates taken as a basjs 
for the preceding payment and the actual amount of loan contracts signed in the  ~curse of the same-
year. 
-1 Examples of this type of operation: loans for balance of'payments support for thirp countries or the 
guarantee provided to .a _consortium  of corrimerctal  banks to finance  purchases  of food  products  in 
third countries.  .  .  ·  . 
2 Examples of this type of operation: EURATOM ·loans to third countries and guarantees provided to 
the EIB for loans in the Mediterranean and'ALA countries, the CEEC and South Africa. - 4-\-
5.  The rules concerning provisioning of the Fund only apply for operations decided and .entered 
into as from 1 :January 1993 (for more detailed information  on  the  rules and  operation of the Fund, 
see Council Regulation W  2728/94 of 31  OCtober 1994 establishing  a  Gu~rantee Fund for external 
actions, appended hereto).  · 
Management of the Fund's resou'rces 
6.  Wrth regard to management of the Fund, the solution adopted divides responsibility between 
·the Commission  and  the  EIB: the  Commission  ensures administration  of operations  at budgetary 
level and the EIB is entrusted with financial management of the Fund's resources.  The text of the 
mandate entruSting management by the Commission to the Bank was drawn up and approved.by the 
Bank and the Commission.  ·  · 
Repercussions for EIB operations outside the Community 
·  7.  As th.e  budgetary reserve for provisio'ning the Fund is limited to ECU 323 million per annum 
at'1995 prices, there·is an implicit constraint on  annual commitment capacity for new operations.  ·In 
the  ~oinmunication from the Commission to the Council of is  July 1995 (COM (95)' 404 final). the 
Commission  points  out  that  "this  constraint  is  such  that  if the  amount  of  the ·reserve  and ·the 
guarantee mechanism remain  unchanged,  it .would  be  impossible simply to  renew the  EIB's multi-
. annual  loan· allocations  at  their  present  level  while  maintaining  a  min'imum  macro-financial' 
assiStance . capacity".  ·1n  this  same  communication,  the  -Commission  also  mentions  that  "the 
European Council meeting in  Cannes confirmed the  Union's intention of strengthening  its financial 
cooperation  with  partner  third  countries,. in  particular  the  central  and  east  Eu rbpean  countries · 
· (CEECs) and the Mediterranean countries (MED}".  There is consequently a risk that the constraints 
of the .Fund  could  be  exacerbated.  The  communication  ind_icates  that this situation would call for 
either a  revision  of the  financial  perspective,  a decrease  in  the  rate  of guarantee  cover on  EIB 
operations outside the Community, an  amendment to the regulation establishing the Fund to reduce 
the rate  of provisioning of the Fund  or a combination  of these  various p·osSibilities  to  unblock the. 
situation.  The Commission summarised the current  position  and· furnished  additional  details  in  its 
information note of 11  January 1996 by  Mr de Silguy and Mr Liikanen (document SEC(96)49). 
8.  Against this background, it should be noted that when the Council held discussions last year 
on the problems of the Guarantee Fund, the  Bank's representative  issued  a reservation,  indicating· 
~hat his institution could not commit itself to signing contracts for specific annual amounts .but hoped 
to operate, as in the past,  on the. basis of multi-annual mandates and  packages.  An  adjustment in 
the  pattern  of signatures to  accommodate  the  accounting  constraints  of the  Fund· would  not  be 
manageable for the Bank (~ee introductory note  W  1  0872/95 of 19 October  1995 from the General 
Secretariat of the Council to the ECOFlN Council held on  23 October 1995).  From the operational 
point of view, it is clearly impossible for the EIB to increase or reduce the volume of loans from one 
year to the next in  line with  a  budgetary margin which  is not known· in  ~dvance, on  the one  hand, 
because of possible non-programmable macro-financiar assistance  and,  on  the  other,  because it is 
not certain in which year the target amount of the Fund will be  reached and  its provisioning_ rate can 
be reduced. 
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·(Acts whose-publication is  obligatory) 
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC,  EURATOM) No 2728/94 
of 3i  Octob~ 1994 
establishing a  G~antee  F~d  for external actions 
TiiE COUNOL OF nrE EUROPE.AJ.'-1  UNION, . 
.  /  .  . 
Having, regaid  to  the  Treaty  establishing.  ~e European 
· · Co~uruty, and in  particular Article 235 thereof, 
.  . 
·Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Atomic Energy Community, and in  particular Article 203 
thereof, 
Hav.ing  regard to the  propos~! from  the Commission (1), 
· Having  regard  to  the  opinion  of  the  European 
Parliament .(2 ), 
.. Having  regard  to  the  opinion  of  the  Court  of 
Auditors (3), 
Whereas  the  general  . bu'dget  of  ..  the  European 
Communities  is  exposed  to  increased  financial  risk as  a 
result  of  the  guarantees·  covering  loans  to  third 
· countries; 
Whereas  the  European  Council on 11  and 12 .December  · 
1992 concluded that considerations of prudent. bu'dgetary 
management  and  .fuiancial.  discipline·  called  for  the 
establishment  of a  new  financial .  mechanism,  and  that 
accordingly a Guarantee Fund should be  set up in  order 
to  cover  the  risks  related  to · loans  and  guarantees 
covering  loans granted  to. third countries or for. projecrs . 
executed in  third countries; whereas it is  possible to meet  · 
this  need.  by  the  establishment  of  a  Guarantee  Fund · 
which  may  be  drawn  on  to  pay  the  Community's. 
creditors direcr;_  · 
Whereas  the  institutions  have  agreed,  pursuant to  the 
Interinstitutional ·Agreement  of  29  Ocrober  1993,  to 
. enter  into  th~ budget  a  reserve  relating  to  lending  and 
guarantee  operations  for  the  benefit  of  an,d · in  third 
countries; 
(1)  OJ  No C 68, 11.  3.  1993, p.  10. 
(2)  OJ  No  C 315, 22. 11. 1993; p.  235. 
(3)  OJ  No  C 170, 21. 6.1993, p. 25. 
Whereas  mechanisms  currently  exist  'for  :honoUring 
'guaran~~es  when  they  are  activated,  in  particular  by 
drawing provisionally on  cash resources, as provided. for 
in  Article  12 of Council Regulation  (EEC,  Euratom) No 
· 1552/89  of  29  May  1989  implementing  Decision 
88/376/EEC, Euratom on the system of the  Commlinities! 
own resources (4);  · 
.  •I  .. 
Whereas  the  Guarantee. Fund  should  be  constituted ·by 
the gradlial payment of reseurces;  where~s the F.pnd  will 
subsequently .also receive interest on its invested resoilrces 
and  amounts  recovered  fro'in  defaulting  debtors· where 
the  Fund  has  already honoured .the· guarante_ei 
Whereas,  by  reference . to  the . practice  of.  international 
financial  institutions,  a  ratio  o'f  '10%  betWeen  the 
·Guaran_tee  Fund~s resources  and  guaranteed ·liabilities in 
principal,  increased· by  unpaid .  interest. due,  would seem 
. adequate;  · 
Wherea; payments to. the  Guara.ntee Fund equal to 14 % 
of the amount of each operation would seem  appropriate 
to  attain this  target· amount;  whereas  the  arrangements 
for  making such payments ~must be  defined; 
Whereas,  once  the  target  amount  is  attained,  the 
provisioning  rate  .  will  be  reviewed,  whereas  if  the 
Guarantee  Fund  exceeds  the  target  amount  the  surplus · 
will  be  paid  back to the. general  budget of the  European 
Communities;  · 
Whereas  the  finanCial  management  of  the  Guarantee 
Fund  should  be  entrusted  to  the  Europe~n Investment 
Bank  (EIB);  whereas  the  financial- management  of  the 
Fund should be subjeCt to audit by the .Court of Auditors 
in  accordance with procedures robe 'agreed  upon  by  the 
(4)  OJ No L  !"55~ 7. 6.  1989, p.  1.  R~ulation as  Lm  amenqed 
by Regl.!lation  (EC, Eurarom) .No 2729/94 (see page 5 of this 
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Court  of Auditors,  the Commission  and  the  European 
Investment Bank; 
Whereas  the Treaties  do not provide  any  powers  other 
than those purs1.1ant  to Article  235 of the  EC Treaty and 
Article 203 of the  EAEC  Treacy for  the adoption of this 
Regulation~ 
HAS  ADOPTE> TinS REGUlATION: 
Article 1 
A Guarantee Fund, hereinafrer referred to as 'Fimd', shall 
be established, whose resources shall be used to repay the 
Comunity's  creditors  in  the  event  of  default  by  the 
beneficiary  of  a  loan  granted  or  guaranteed  by  the 
Community.  · 
The  l~nding and guarantee operations referred  to  in  the 
first  paragraph,- hereinafter  refered  to  as  'operations'' 
shall  be  those.  carried  out  for  the  benefit- of a ·third 
country or for the purpose of financing pro]ects in  third 
countries.  · 
Article 2 
The Fund shall be  endowed by: 
- payments  from  the  general  budget of the  European 
·Communities pursuant to Article 4, 
- interest on Fund resources invested, 
amounts recovered from def;;tulting debtots where the 
Fund has already honoured the  guarantee. 
Article 3 
The  Fund  shall  rise  to  an  appropriate  level,  hereinafter 
· referred to as 'the target amount'. 
The  target  amount "shall  be  10 o/o  of the  Community's 
total  outstanding  capital  liabilities  arising  from  each 
operation, increaSed  by  unpaid iriterest due. 
If, at the  e"nd  of a  year,  the  target  amount  is  exceeded, 
the surplus shall  be  paid back to a special headip.g in  the 
statem.ent  of  revenue  in  the  general  budget  of  the 
European Communities. 
Article 4 
1.  The  payments  provided  for  under the  first  indent of 
Article 2 shall be  equivalen~ to 14% of the capital value 
of  the  operations  unci!  the  Fund  reaches  the  target 
amount. 
The  provisioning  rate  shall  be  reviewed  when. the  Fund 
reaches  its  target amount, and in  any. "case' no later than 
·the  end  of 1999: 
·"'""  1. 
2.  Payments. into the  Fund  shall  be  made  in  accordance 
with the arrangements indicated in  the Annex .• 
Article 5 
If, as  a·  result of the  activation of guara11tees  following 
default, ·resources in  the Fund stand  below  75 o/o  of the 
target  amOUJ1t,  the  rate  of.  provisioning  On  new 
operations  shall  be  raised  to  15 %.  until  the  target 
amount  has  once  more  been  reached  or,  if  the.  default 
occurs  before  the  target  amount  is  reached,  until  the 
amolplt drawn under the  activation of the guarantee has 
been  fully  restored.  ·  · 
If,  a~ a result of the  activation of guarantees on one  or 
more  major  defaults,  resources  in  the  Fund  fall  below 
50 % of the target am9ui1t, the· Commission shall submit 
a report on exceptional  measures that might  be  required 
to replenish  the  Fund.  · 
Article  6. 
The Commission shall  entrust· ·the  financi~l management 
of the Fund to the .EIB  under a brief on the Commtinity's 
behalf. 
Article 7 
The Commission shall, by no later than '31  March of the 
· following  financial  year,  send  to  the  European 
Parliament,  the. Council  and  the  .. Court of Auditors  an 
annual  report  on  the. siruation  of  the  Fund  and  the · 
management thereof in  the  previous year. 
Article 8 
The  revenue  and  expenditure  account  and  the  balance 
sheet  relating  to  the  Fund  shall  be  attached  to  the 
Communities'.  revenue  and  expenditure  account  and 
balance sheet. 
Article 9 
The Commission shall, before 31 December 1998, submit 
a comprehensive  report on the functioning  of the Fund. 
Article 10 
This Regulation shall enter. into force  on the seventh· day  · 
following "Its  publiearion ·in  the  Official journal of the 
European Communities. 
Article  4  shall  apply  to . operations  decided  on · and 
committed as  from  1 january 1993. 12. lt. 94-. 
;. 
:  ~: . 
A-t+_. 
Off~cial Journal of  the  European Communities 
This Regulation  shall be  binding· in its entirety  and  directly  applicable  in  all  Member 
States.:  ·  -
Done at Lux~mbourg, 31  October 1994. 
.  I 
'.  ' ~ 
..  ,~  .. 
r  .-~ .- -·  - . ' 
. ~ .  ·: 
For  the Council 
The President 
K.  Kl~"KEL 
I 
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ANNEX 
Arrangements for the payments stipulated in  the first indent of Arri,cle  2 
1.  Payments into the ~und will be made  i.ti.  accordance with the arrangements set out in  paragraphs 2 and 
3,  depending on whether the operations concerned are: 
(a}  Community borrowing/lending operations or guarantees to financial  bodies, whether made in  one or 
more than one. tranche, except those covered by  (b}  (1 };  •  · 
. (b)  COmmUnity  borrowing/lending  operations  or guarantees. to  financial  bodies  under  a  framework 
facility ,spread over a number of years and with a micro-economic and structuia.I purpose (l). 
2.  For  the operations referred to under  point 1 (a}  the Comission will  start the  procedure for making the 
payments into the  Fund as soon as  the Council has  formally adopted the basic decision. The amount to 
be paid into the Fund will be calculated on 'the basis of the total amount for the operation decided on  by 
the  Council.  ·  · 
3.  For  the  operations  referred  to under  point  1  (b),  payments  into  the  Fund  will  be  made  in  annual 
tranches calculated on the basis of the  annual amounts inciicateQ  in  the  financial  Statement attached  to 
the Commission proposal, adapted where appropriate in  the-light of the  Council  decision. 
The Commission will Starr the procedure for making p~rments into the Fund as soon as the Council has 
formally adopted the basic decision, or at the  beginning of the following financial year if no operation is 
programmed for the current financial year. For subsequent financial years the  Commission will stan the 
payment procedure at the beginning of the financial  year. 
As  from  the  second  year,  the  amounts  to  be  paid into  the  Fund  will  be  corrected  by  the  d.ifferen~e 
recorded on 31  December of the previous year between the estimates that were  taken as a basis  for  the 
previous payment and the actual ngure for the loans signed during that year. Any  difference relating to 
the  p~evious year will give  rise to a payment in the following year.  · 
4.  When  it  startS, a  payment  procedure  the  Commission  will  check  the  siruatjon  with  regard  to  the 
performance of the operations which were the subject of previous payments and, where the commionent 
deadlines  originally  laid  down  ha'Ce  ·not  been  m~t, will  propose  that  this  be  taken  into  acount  in 
calculating  the  first  payment  to  be  made  at the  Starr  of. the fo!Jowing  financial  year  for  operations · 
already under way.  ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
5.  For  operations  decided  «?n  by  the  Council  as  from  1  January  1993  the  Commission· v.'ill  Start  the 
procedure  for  making  payments  into  the  Fund  as  soon  as  possible  after  the  entry  into  force  of the 
Regulation,  in accordance with the arrangements set out in  the preceding paragraphs. 
(1)  Ex.:amples of this  cype of operation: loans for the  b~lance of payme~rs of third countries or the guar:mtee granted to a. 
consortium of commercial banks to finance  the  purchase of food  productS in  rhicd  countries. 
(l)  Ex.:arnples of th.is  rypc of operation: Euratom loans to third countries and the guarantees granted to the EIB  for  its loans 
in  the  developing  countries  in  Latin  Amerio  and  Asia  (DClAA)  and  the  cenrral  and castem  European  countries 
(CE.EC).  • 
12.  11.  94 Annex 7 
Use of  the Member States' or Community budget-guarantee 
As stressed in the report, the EIB has always arranged appropriate guarantees for its operations from 
own  resource~; so  as  to· safeguard  the  guarantee  ·also  furnished  by  the  Member·  States  or  the 
Community budget to comply with Article 18 of the Statute. 
Thls security'has consisted essentially of sovereign guarantees·provided by the Associated States in 
which the Bank maunts operations.  In fact, until 1993 the great majority of loans were made to these· 
States themselves  or their public  institutions  (see  report ·and  Annex 5).  ·In  the  absence  of such 
sovereign  cover,  guarantees  hl:!ve 'been  furnished  under ?mmgements  offefing  adequate  security 
(guarantees from banks, promoters or a combination of the two).  ··  · 
. ' 
... The  tables  below· detail  the  use  made  of  the~e guarantee  arrangements  in  practice  since  their 
· \  introduction, namely:  , 




. ~Table 5: 
Summary .  of  arrears ·on  loans  outside  .the· European  Union  (appended 
hereto)~: . 
Historical summary of guarantee caljs made in respect of arrears in the  nol!-
mernber Mediterranean countries· (these tables are available on request from 
the. Bank).  : 
Historical summary of guarantee  call~ made in respect of arrears in the ACP 
Stat~s  .(these tables are available on request from the. Bank). 
_Arrears covered by and still owed to the guarantors (apperlded hereto). 
Ge'ographicai breakdown of lending by country .in which projects are  located . 
(appended hereto). 
While the conclusions emerging  fro~ the above tables are deveioped in the main body of the report, 




Up until 1985 the Bank had recorded virtually no payme-nt arrears and consequently had not 
had to invoke·the guarantee of either the Community or the Member States1.  This reflected the 
general  situation' with  respect  to  debt  servicing  vis-a~vis both  multilateral  and  bilateral  public 
development financing bodies.  ·  · 
Developments. in this situ~tion were such that as. from 1987 the firSt payment arrears began to 
emerge (ECU 2.8m for the ACP States and ECU 2.2m for the Mediterranean Countries in  March 
1987).  No call needed io be  made on the .Community guarantee with  respeCt to these inftial  lat_e 
payments to the extent that the 'defaulting borrowers or. the ,guarantors managed to settle these 
arrears within three months of the due date.  ·  ·  · 
It ·is  imp~rtant to  note that,  as  can  be  se~n from  Table 1,  the  time  lapse  between· the 
occurrence  ~f  payment  arrears  and  an  ,  actual  ~II  being  made  on  the  Com'munity 
guarantee represents  a normal state  of affairs,  given that the  various  guarantee  agreements 
concluded  between  the  EIB  and. the  Community  provide for such guarantee to  be  invoked  no 
later than three months after tt'le due date in question.  The Bank makes use of this period of , 
three months·  to take all p.ossible measures to recover the sums concerned.  lnaeed, ·these 
amounts  are  sometimes  recovered  even  after a formal  call  has  been  made  on  the  Member 
States' or Community _budget guarantee, resulting  in  annulment of this call ..  Recovery of these 
amounts  and  ·  adiTJinistrative  management  of  these  procedures  represents  a  considerable 
workload  for the Bank's departments, the  positive outcome of which· depends largely, over and 
above  contra'ctual  .commitments. as  such,  on  thorough  knoWledge  of projects  and  borrowers; 
enabling- the  Bank  to  benefit de facto, when the  project  and/or  country  situatio~ so  pennits, 
.  { 
1 with one minor exception in 1984. relating to Liberia (three instalments of ECU 0.3m  subseq~ently 
paid ·by the borrower and _refunded to the Member States). • 
from  preferential  treatment.  Payment  arrears  generally  stem  from  forex  transfer  problems 
cOnnected  with  the  situation  in  the  countries  concerned  rather .than  from  difficulties with  the 
projects themselves.  · 
The first calls on the Community gl.:aarant,e,  in tenns of·. actually requesting settlement 
from the Member States'' or the Community budget guarantee, date from June 1988.  They 
related to Lebanon in the Mediterranean region  and  a number of ACP ·States (Zambia,  Liberia 
and  Nigeri~).  The. graph  in  Table 4· provides  an  overview  of developments  (the  graph  in the 
·main  body  of the  report  relates  to  aggregate  arrears,  i.e.  amounts  owed  to  the  Bank  plus. 
amounts settled under the Community guarantee). 
,.-' STATEMENT OF ARREARS ON LOAN INSJALMENTS ·LOANS OUTSIDE THE COMMUNITY 
OWN RESOURCES 
(ECU '000) 
ACPSTATES  MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES  FORMERYUGOSLAVIA 
Total owed  Instalments seHied by  TOTAL  Total owed  Instalments settled by  TOTAL  Total·owed  Instalments settled 
..  ,.  toEIB  ·  the Member States(1)  to EIB.  the EC budget(1)  toEIB  by the EC budget(1) 
(a)  (b)  0 0 
.  .  .  . 
Mar~87  2 786  - 2 786  2191  2191  .. 
Jun-87  9045  '9'045  . 5576  0 0  '5576 
Sep-87:'  7665  7665  5 713 ..  0 0  5]13 
Dec-87  13060  13060  9028  9028 
; 
Mar-88  8176  8176  4 738.  . 4 738 
Jun-88  c  0 17047  1 544  18 591  '9489  3905  '13 394 
Sep-88  11 945  676  12 621  14 417  .. 3905  0 0  . 18 322 
Dec-88  .  20 546  676  21  222  . 8955  0 0  3943  12 898' 
Mar-89  ·  7 864  676  8540  10 218  3943  '  14161 
Jun-89  16 766  350 
0 0 
17116  15 571.  4238  19809 
Sep-89  12 713  .  12 713  9172  7 800  15 972 
'  Dec-89  12 235  354  .  12 589  13 636  7800.  21  436 
.. 
Mar-90  10.324  10324  10345  .·12 OZ5  .  22 420 
Jun-90  20944  1 212  22156  16529  13043  29572 
Sep-90  11186  ·3-150  14 336  7 474  20163  27.637 .. 
· Dec-90  18 268  .  967.  19 235  15 632  21059  36691 
0 0 
Mar-91  10 738  517  11.255  5303  14 381  19684 
Jun-91  16925  1 312  18 237  13.239  14 381  27620 
Sep-91  13171  1 312  14 483  6656  332.  .  6.988 
Dec-91  18 21;14  2 678  20962  8948  2 288  11  236 
Mar-92.  10 t36  3 651  13 787  7 474  2 286  9 762  4 611 
Jun-92  14 551  3651  18 202  10 447  . 2956  13 403  6317 
Sep-92  10056  5097  15153  1157  5059  6 216  11  674 
Dec-92  20 347  5097  25444  2952  2952  6610  8500 
Mar-99  18 217  6 48.1  24698 
0 . 
4191  4 191'  13 502  ·9500 
Jun-93  32 717  7 378 ..  40095  2 458  2 458  8970  15176 
. Sep-93  25093  ;12 729  •  37 822  76  0  0  76  9 211  .  0 22 595 
Dec-93·  34907  15374  50281 ..  3 765  3 765  5 745  2~660 
Mar-94  27 316  24 726  '  .  52 042  '  .  1 . 
.. 
1  13 837  28660 
o  •  Jun-94  34 681  24 513  .  59194  2 821- . 2 821  9402  34 639 
Sep-94  20972  26 334  47 306  1 539  ·1  539  9303  43 217 
Dec-94 ··  29407  23 556  05~ 963  1808  . 1 808  10 561  43 217 
32 034.  46028  42 
.. 
"42  13 756  48 516  Mar-95  13 994  . 
Jun-95  ·  25838  32 978  58816  '  3189  ·.3'.189  9 351  54 598 
Sep-95.  ',18 717  41  374  60091  663- ...  663  17 411  . 54 598 
Oec.95  27 525  41  398  68923  1 228  1 228  10792  63 213 
.  0 
(1) lnetalments settled by the guarantors and still owed to them 
lource: weekly ttstement, .,.;,.,.mort thiln 10 dlyt overdue; flgur•• at end of qual1er  1\RIIIlSU!I.IILII 
1\IIIIC,;~  I'  JCJ.U~\;;  J.. 
TOTAL  Sltotal still owed 
TOTAL  arrears  . to guarantors 
.  ' 
(c)  ·  (a+b~c)  I  (g) 
. 4977  0 
14 621  0 
.13 378  ··o 
22 088  0 
.. 
'  12 914  0 
. 31  985  5449 
.:;...  30 943  .  4 581  ,..  ... '  34 120  4 619 
;_,  .,  ;,,A  ,.  -
..  ..  j' 22 701  ....  4 619 
·-1- ~ f  _  .. ,,  36-925  ·0::. 4588 
1~.  ·~  •J  :·~  '  . 29.685  .•  ':.:  7  800 
''".  ~~·~  '  34 025  ._!'  "'  8154 




.  51  728  ..  14 255 
41973.  23 313 
..  .  55 926  :  22 026 
~ .  . ·-
..  30 939  14 898 .  ..  ...  45 857  .  :  15 693 
...  .. ··::·  2·1  4i1  1 644 
_:,  32  198  .  4 966  .. 
4 611  28  160  5939 
6317  . . 37 922  .•·  6607 
11 674  33 043  10 156 
15110  .43 506  13 597  -.. 
22 002  50 891  14 981 
. 24146  66 699  22 5,54 
31  806  0  69 704  35 324 
34 405  !JB 451  44 034 
42 497  94 540.  53386 
. 44 041  106 056  59  152 
52 520  101 365  69 551 
·  sJ na·  108 549  66 773 
0 '62 272  108 342  80 550 
63 949  ..  :125 954  87 576 
72 009  . '  132 763  95 972 . 
.74po~  .  -:  14.4 156  .  ,'  ',:,~ 104 611 

















INSTALMENTS SETTLED BY GUARANTORS AND STILL OWED TO THEM 
Loans outside the European Union - Ordinary Section 
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[  •  Member  Stat~s· guarantee  -~  EC bu~~t  gu -~~ -~ee  __ _ _ __I 
Source: .weekly statements, arrears mqre than 10 days overdue; figures at end of qua·rter 
Annex  7,  Table  4 





Annex 7, Table 5 
6 ..  GEOGRAPHICAL BREAKDOWN OF LENDING BY COUNTRY IN WHICH PROJECTS ARE · 
LOCATED  . 
/ 
'· 
Countries and ·territori~s in  No. of  Aggregate loans  Undisbursed  .Disbursed ·portion ·.  %of 
which  ~rojects are located  loans  outstandin£1  .·  eortion  total 
6.2.  Loans for projects outside the Union 
6.2.1;  .ACP Countries/OCT 
NIGERIA  ,  T  210 344 684  75 000 000  .  135 344 684 
ZIMBABWE.  15  182 768 248  . .· 74 476 455  108 291  793  ' 
COTE D'IVOiRE  13  116 591  727  10 491869  106 099 858 
KENYA·  9  105 949 734  13 000 000  92 949 734 
BOTSWANA  1'2  79 309 997  4.8 264_100  31  045 897 
GHANA.  4  76 854 731  50 000 000  26 854 731 
~AMAICA  ·  10  72 811976  26 '878 819  . 45 933 157' 
MAURITIUS  9  . 70 202 386  . 52 000 000  .  18 202 386 . 
ACP GROUP  2  70 102 147  60 000 000  10 102 147 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA  7  69 698 190  41  000 000  28 698190 
· TRINIDAD'& TOBAGO  5  64 896 406  26 055 593  .  38 840 813 
CAMEROON  .  g.  52'379 561  . ·  ..  8 000 000  44 379 561 
SOUTH AFRICA  2  45 000 000  45 000 000 
·MALl  1 .  35 153 898  .11  752 274  23 401  624 
FIJI  ·7  30 493171..  8 000 000  .  ·-22 49317·1 
BAHAMAS  3  26 861  730  14000 000.  12 861730 
NAMIBIA  3  23 746 645  1.8 592 464  .  5.154 181 
MOZAMBIQUE  1  20 000 000  20 000 000 
·GUINEA  3  17 492 118  .  7 500 000  . 9 992 1~8 
BARBADO$ _  ·  '4  16 946 383  ··1o ooo boo  6 946 383 
. NETHERLANDS ANTILLES  6  14 804 827  5 000 000  9 804 827 
MAURITANIA  1  14 076·763  14 076 763 
REGIONAL- AFRICA  '  1  13 862 537  3 015 668  10'846 869 
FRENCH POLYNESIA  4'  12 6'53 353  3 023 500  9 629 853 
SENEGAL  .2  12 333 499  12 333 499 
MALAWI  5  9 279  ~31  9 ~79 531 
ZAIRE  1  7 756 649.  7 756649. 
SAINT LUCIA  3  6 920 042  1 060 000  5 860.042 
NEW CALEDONIA  2'  6 354 190  1 325 000  .5 029_190 
GABON  3  6 0.36 778  . 6, 036 778· 
SWAZILAND  3  4'477 296  4 477 296 
. ' 
. CAYMAN ISLANDS  3  . 4 447063.  . 4 447'063 
.  ·.LESOTHO  1  4 261  018  4 261  018 
CONG,P  2'  3 725 949  3 725 949 
BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS  2  3 480 651  1 300 000  .  2 180.651 
ARUBA  2  3 085 494  1 600 000  1 485 494 
SAINT VINCENT  1  2 705 764  .  2 7os 7~ 
WEST AFRICA  1  .. 2 648 381  2 648 381 
ZAMBIA  1  2 601  843  .  2 601843 
EAST AFRICA  1  2 433 1'08  24!33.108' 
FALKLAND ISLANDS  :1  '  2 337 945  2 337 945 
TONGA  2  2 285 216.  620 000  1 665 216 
TOGO  1  2 167 183 
.. 
2 167 183 
CENTRAL AFRICA  1  -1  598 418  1 598 418 
SEYCHELLES  1  1 378 438  . 1 378 438 
BELIZE  2  1 047 141  1 047141 
NIGER  1  :sse 987  ·  9~8 987 
. MONTSERRAT  . 1  302 730  302 730 . 
LIBERIA.  _'_1  141  829  141  829 
.  Sub-total  182  1 537 806 355.  636 955 742  . 900 850 613  1.34 Annex 7. Table 5 
6.  GEOGRAPHICAL BREAKDOWN OF LENDING BY COUNTRY IN WHICH PROJECTS ARE 
LOCATED 
Countries and territories in which  No .. of  Aggregate loans  Undisbursed  Disbursed portion ·  %of 
projeCts are located  loans  outstanding  portion  total 
6.2.2.  Mediterranean Countries 
EGYPT  25  774 359 483  475 016 182  299 34.3 301 
MOROCCO  ·.·.  ,.  22,  . 766156 894  500 063 44:6  266.693448 
ALGERIA  17  .  . 717 639 916  492 518 694  '225 121  222 
TUNISIA  31  450 032 887  236 858 290  213 174 597 
FORMER FR OF YUGOSLAVIA (b)  18  420 311  940  420 311  940 
LEBANON  8  254 878 987  200 047 000  54 831  987 
JORDAN.  26  . 1.98109515  111217184  ·as 892 331 
ISRAEL  4  97 000 214  .  68 000 OOdeiO  29 000 214 
TURKEY  4  94 694 344  93 500 000  •.  1 194 3:44 
CYPRUS  8  74 490 986  34 249 500  ·40 241486 
SYRIA  5  54 783 349  11  855 200 .  . 42 928 149 
MALTA  5  46 349 671.  26.720 500  19 629 171 
GAZANVEST BANK  _l  20 000 000  20 000 000· 
Sub-total  .'115  ·3 969 408 186  2 270 045 996  1 699 362 190  3.46 
6.2.3.  Central and Eastern EuroQeari Countries 
POLAND  1.5  1 005 655 609  707530 284  298 125 325 
CZECH REPUBLIC  9  737 871285  . 658 482 313.  79 388 972 
HUNGARY  13  729174 515  425 235 470  303 939 045 
ROMANIA  9  -381549241  309 010 137  72 539 104 
BULGARIA  7  285 451  998  231  048 434  54 403 564 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC  8  252 378 561  145 128 013  107 250 548 
SLOVENIA  5  120 075156  96 791  910  .  23283 246 
ESTONiA  5  51  823 399  40 sao ooo  11  323 399 
ALBANIA  3·  ·34 000 000  34 000 000  . 
LITHUANIA.  3  28 952 585.  23 003 261  ·5 949 324 
LATVIA  _1  5 000 000  5 000 000 
Sub-total  78  3 631  932 349  2 675 729 822  956 202 527  3.17 
6.2.4.  Asian and Latin American Countries 
ARGENTINA  3  118 599 982  76 000 000·  •.  42 599' 982 
CHILE  1  71  019 591  4 631  261  66 388 330 
PAKISTAN  2  60 000 000  ·so ooo ooo 
THAILAND  . '2  57 959 191  51  719 844  6 239 347 
INDIA  1  55 000 000  . 55 000 000 
CHrNA  1  55 000 009  55 000 000 
PHILIPPINES  2  47 811  382  39173 581  8 637'801 
INDONESIA  1  46 000 000  46 000 000 
COSTA.RICA  1  44 000 000  44 000 000 
PERU·  1  2S 626 839  1 642 050  24 984 789 
PARAGUAY  __  1  17 000 000  17 000 000 
Sub-total  ___j§  599 016 985  450166 736  148 850 249  '0.52 
Total.  ~ 9 738 163 875  . 6 032 898 296  3 705 265 579  8.49 
GRAND TOTAL  . 5193  114 636 808 650  18 545 044 986  96 091  763 664  100%  = 
(b)  Loansgranted to public entities in the former Federal Republic of YugOslavia are still considered as 
related to loans in the Mediterranean Countries. .. /: 
. ' 
ANNExs· 




·t  :j  ·:,. 
·~J.r  · ... 
. ····. 
'1  ~ t.i,. '-
•.\ 
:·,.  .•:  .·. S" 3-
Total  Total 
Country  Rating  BB  IFC 
I  'Commitments  Commitments 
Singapore  AAA  0  14 
Cyprus·  AA·  74  -
-
'  .. 
Total AAA,and AA_  74  14 
~  .. 
Malaysia  A+  ,_  0  55 
Total A+ 
., 
0  55 
.,  ·'  I  ,. 
~ 
Baharrtas  A  27 
Czech ·Republic  A  738  107 
Malta  ;  A  :  46 
. ·  •.  ~ ..  • ,  ~  • >  ~  ., . 
Thailand  A  '  ss 
., 
644  ;  :"·~·  '  ;  .  ~  " 
Total A 
I 
869  ·751 
i  •.  ,., 
Chile  "  A~ 
.. 
71  '"  655  '  I 
Israel  A·  .  97  1·1 
Sloveriia  A· 
; 
120  227 
i  .. 
Total A·  288  892  ... 
l 
China·'  BBB  55  180 
Indonesia  BBB  46  642 
Total BBB  10~  :  821 
Tunisia· 
I 
BBB- 450  '74 
Colombia  BBB- 0  368 
-~ '· 
Total BBB- :  450  442 i' 
I  I  C:2untrv  ;.  lbtinq 
I 
~tswana  BB+ 
Hungary  BB+ 
India  . BB+ 
Namibia·  BB+ 
Slovakia  BB+ 
South Africa·  BB+ 
Trinidad & Tobago  BB+ 
Uruguay  BB+  . 
BB-+  ..  ;• 
'  Barbados  BB 
Egypt  BB 
MeXic'o  ..  BB  '  ..... ,.,,._  . 
Morocco  BB  t 
Philippines  BB  : 
Poland  BB  ; 
Total BB  ; 
Argemina  BB- : 
Paraguay  BB-
.  Romania  BB- . 
'  Zimbabwe  BB- ' 
IToul 88-
Brazil .  B+ 
Joidan  B+  ' 
'  LeSotho.  :t,  .•  B+  i 
Mauritius.  ~  '  B+  ~·  . 
'  P.Jc.istan ·  B+  ; 
Sri Lanka  ····'.·,  B+ 
.•, 
{· 
Turil.ey  .  B+ 
. -~ (  Venezuela·  ..  B+ 
' 
ITOU.I B-+  1 
- .. 
! 
Estonia  B 
Fiji  B  •  I 
. Leban11n  B  ' 
Papua New Guinea  B  ' 
St. Christopher &  Nevis.  B  ., 
St. Lucia  B  ~ 





'  Benin  ..  B-
Bolivia  B-
BuriUna Faso  B- ' 
Costa Rica  B-.  .. 
Ghana  B-











Total  j 
SB  ! 
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Country  SB  IFC  .  Commitmems  Commitments 
Bulgaria  C+  285  5 
Co~e d'lvoire  C+  , 17  106 
Gabon  C+  6  105 
Guatemala  C+  0  .  70 
Mali·  C+  35  69 
Swaziland  C+  4  33 
Tanzania  C+  0  48 
Total C+  448  436 
Algeria,  c  718  10 
Dominica  c  0  1 
Dominican Republic  c  0  84 
Ecuador  ·c  0  64 
Ethiopia  c  0  22 
Gaza-Cisgordania  c  20 
Syria  ·c  55 
Zambia  '  c  3  87 
TotaiC  795  267 
·Albania  c- 34  0 
BuNndi  c- 0  .s 
Cape Verde  c- 0  '2 
Gambia  c- 0  6 
Gui~ea  c- 17  30 
Guinea-Bissau  C:- 0  7 
Honduras  c.  0  22 
Malawi  c- 9  33 
Nicaragua  c- 0  9 
Niger  c- 1  2 
Nigeria  c- . 210  188 
!Togo  c- 2  12 
Total c- 274  317 
Belize  D 
'  1  16 
Cameroon  D  52  65 
Congo  D  4  58 
Grenada  D  0  6 
Guyana  D  0  2 
Haiti  D  0  2 
Uboeria  .  D  .0  9 
Madagascar  D  0  42 
Mozambique  D  20  14 
Rwanda  0  0  2 
Sierra Leone  0  0  25 
Somalia  D  0  1 
Sudan  D .  0  27 
Ex-Yugoslavia  ....  420  - Zaire  D  a  49 
TotaJD  505  317 
. 
Totals  9 6001  15 524 - Sb-
.,  .· Simulatio~ of Future Tr,n'ds'. ' . 
in Bank Loans Outside the EU 
AJ\TNEX 9 . 
., 
Commitments, Disbursements and Budgetary Allocations to the Gu~i-antee . 
. :  .  ·  .  .  · .·  ·.  ·  ·  Fund  '.  ·  ·  ·  · ·  ·  ..  ·  ·~;~  .  · · · 
.'·: 
· Th~  attacheQ. table and graphs illustrate the possible d)'narnics ofBank lo~s·i~at 
woUld be covered by the new gUarantee scheme and its budgetary implications unde(the 
current proVisioning~rules for the Guarantee Fund.  It shows ~at  a guarantee schem~,:based on 
a 60% blanket coverage of  Bank loans Signed minus loans cancelled and reimburse.Ci would 
result in a  35% reduction in the amo~nt  of budgetar{resources [leeded to cover~a given 
amount of Bank loans.  It shows also that reducing the lev~l ofb~et  coverage to ?0% 
would increase significantly the. amount of  Bank assets at risk:  by 2007, some ECU.4-billion 
would be at risk in the sense that they would not be covered oy a.budgetary guarantee  .. 
.  :  ~. 
As~ptions·are  as follows:· 
•·  AnnuaJ committnents:  ECU3 billion  .. 
\  ·:· 
;  ~ 
·.  ~ . 
' '~· . 




•  . Disbursement pmfile:  10% ofloans signed the first year, 30% during each ofth~next . · 
three years. • 
•  Aniortisati9n:  over ten years, with a 3-year_ gra.Ce period, 
•  Guararitee Fund:  current provisioning. rules .continue to apply (14% oftheJeve{~overed 
by· the bla:nk:et coverage)  ·  · 
.  '  ··~' ··.  .. 
·.' 




.  : . Budgetary lmttlications of Alternative Coverage foa· EIIJ Lomas 
(in millions ~fECU) 
1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  - 2003  2004  2005  20fl6  2007  2008  2009  I- 2010-
Portfolio dynamics (nssuming that new PA commltnicnts amount to EClJ J hn pcrycnr) 
Fh>ws (during the year) 
Signed  3 000  3 000  3 000  J 000  J 000  J 000  3 000  J  ()11(1  3 ono  3 ()()()  J 1100  J oon  3 0011  3 ()()() 
Disbursed  300  I 200  2 100  3 000  3 000  3 000  3 000  3 01!0  J 000  3 0()()  3 000  J 000- 3 ()()()  3·ooo 
Rcpnymcnts  0  0  0  43  214  514  943  I 371  f 1!00  2 229  2.(i57  J 01!6  . J 51·1  3 943 
Stocks (  nl ycnr-cnd) 
Outstanding (disbursed)  300.  I 500  3 600  6 557  9 343  11829  13 886- IS  51•1  16 714  17 486  17 !!29  17 7•13  17W.I  16 286 
Signed (cumulntive minus r~payments  3 000  6000  9000  II 957  14 743  17229  19 286  20 914  22  114  22 886  23  229  23  1•13  22 6i?  21  686 
To be disbursed  2 700  4 500  5_400  5 400  5 400  5 400  5 400  5 400  5 400  5 400  5 400  5 400  .S  t!OIJ  5 400 
•I 
Duclgctnry funds to be allocated to the Gtuirantcc Fund (cnmulntivc)  if; 
Under the current system  385  770  I 155  I 535  I 892  2 211  2 475  2 61!4  . 21!31!  2 937  2 981  2 970  - 2 911-1  2 783'  -;.\  .. 
Amount al risk  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Under n scheme pro,·ldlng for a blanket coverage based on Bank commitments minus loans reimbursed and _cancelled 
Olnnkct coverage nt 75% 
Provisioning rate. of 14%  315  630  945  1256  I 548  'I 809  2'025  2 196  2 322  2 403  2 439  2 4311  2 J'/li  2 277 
Savings comp:rred to current syslc  18%  18%  18%  IBo/o  18%'  18%  '18%.  18%  18%  II!%  18%  II!%  II!%  Ill% 
Amount nt risk  0  .  0  0  0  .o  0  0  0  12?  321  4n7  ·  .lR(i  257  21 
131nnkct  covcrng~: ot 60%· 
.  Provisioning role of 14%  252  504  756  I 004  I 238  I 447  I 620  I 757 .  -I R58  I 922  I 95-1  I 94•1  I 'Jill  I 1!22 
Snvings compared to current syste  35%  3S~a  35%  35%  35%  .  35%  35%  35%  ·35%  35%  35%  15%  35%  .15% 
Amount nt risk  .  0  0  0  0  .  497  1491  2 314  - 2 966  J446  1154  llliJI  J !!57  ]  (I) I  3274 mns ofECU 
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ANNEX10 
·.POLITICAL RISK INSURANCE 
:,·A Survey of Multilateral, National and Private M~rket> 
Insurance Instruments 
't"  , 
-. Sriminary and. conclusions 
This annex is. based on a thorough reyiew of  the operations of  the various insurers of 
political risks made by Bank staff for the purpose of  the Study requested by ECOFIN.  It· 
provides information on the various multilateral, national and private market insurance 
instruments to cover political risks.  · 
.. 
• 
Information of  direct operational relevanc~ to the study are as follows:  ... 
Investment financing in developing co~ntries involves .considerable risks, in particular 
significant political risks.  · 
Private project sponsors and providers of  firiance are generally not prepared or able to 
bear political and sovereign nsks and ·require political risk insu·rance ..  Demand for political 
risk insurance has remained very significant and has generally outstripped supply. 
•  Demand for cover has  conce~trated on transfer risk and inconvertibility,  :·  ;  c 
expropriation, war apd 'Civil strife, and, to a  .lesser eJ1ent (at least to  date), breath o.f 
contractual obligations by the host government.  '  ·  · 
•  Political risks do not lend themselve·s to statistical comput!ltion (and only little information 
on losses is available).  By their nature, such risks are susceptible to aggregate into  . 
· country, .regional and ·even V~Orld-wide catastrophic_ events (the typical contagious or· 
. dorrii,no effect stressed fn the study).  Therefore, supply for this· type of  risks was and, 
essentiaiiY: r,~]Il~s,'.~  :p4l;>lic :~~~or  ",'Qu~~ess":  ··  · , 1· ,  . ,  . ·. :  ..  ,.  c,  ..  · w . . · ·  .:  · 
• .. The three main s_ources of  political risk insurance tend to be complementary ~d  offer 
. · · mainly cover for currency transfer riskS~ expropi:i.ation, war and civil strife. · Breach of  . 
. contract coverage, which raises considerable difficulties, is covered by only a few insurers. 
Exchange rate risks are in general not covered and ·coverage of  catastrophic risks varies. 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  ,I 
.  '  .  .  •  .  •  I 
•  Pricing is  an essential component of  political risk insurance.  lt is risk-related, and market-
.related in the Private Market.  However, all. actors acknowledge thatrisk-r~lated pricing in 
this field is a very. difficult-exercise.  Multilateral and national public schemes are, in 
general, cheaper than private ·insurers.  · 
.  . 
•  · Regarding portfolio management, insurers diversify their portfolio through country, sector 
• 
• 
and project exposure limits, and generally seek to avoid expostire in the f!lOSt risky  · 
countries.  They can re-insu.re a substan~al part of  their exposures. 
Most i11surers consider that the risks }nvolved in lending to public sector borrowers 
are essentially political i.n nature (sovereign/country risk). 
Insurers of  political risks prefer that the risks they cover be identifiecf.and listed, and that 
_all other risks be considered commercial risks and be left to the client. ·the latter always 
·b~rs  t~e burden of proof in case ofdefault.  · 
• ·  ECAs are being increasingly involved in the field of  project finance  .. ~  ma.J:ly cases, they 
have had to renounce drawing a distinction between political and conimercial risks 
because in project finance breach of  contract is one of  the main risks and government are 
omnipr~sent. In th,is context, ECAs prefer to assume all categories of  risks, charge 
adequately for this risk assumption, but cover only part of  the contingent ·liabilities, with 
other insurers/partners assuming the rest of  the ·contingent liabilities.  · - c,  l  -
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. 1..  .Demand for political risk insur~nce 
. Investment financing in developing countries involves considerable risks, in particular 
risks ofm~croeconomic  instability (generally ~oWn  as sovereign risk) and·a·myriad of 
significant political risks which private lenders or irivestors generally ·are not prepared to 
. · accept. T~e  perception of  political risks has continued to limit considerably the flow of 
finance, in particular foreign direct investmen~ to .developing countries. 
Therefore, ·most project sponsors and providers .of finance require politicaJ risk 
-insurance. 'Banks and companies still seek political ri.sk insurance for projects in most former 
.  ·.,  rescheduling countries in Latin America, Asia and EU:rope despite improved policies-and  · · 
. renewed access to intemationa~ capital markets.  Many providers offinanc~ also seek 
insurance in a number of  countries'that have not rescheduled.· 
. The limited ability/willingness of  private lenders and myestors to handle political risks 
has led political risk insurers to expand the range of  their products in theTecentpast. Demand 
fo'r political risk insurance had traditionally focused on transfer problems and political 
disturbances· as expropriation as well as elements of  natural disasters (earthquakes, fire and 
f}oods,  etc:).  Transfer :problems cover losses due to the inability to convert local currency to · 
foreign exchange or restrictions on Jpe transfer. of  amounts in foreign or local currency 
abroad. (see Annex. II for the defiriition of  selected political risks) 
The current world-wide shift towards privatisation and private financu;g of. 
infrastructure increases the complexity of  financing deals and is altering the nature. of  political 
· · riskS affecting investors or lenders.  In the new business. environment,·  politic~ risKis : 
being. extended well beyond traditional definitions.  The new fomis of  political risks that  , 
concern investors and .lenders involve less outright interferences and more subtle threats to 
projects' viability steinming from government actions.  These include cancellation of  export or . 
import licenses, change_s in regulations and indirect or "creeping" .expropriation.  They also 
cover project losses due to. unanticipated changes in exchange. rates .. These risks aie by their . 
nature more difficult to define, foresee and prove. 
In sum, demand for political risk insurance has remained strong and appears to 
have' remained superior to global supply. In particular, mostproject.sponsors and  . 
financiers consider that the availability of political risk insurance is very important in 
being able to structure project finance.  A recent market survey· by the.Iristitute of ·  · 
International Finance (IIF) shows that for most projectsp~nsors and financiers t_ransfer  ·  · 
risk and inconvertibility remain the most important risks, followed by expropriation, 
war and breach of  contract.  A large majority consider. that cancellation of  permits· or' 
··licenses; changes in laws and regulation, .and unfair calling of  bonds are also· incr~ing}y 
important.  ·  ·  ·  · 
Three main sources of  political risk insurance help to meet the demand for ~over: 
multilateral,. national (by official Export Credit A.gencies--ECAs--), ·and private sources.  The-
availabilitY of  political risk insurance varies significantly among national, multilateral  · 
institutions and private insurers which tend to complement each other.  The remainaer of  the 
paper is organised as follows:  Chapter 2 presents .the various in~ruments of  multilateral 
political risk insurance.  Chapter 3:examines the major aspects of  insurance cover provided by . 
.  ·national. export credit agencies and investment gilarantee schemes.  Chapter 4 describes-the  · 
· private market for  political risk insurance. Annex 10 
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2.  Multilateral political risk insurance 
Multilateral mstitutions provide coverage for variqus types of  political risks aSsociated 
t6 investment projects in developing countries.  Some specialised institutions such as MIGA 
cover the full range of  traditional political risks.  MIG  A's activities and policies are discussed 
in§ 2.1.  1  ' 
··  In addition, the World Bank mainstream~d re.cently its'gtianlritee programrries to cover 
selected political risks particularly in relation to contractual coinmitments of  th~ host 
governments· (and agencies) or changes in the legal· envirorunent.  Regional. development . 
banks followed the Wotld Bank's lead, developing guarantee 'programmes broadly similar to. 
that ofilie World Bank.  These guarantee progr3mmes are presented in§ 2.2. 
.  . 
· ·  P-roject sponsors or financiers consider in general that multUaterals usefully increase 
the protection available to cover government interference in projects and host govemrne~t 
obligations . 
. ! 
2.1  MIGA 
2 .1.1  Bac~ground and financial stru~re 
~; • ••  1  r •  '  '.•  · , . 
:·· .. 
'· 
The .Multilateral rnv·estm~nt Guarantee Agency, cMIGA),''established in' 19ssf is a'  • '· 
member ofthe World Bank group and has 128 Member countries at present.  The purpo~e of 
the Agency is to help developing countries attract productive foreign invest111ent~ }t  .  . 
seeks to achieve its purpose through two essential means~ the provi~ion  of'guarantee~  ,(or·::· 
insurance) against non-commercial risks .and. a programme of  consultative and a~visory .  . 
services.  MIGA has the capacity to tap the human and technical re~ources of  the entire Wo~ld 
Bank gro.up. 
.  .  To cover potential losses, MIGA was endowed wi~  a soiid equity bas.e by its · 
founders; it does not raise resources on financial markets.  As ofJurie 30, 1995, :MIGA's 
authorised capital was usn 1,043.million, ofwhich 20% (or usn 208 million) were paid in, 
. including half  in the form of  promissory notes., The remainingUSD'834 million i~ subject to  . 
call by the Agency when required to meet its obligations.  Moreover, the. Agency makes 
reserves. for claims out of  its operational surplus.  As of  June 30, 1995, :MIG  A's reserves for 
claims amounted to usn 17 million.  .  .  ·,..  .  ' 
.  Unti11994, the Agency's risk-to-equity ratio was limited to 150%  ..  In February 1994, 
as con~emplated by the MIGA Convention, the Council of  Governors decided to increase the 
maxunum aggregate amount of  contingent liabilities that may be tssumed by the Agency to 
350'% ofthe sum of  the Agency's ucimpaired subscribed capital and.its re·serves.  Such 
increase was to be accomplished in two stages:  . .  ..·  ..  . .  . 
.,  . 
•  an increase to 250% in 1994 (providing for a usn 2.7 bn coverage capacity); 
1  Other SJ)ecialised multilateral providers of  political risk insurance inc;lude institutions in the Arab world, in 
particular MJGA's forerunner, the Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation; which now focuses mainly · 
on export credit insurance.  ·  · ....  ~  ·,,  . 
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•  ari increas·e to 350% to be considered later. 
2.1.2  ·Type of  risk~ c~vered 
.  ·. MIGA covers selected political risks.  It offers insurance againsfloss caused by non~ 
commercial risks by issuing long-tenn (up to 20 years) guarantees on four different cat~gories '  l 
of  risks:·  ·  ·  ·  · 
•  currency  tr~nsf~r/inconvertibility: protects against losses arising from  ~he investor's 
inabitity to corivert local currency returns into foreign exchange or to transfer local or 
foreign eurrency returns outside the host country.· Currency devaluation is. not covered.· 
_ Any bl.ocked:·loCal currency must be· transferred to MIGA by the investor prior to payment 
of  compensation. 
•  expropriation:  protects against partial or total loss ofthe·insured inve~ent  as a.resclt 
of  acts by the host government which may reduce or elimimite oWnership of: control over, · 
or essential. rights over the insured investment;  In addition to outright nationa.lisation and 
confiscatio~ indirect Of "creeping'' expropriation, for instance, a series of  aCt$ which, over 
. time, have an exptopriatory effect is als<? covered.  Compensation will be paid upon  . 
· subrogation o"fMIGA to the rights of  the investor in the. expropriated investment (e.g.,· 
equity shares or loan agreement) and assigiunent of~ose  rights to the Agency: 
•  ' 'war and civil disturbance:  prot~cts against losses from dainage  t~, or the destru~on  or 
disapp~ance  of,· tangi]Jle ass.ets caused by politically motivated. acts of  war or civil  · 
' qisturbahce in th~ hoSt country including revolution, insurrection; coup d'etat, as well as,  ' 
under certain ronditioris~ sabotage and terrorism.  '  ' '  ' ' 
.  .  .- .  .  .  ·'  .. 
'  '  ' 
•.  breach of contract:' provides partial protection against losses,arising fro~  the host 
government's breach oi repudiation of  a contract with the investor .  .Jt is available o~y  if 
the investor has obtained an award for damage in his favour  ... following an alleged breach of . 
' a contractual obligation by the hoSt government and if, after a specified' period of  time,' the' 
·award has not be paid.  In effect, the coverage is similar to the risk of  derual of  juStice:  · 
MIGA,  msur~s  the investor against the impossibility to ob~  or to enforce an arbitral or 
judicial decision recognising. the breach of an obligation by the host government.  Iri  ' 
practice, this coverage has not been  us~d frequently especially sine~ some aspects of · 
breach of  contract risks -C~  be covered under expropriation.  -· 
- :  '• 
MIGA.can cover new ~ross.:.border investments f'greenfield" investments)as well as 
new contributions to expand; privatise or financially restructure eXisting project-s.  It can cover 
·  various forms of  investment, includirlg  ~quity, loans made or guaranteed by foreign equity 
. holders, non"'s.hareholdet loans by cOmmercial bank, provided that MIGA also insures.t:quity 
in the project as well as non-equity forms of  investment such ~  te~hnical assistance and' 
: management contracts. 
'! Annex 10 
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2.1.3  Pricing 
:MIGA has established a premium structure (outlined in the tab.le below) that provides 
the basis for determining the premium rates for a specific mvestment.  Accordingly, the. 
following base rates may be adjusted up or down for a'  particlilar project depending on the 
project's risk profile, ·which depends in part 6n the sector and the country (for instance, the 
coverage of  currency transfer risk can vary between 30 bp and 150 bp).  The rates are defined 
' in relation to the type of  industry and coverage, and are applied to the amount of  the 
investment at risk.  The base rates shown  ·in the table below are a good approXimation of  the 
average premium rates.  ·  · 
Base Premium Rates Charged by MIGA 
(in basis points, per year) 
Sectors 
Type·of  risk · ·  Oil and gas  Natural  Manufacturing 
resources  and 'Services 
Currency transfer  50  50  50 
Expropriation  I  125  90  60 
War and civil disturbance  70  55  55 
2 .1. 4  General policy guidelines 
To manage its guarantee portfolio prudeptly, :MIGA has consistently sought to 
diversify its contingent liabilities by regions, country, and sector.  Exposure to individual 
country cannot exceed 15% of  total guarantee portfolio, or USD 175 ron (recently raised to 
USD 225 mn). ·MIGA's guarantee portfolio is spread across 34 beneficiary developing  . 
countries (see Attachment I to Annex 10).  Exposure limits to individual projects are, at 
present, quite restrictive (USD 50 mn per projects) and MIGA's maximum contingent liability 
normally cannot exceed 270% of  investor's contribution to the project.  · 
Reserves for claims are based on management's evaluation of  potential claim 
payments.  Given the lack of  historical claims experience in .MIGA, ·there is no actUarial or 
· historical basis upon which to detennine the Agency's expeqted claims experience.  . ·  · 
Accordingly, management relies on a premium-based methodology for establishing the reserve 
for claims, allocating about three-fourth of  premium arid commitment fee income to making 
reserves. 
:MIGA's guarantee capacity can be increased through recourse to re-insurance or co-
msurance  . 
. 2.1.5  Experience to date 
The.maximum amount of  contingent liability ofMIGA under guarantee.s issued and 
outstanding at October 31, 1995 totalled some USD 2 billion.  . <6(:,. -: 
c- 5_ -). 
MIG~'s  Portfolio by Type of Coverage 
(as of Oct.  31,  1995) 
War and  ci\11  disturbance 
Currency transf~r 
Expropriation 
'0.0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1.0.  1.2,  1.4  1.8  20 
bnofUSD 
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.  .  '  . 
As of~at  date, there have been no claims lodged With the ~gency, which reflects in· 
P.artthe long-term nature of  the projects covered and the fact that MIGA has been in  _. 
. operation for orily a few years.  MIGA'.s membership in the World Bank group ha5. proven to 
be an asset both in terms of  political leverage, dispute resolution ability,· and analytical•  : · 
· capacity.  ·  ·  ·  · 
·.' 
2.2 ..  · Other MUltilateral insurance instruments· .. 
Inthe recent past, the le~ding multilateral development banks have kdicated'theif 
greater willingness to give guarantees to private lenders and investors against some political 
risks~ mainly in infrastructure projects or natural resources, to promote private sector 
investment.,The IBRD was the first MDB. to re.:.organise its guarantee programme for. this 
purpose.  The Asian Development Bank (A$DB) and the _Inter-American Development Bank 
(IADB) in1foduced ~ou~ced  new guarantee facilities modelled closely .on the IBRD  . 
programme.  Therefore, only. the IBRD's guarantee progra.rrulle  ~s presented below.  2 bt 
(- 6 -) 
2.2  .. 1.  Structure and purp~se ofthe guarantee scheme 
Annex 10 
The IBRD mainstreamed its guarantee programme in 1994. 3  The purpose of  the. 
programme is to provide guarantees covering commercial debt financing for public and 
private entities in developing countries.  Unlike MIGA, the World Bank does not guarantee 
equity capital. 
The proposed guarantees are intended to mitigate those risks which are beyond the 
control of  private lenders, including events ofpoliticaljorce majeure.  The ffiRD considers 
that its guarantees are most likely to be used for financing infrastructure, where the demand 
for funding i~ large, political and sovereign risks· are ~ignificant, and long maturity financing is 
often critical to a project's viability and which exceeds generally the ·capacity of  specialised 
agencies like MIGA.  The guarantee could be valuable· in particular where activities. 
traditionally undertaken and financed by the government are being shifted to. the private sector 
but where the government and its agencies remain involved, for example, as_regulator,. 
provider of  inputs or buyer of  outputs. 
There are limitations to expand the programme especially since the ffiRD is required 
under its Articles to -obtain a counter-guarantee from the host government.  The counter- · 
guarantee indemnifies the Bank for any payment it makes under its guarantee.  (The World 
Bank argues that when the. guarantee covers specific sovereign policy or contractual risks, the 
counter-guarantee demonstrates the commitment of  the government to meet ob~gations 
entered into as part of  the project.)  · 
The pote~tial use of  guarantees is considered within the framework of  the Bank's ·  · 
country assistance strategy and risk-management strategy; guarantees are imputed to th·e 
·Bank's usual country exposure ceilings.  · 
2.2.2.  Risks covered 
Since the World Bank's gliarantees are intended to be catalytic, only partial 
guarantees are offered, and risks are shared between the World Bank and private  . 
lenders.  The World Bank's objective is to cover those risks it feels uniquely positioned to · 
bear given its experience with developing countries and special relationships with 
governments.  Other project risks a:re taken by private sector lenders and other partner 
institutions: 
.  . 
The World Bank guarantees may be either for specified risks (the partial risk. 
guarantee) or for all credit risks during a  specified part of  the financing term (the partial credit 
guarantee). 
•  A partial risk guarantee covers specified risks arising from non-performance of 
sovereign contractual obligations or certain politicalforce majeure events.  The new· 
.. partial risk" guarantee programme of  the IBRD, IADB and AsDB are especially 
designed to protect private sector infrastructure _projects from breaches of  contract by  ,.  .  .  .  . 
3  The World Bank has bad a guarantee programme since 1983, first under the World Bank's B-loan 
programme and then under the ECO, or Expanded Cofinancing Programme.  Only a handful of  guarantees 
were, however, provided under these programmes, which served as forerunners to the present programme. 
~  •  •  4 Annex 10 
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p~blic entities.  It is most appropriate for  "furu~-ed rec~urse financing" schemes such as 
build-own~operate-transfer or build-own-operate projects.  Partial risk guarantees 
. erisure payment in case of  debt service default resulting from the non-performance of 
contractual obligations under:taken by governments or their agencies and similar . 
projects.  A partial risk guarantee can cover in particular: 
•  failure of  goveniments to honour project obligations 
•  maintenance of  agreed regulatory framework  ·  · 
•  delivery of  input~ by governments and_ government-owned entities 
•  payments for output by gbvernm:ent/government-oWJ1ed entities 
.  •  . specific sovereigTI  ri~ks such as foreign exchange transfer risk  and other 
politicalforce majeure events.  · 
.  •  A partial credft guarantee typicaliy eXtends  ~aturities beyond what private. creditors 
.·  could otherwise provide--for exa,mple, by guaranteeing late..:dated repayments or  · 
providing  incentives for lenders to roll over short-term loans.  It cove,rs all eve.nts of. · 
non-payment for a designated part of a financing. · · 
..  ' 
..  ' 
2.2.,3.·  Pricing 
The World Bank ch'!-fges, at present, two fees for guarantee cover:  a standby fee and · 
~  '  .  ' 
a guarantee fee.  These·fees are charged either to the borrower or lender on the amount 
·  . eovered under the guarantee: 
• 
• 
.The standby fee is applied 'during the period when the guarantee is in force but not 
callable.  It is currently 25 bp per annum on the Bank's guarantee exposure, repn!sented by 
the present value of  the guaranteed amount at the first possible date of  call.  · 
The guarantee fee is applied during the period when the guarantee is  callable~  It is 
currently in the range of  40-100 bp per .annum on outstanding debt covered by the 
gtiarantee--this consists of  a base fee of25 bp plus an annual premium ranging -from.I5 to 
·75 bp ..  The premium is determined case by case to reflect the level of  coverage and thus ... · 
the value to the borrower. 
Any guarantee fee above is bp is refundedtp the host government,· so that the net 
cost of  the guarantee is the same as the spread o.n.a World Bank loan.  the World Bank is a ·  ..  : 
co-operative institution and maintains a policy of non-discriminatory pricing among its 
members.  ·  ··  ·  · 
2.2.4.  Use of  the prograinme 
·Only limited experience has been accumulated to date, the new guarantee programme  ' 
having beer: launch~d in 1994 only.  Debt covered by outstanging Bank gUarantees currently· · Annex lO 
totals some USD 1 'h bn.  World Bank officials consider that the guarantee programme is 
likely to rem~  a limited aspect of  total IDRD activities, at least for the foreseeable future~.· 
3. .  National ve~icles for insuring political risks 
3.1.  Background:· a considerable  institutio~al heterogen(!ity 
Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) have .been the main sou~ce of  supply of  political risk 
insurance and. guarantees, and their services are greatly valued by project sponsors and 
financiers, particularly in Europe and ·Asia. Their primary objective is the promotion of · 
national exports through insurance or direct extension of  exp~rt credits  ..  Public seqor 
guarantees are generally limited to operations deemed priority operations bythe government. 
.  .  .  . 
· ECAs traditionally give insurance and· guarantees to either (or both) the exporters who 
are supplymg or constructiiig projects or the banks who are providing the loans to finance the 
· projects.  This msuring activity would  ·typically be that of  COF  ACE of  France, .Hermes of 
. Germany, SACE ofltaly, ECGD of  the UK, EIDIMITI of  Japan and CESCE of Spain. (See 
Attaclunent IT to Annex 10).  In addition to insurance actiVities, most agenCies are involved in 
official .financing support.  Several agencies make export finance dir~ctly available to 
.  borrowers (US Eximbank)~ or will refinance credits eXtended by the private market: · 
.  A variety of  solutions have evolved with regard to government involvement.  The 
organisational form of  the institutions providing insurance or financing ranges from ·a section · 
of  a ministry, or a government agency,. thro.ugh independent government agencies and semi-
public joint-stock companies to private institutions operating partly under an a.gfeement with 
the government.  These solutions are reflected in the way these organisations·are funded: 
from the budget, from special government funds, from loans and capital.fron:t the government,. 
or from shares and bonds.· Austria, Germany anc~ the Netherlands conduct their export credit 
insurance programmes· through private companies (OeKB, Hermes, and NCM respectively). 
Another aspect that varies widelyis the position of  the export credit agency on the . 
market for officially supported (insured or financed) export credit or, conversely, the role 
played by private organisations such as banks and insurance companie~. This is complicated 
by the fact that some private organisations act partly in the public sphere on behalf of 
governments (Hermes and Treuarbeit in Germany, COF  ACE in France),' and partly in the 
private sphere on their own account, while some public organisations act from time to time as 
if  they were privately owned.  An increasing number of  official agencies are also experiencing 
the pressure of  competition from private sector·agencies. 
Thus there is a v.r:ide range of  approaches.  At one extreme are those that combine a 
complete range of  insurance and guarantee facilities, as well as additional options such as · . 
· currency risk  insurance, with a comprehensive financing support system (including · 
participation in mixed credits).  In the middle are syStems that offer the usual insurance cover 
(pre- and post-shipment cover for political and commercial risks.on 'individual or whole 
turnover policies), some development aid credits and additional insu~ance facilities, and credits 
that the domestic market cannot provide.  At the other extreme would be an approach that. 
provides only insurance, guarantees and credits that the intem~tional market cannot provide, - 1--o'-
(- 9,j.~ . 
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such as political_risk insurance for higher risk countries or subsidised credits or gtiarant~s for 
matching purposes and development aid credits. 
Despite this institutional heterogeneity, it can be stated that in their medium and 
long term and investment insurance activities, ECAs are acting as, or for, or op the 
account of their" governments and are primarily engaged in supporting/providing tied 
finance. 
3.2.  ltisks covered 
. TraditionaUy ECAs cove~  embraces both politicai and commercial riskS but they' 
see politic3l risk (defined as country Jjsk) as the most imp~rtant risk i~ medhnn- and  ;. 
·tong-term financing to developing country.  All OECD countries and.a number of  other. 
countries have set up ~pecialised organisations to insure at least the political risk (nsk of  non-, 
.payment because of  government-imposed restrictions).ofproviding export credit to forei~  · 
buyers, and many will also cover the "transfer" risk (risk ofnol).-availability of  foreign· 
excha.il.ge.to meet repayment obligations), although cover may be veiyrestricted in· markets 
with poor payment exp~rience.  Most of  the institutions providing such insurance will·also · 
cover the corilinercial risks (risks of  non-payments because ~fbankruptcy  oz: default by the· 
. b1,1yer) and SOJ;ne remsure such risks taken by private _institutions. 
.  . 
·  Although die relations between'ECAs and their'government are varied and often · 
complex, medium ~nd.long term.political risks msured by ECAs·a~e·  ·. 
invariablytaken-ultimately-by their governments.  This is not ~n area in.wJ:Uch. 
·private sector insurers or reinsurers have been inte~ested.  Many ECAs also  ·prov~de .  .  · 
Investment In~urance against selected poiiticai.risks (transfe~ of  profits and  divid~nds, 
expropriationlnationalisation and war/civil war).  · 
.  There are two main approaches (see Attachrneritill to Annex -10 for details on risks . 
covered.by individual nationa) schemes):  .  .•  ·  .  .  ·  .  :  .  · 
•  the UK, US, Japan and Canada either lend directly or give 100% and.unccinditional 
guarantees to lending banks; 
'  .  .  . .  .  . 
•  France, Germany, Italy give conditi011al  insur~ce arid. less thlW.  lOO% cover. 
. .  Almost all bilateral ofncial ECAs,· lenders and insurers, provide coverage for 
traditional political fisks--including tian~fer difficulties, war, revolution and nationalisation--. 
Agencies are for  the most part reac;iy to cover non-payment by govellUTlent  en~ities, but cover 
for changes in government regulations or cancellation 9f  orq.ers or e}qJort and import licenses 
·  is less readily available.  Few v.-ill pro"i.de cover or.protection against exchange rate changes. 
COFACE.proVides cover.for·embargo, cancellation of  import licenses, war and: civil strife.  ·· 
... 
!  .  •  '  •  ;-'  .. 
Of  note, political. risk is defined as the risk associated with the country and the risk of 
non-payrnent by a public sector d~btor  (public sector entity which ··cannot be declared ·  ·  · 
bankrupt and whose default would be the: direct consequenceofthe s~te's responsibility). 
Hermes, COF  ACE and CESCE deterlnine the b~sic premium for public sector buyers only ~n 
the basis ofthe ~ountry ris}(:  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  · '  '  · ·-·1-\-
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3.3  .  Pricing.~and Risk Mitigating Techniques 
.  ECA.s' financial results hinge a:ucially on two factors:  reali~ic pricing and 
diversification· of  risks.  After a decade of  weak financial performance, all EC,As see realistic 
pricing of  risks as an important objective.  Premia were increased on several occasions since 
. the early 1980s to limit the cash flow deficits incurred by most ECAs.  They have refin~d and 
systematised their country risk assessment process and reinforced the link between the risk · 
assessment process and cover policy.  In particular, there is now a more. direct link between 
the rate of  premium and the perceived degree of  country risk, 
Premia vary with the borrowing country, the type ofborrower, and the maturity of  the 
eX:port credit.  Agencies see differentiated premium rates as a way tci help dampen demand in 
riskier markets, thus  rationing cover in an economically efficient manner, and to encourage a 
shift in the direction of  trade towards stronger markets. 
ECA.s use highly structured premium systems.  They classify <;ountries into risk 
categories:.  Some ECA.s attempt to quantify risks, and attach specific credit scores to 
countries.  For instance, ECGD, COFACE-and the US Eximba..nk employ quantitative 'systems 
of  risk assessment and assign a probability of  default and an expected loss coefficient to each 
new credit. ECA.s con.Sider .payment performance the single most important factor ·in their  . 
assessment of  country risk.  They give significant weight to economic performance (which 
includes economic policies), indebtedness and adequacy of  international reserves position. 
Some agencies monitor closely ratings of  bond issues and secondary market prices of 
comrnerciai ·bank debt of  borrowing countries. 
The average level and steepness of  the premium curve varies substantially across 
agencies, as do the degree. of  differentiation arn()ng recipient countries and the methods of 
·calculating premia. These differences reflect the variety of  views on the ~elative importance of 
various risks and on the appropriate method ofpricmg e::1ch ofthem, as well as the fact that 
premium levels are used in conjunction with varying constellations of other cover policy 
instruments, and that the terms of  the cover agreements vary widely.  · 
For instance, the premium system used by Hennes, the GermaiJ. e-,q}ort  cre~it 
. insurance agency, utilises five country risk categories~ namely: 
/ 
Category 1:  OECD countries 
Category 2:  .Countries with well-established payments records and 
no expected payment di.ffic1,1lt~es; 
Category 3:  .  Developing ~ountries with the typical level o~  developi.rig country risk; 
Category 4:  Reschequling countries ~d  those with imminent payment problems·; 
- .  .  . 
.  - Category 5:  High-risk countries for· which Hermes is off  c6ver either entirely or 
for medium- and long-term loans. 
A country where Hermes has a very high concentration of  risk may be assigned to.a 
higher country cat~goiy. Premium charges are due at the time the risk begins, with very - 1-2- Annex 10 
(- 11-) 
limited exceptions. The new system differentiates between public and private buyers both for 
suppliers' and buyers' credits. In the case of public buyers, the basic premium is 
·determined only .by the country risk. For Category 3 countries- the category taken as the 
basis premium fo_r determining ·premia- 1 percent of  the covered '3Jilount is charged. Premium 
. levels· for other categories are adjusted by a factor refleCting the.difference in country risk ·  . 
·relative to Category3. Thus for Category 1, the basic preniium is 0.33 percent; for Category · 
2, 0.67 percent; and for Categories 4 and 5,  1.5 percent and2 percent, respectively~ In 
addition, a further, time-dependent premium component is charged. The annual level of  this·.·  · 
component is 0.72 percent ofthe·outstanding covered amount for Category 3, and this·lev¢ris 
adju_sted b)r the same factors as the basic premium for each· other category.  · 
. In the case of  private buy~rs, an additional.flat premiu.m cpmponent is adoed, 
amountmg to 3 5 basis points for the. basic premium po[tiori and an adciitiona125 basis points  : · 
per annum. This surcharge is reduced if  a commercial bank guarantee is available,4 or an  · 
international financial institution is involved, and in the case of  co-financing With bilateral aid. 
·Although useful, premium differentiation has clear practical limits as a risk 
~itigating technique.  In certain cases, even the highest premia fail to compensate. 
adequately for some of  the risks taken,  iJ:1 particular inhigh-risk marke~s where demand for 
. cover is highly inelastic with respeCt to premium levels .. T~s  i? also a problem when pre~a 
are kept, for. political reasons, at levels below those that would haye been impli~d·by risk. 
assessment.·. ·  ·  ·  · 
.  _; 
Risk diversi,ficaiion has proved to be difficult becauseofthe. strong links topanicular: 
markets for historical and geographical reasons and because of  adverse selection:  official  · · · 
supp~rt for export credit is sought only for exports for which private sector insurance is either 
not available or is more ·costly and for which self-insurance is seen as too risky by the_  · 
exporter.  All.ECAs ·have therefore strengthened and refined risk-sharing and risk-:reducing 
techniques to .ensure portfolio diversification and improve the quality oftheir portfolios.· 
Almost all ECAs found it necessary to supplement high preniia with. other instruments, 
particularly quantitative ceilings, for countries seen as high·ijsks.  Limits on total exposure 
contimie to be a feature of  most agencies' cover policies toward at least some developing 
countries.  This can be supplemented by  redt~cing the percentage'  .of cover on the ·assumption·. 
tha,t forcing the exporter or financier to bear a part of  the risk helps safeguard against badly · 
.  designed or unviable transactions.  .  .  . 
3  .  .4  Performance in recent years 
ECAs have incurred huge losses.during·the  1980~as a· result of  successive debt crises 
·and treditoi:' governments have had to fund substantial cash flow deficits,  For several years, 
they have paid claims that were m'excess of  their premium income and most ofthem--at least 
in respect to their m~dium  and long-term credit activities--have accumulated deficits.  In  . 
addition, the recent trend toward debt forgiveness under the Toronto, Trinidad and Naples 
terms has worsened considerably the recoverability ofSome claimsthey have_paid, With a 
negative impact on the firiances and balance sheets ,ofECAs.' 
.  I 
4 From a bank acceptable to Hermes as  ~the sole d~btor  for the amount in~olved. . (_- 12-) 





Many agencies have responded with institutional and structural changes .designed to 
improve their risk management techniques.  However, agencies sometimes find it difficult to 
react appropriately to developments inborrowi.ng countries, especially in major markets  .. In 
particular, ECAs tend to Stay on cover too long in countries that do not have apparent debt-
servicing difficulties but are pursuing policies that could'lead to future debt serVicing · 
. problems.··  · 
One difficulty is that early warning signals are usually not conclusive.  Moreover, 
ECAs are faced with strong pressure to help exporters gain an early foothold in countries seen 
as future growth markets, such as many of  the countries in transition.  In. some ofthese cases, 
·export .Credits have also been used as channel for significafl.t financial support, even though 
cOuntry risk assessments indicated the need for a much more cautious stance. Conversely,· 
most ECAs remain slow in reopening cover for countries that have had poor-payments 
records in the past but that have more recently improved their policies and cleared their · 
arrears. 
3.5  ECAs and P!Oject fmancing 
· The traditional security for ECAs in projects in non.;OECD countries bas been 
government or sovereign guarantees.  However, as other financiersfmsurers, ECAs-have 
been confronted by a major change in their market as a result of  the ongoing world-wide 
privatisation wave.  Moreover, there has been a disenchantment and poor experience with 
sovereign guarantees (see above).  Finally, developing countries are increasingly reluctantto 
grant sovereign guarantees, in particular to private sector borrowers, in part under the . . 
pressure of  the IMF (and the World Bank). 
Together, these factors have resulted in much greater interest in limit~ recourse 
financing on the part ofECAs.  However, project financing presents~  ·whole ~ew  range of 
challenge and problems.  Moreover, only I.irillted experience has been accumulated by ECAs in 
this field and the lessons drawn below are very tentative.  (These are drawn from a paper by 
Mr. Stephens:--see references- and discussions with representatives of  various ECAs). - '=t-4- Annex 10· 
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•  In the emerging business environment, "privatised" ·  need_s to be in quotation marks 
because governments remairi crucial elements in the financial  Vi~bility of  limited 
recourse projects; 
•  Many of  the traditio,ilal mechanisms in ECAs.and the OECD "regulatory framework"-.: 
the so called Consensus-- are not ideally suited for project financing and· privatised 
projects.  Most of  the present funding. and insurance infrastructUre is·based on  . 
government buyers.  or government borrowers or  goyernment guarantees in respect to 
· · · medium and long tenn·credits for ·projects. 
•  ECAs are faced withconsiderable constraints: ·they d~  not have the necessary 
expertise in all sectors; their analytical capacity is limited (in terms of  projects they can 
handle in the same time), designing arid implementing risk-sharing ariange,-nents has 
been very difficult;  .  · 
• /  In designing risk  sharing mechanisms, ECAs have preferred to list the risks they 
.·'.cover (and to define those risks as precisely as' possible) and to leave all other risks to 
third parties.  Moreover~ they have had to  give up s'plitting risks between. political 
and com·mercial risks:  In the field of  project finance, ECAs have re~sed  that,insured 
parties (banks and project pro~poters)'are very skilled.in converting an:y event of 
defatilt into the result of  a political risk.  Therefore, most ECAs now prefer to cover an 
types of  risks involved in a transaction and to limit their exposure to any single_ project · 
.. · by s_hanng risks With other guarantors (including  .o~her ECAs  ).  . 
•  ·  Breaches of contract is a niost .difficult issue but can be insured bv certain ECAs, 
tnainly as creeping expropri(!.~ion.  ·  .  - ·  ' 
4.  ·  Private political risk insurance market 
The Private Political Risk Market emerged in_ the early 1970s when Lloyd's  . 
underwriters and brokers pioneered the insuran<;e of  overseas investments and exports· 
contracts against political risks.  Although the market has grown in importance to b~come  an 
established market, it has remained a relatively small niche of the global insurance 
inc:lustry and continues to complement rather than replace the function of state export 
credit insur~nce. Moreover, heavy losses in the late 19~0s and early 1990s have forced a 
number. of  players to leave the market, increasing the oligopolistic nature o.f the priv~te 
market  ..  This resulted in part from the shrinkage of  the world reinsurance market.  Fin~y, it -
is still a corifidential market and .very little information a:vailable. 
4.1  Structure of the market 
. The main sources of  pnvate politi~aJ risk !nsurance players ~Jude  the Lloyd's of 
Londori, 5 and a handful ofinsurance companies (including monolines and multilines as well as 
s  ~loyd's  is a market wh~re  ~ember  brokers place orders ·with the _member unde'rwriters, and can be 
com~ared  to a· stock exchange  .. Lloyd's underwriters ;m: typically wealthy individuals ("tl!-e names") who - 1-S-.  Annex 10 
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captives), most of  which are based in the USA.  In addition to Lloyd's, the main players 
include AIG (USA); CITI (a subsidiary ofCitib3.nk), Exporters Insurance Company L¢., and 
. UNISTRAT (Paris): Access to the clientele is mediated through a world-wide brokerage 
network and revenues and exposures are spread world-wide through an elaborate re-insurance 
system which serves as an essential portfolio management deVise:; 
Brokers act as independent intermediaries between the purchaser and provider 'of 
insurance, doing the bulk of  the paperwork without taking any risk on  t~eir o~  acco~nt.  The 
usual brokerage commission varies between 15% and 20% of  the preqlium.  Only few brokers 
can handle political risk insurance contracts:  indeed, it is difficult to identify arid quantify 
political risks and to draft appropriate contracts.  · 
Underwriters write insurance policies on their own account.  Frequently, however, 
they roll over part of  their exposure to reinsurers:  There are two main forms.ofreinsurance: 
"treaty" reinsurance (providing aform of  blanket coverage) and ad~hoc  risk-bysrisk 
"facultative" reinsurance.  Reinsurance does not, with few exceptions, tou~h upon the legal . 
relationship between the underwriter and the insured party.  Rather it provides for 
reimbursement of  the underwriter by the reinsurer of  some of  tli.e cash out-flow resulting from 
claims to the insured.·  In exchange·, the underwriter shares with the reinsurer in the premium 
under a key which reflects t~eir respective exposures.  ·  · 
.  . 
·Total premiums for poli~cal risk insurance in 1995 is estimated to have beeri in the. 
neighbourhood ofUSD 55-60 million, (CITI:  USD 16-17 mn;  .AIG:. U$D 14-15 mn; Lloyds' 
USD 14-16 inn;  UNISTRAT:  USD  12 mn) for a total volume.ofbusiness o(so~e  USD  7-:-
8 bn.  . 
Demand in the Private Market is mainly for.two kinds of  operations: 
•  operations that could be eligible to public insurance scheme~ but that do not fulfil all 
eligibility requirements.(  operations launched .before the insurance request, significaiJ,t 
foreign participation, lack of  national interest, non-eligible country).· 
.  . 
•  specific operations or when insurance need is limited to specific parts of  the operation or 
for restricted or a-typical risks,  ·  ·  ·  ". 
Foreign exchange inconvertibi4ty remains the main_ demand in the contract frustration 
field. 
In aU other cases, and because of the _limitations of the Private Market (~xpensiv.e 
and  short-term orientation) public sector insurance provides the most economical 
source of coverage.  · 
group themselves into syndicates.  Those syndicates are n~ither legal entities nor partnerships, and each 
member severally is liable only for his slice of the underwritten rjsk.  They are managed by "underwriting 
agents" who underwrite risks on behalf of  each individual member of  the group.  About' 120 syndicates can 
write political risk policies.  In practice, only a few syndicates are active in this market segment. 
.  .  '  .  .  . ,_.,.  ;.· ..  ,,  '!'-"•t  ,,  ·: 
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4.2 ,  Risks covered 
· Private insurers operate only in markets Sn;d cla5ses of  bu~iness where preryliums 
charged are deemed adequat~ for· the risks a.Ssumed.  The coverage sold by private·companies. · 
is essentially geared to insure short..:term transactions of  less than one year and 
supplements that offered by government ~geodes. (For instance, CITI's average life of  .. 
coverage is 13 m.onths) ..  Coverage period Still does not exceed three years. Of_riote, AIG is· 
considering the possibility to extend this coverage to up to seven years. · The constraint" is 
mitigated somewhat by so-called 
11revo1Ving  mechanisms~~: .policies provide for automatic  ·  · 
renewal at the end of  each year for 'another three years.  s'ut the insured cannot .claim any right 
to extension and preniium tend to b~  increased iil c~e  of  a· deteriorating situation. 
··  Private insurers.have focused on the short-term segment. of the market because 
this is the least risky.  Indeed, short-term transactions are less vulnerable to.contagious · 
events which.lead to catastrbphic risks.  Countries eJ:C,periencing payment difficulties, which. 
~annat tum to other sources of  financing; generally settle theit short-term debts in order to · 
secure vital imports even when general debt servicing has been ~uspended.  Short-term  .. 
contractual obligations are· generally not included in rescheduling procedures  .. 
Because. of  the very· limited time coverage, private market insurance are. gener~ly 
in~dequate to cover new investments.  In this case, investors are uiterested· in being covered 
for the. time they.need to recoup  their investment.  Considering that frequently some "lead 
time" elapses before recovery·'begiris,.clients largely depend on underWriters' fair dealing in. 
renewing the policy at stable terms.·· This is mainly for this.reason that private insurance·is 
PnlCtically .confined to existing investment. 
· In geographical terms; private insurers focus primarily on low-:- to medium-risk 
countries in· Asia and Latin America.  · 
This being said, the, private market is a flexible source of political risk insuran.ce; 
particularly for obligors located .in low-risk markets, , The private market can tailor its policies 
to needs of  individual clients and can write highly specialised "manusCript" coverages, which 
gives it a market edge Vis-a.vis national schemes. .  · 
Under its political nsk policies, the ppvate market excludes COmplerciat risks which 
· are clearly within the control of  th~ investor.  ExCluded risks also extend to losses caused by 
currency fluctuations or devaluations, as well as losses resulting froi:Jl a general deterioration ·. 
of  the business environment even if  such deterioration can be ascribed to political instabilities. 
Private insurers can provide three kinds of  insura.q.ce .against political risks:  .  ·.  ·  ·  .  · 
•  . export credit insura~ce:  p·rotecfs exporters from lpsses due to the inability of  foreign 
buyers to meet payments on contracts as a result of  adverse political decisions or . 
• 
circumstances.  ; 
contract frustration insurance:  protects· exporters should a foreign goveriunent's 
inteiVention SOI:Jlehow prevent an overseas customer from fulfilling. a contractuaL  . 
commitment  Fqreign governmental acts may range from trade embargoes ~d  .acts of 
war to currency inconvertibility.  (AIG's coverage extends to contract or license,···  .·  · 
cancellation caused;by government interference; in contrast, Lloyds' does not c~ver. · 
···'' ~ 11-
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breach of  contract because they consider that there is no way of knowing whether the . 
commitment is  fair and reasonable). 
•  confiscation insurance:  protects an investor against the seizure ofoverseas assets by 
government nationalisation or expropriation. . 
In practice, private insurers have focused on transfer risks, expropriation and 
nationalisation.  They may provide cover in limited instances against war, rev.olution and 
natural catastrophes.  Yirtually none provides cover against exchange rat~ changes. · 
· Of  note, when insuring a public obligor, private market insurers generally covet all 
reasons for non-performance by the obligor because risks are perceived to be too blended·. 
For this eason, insurers do not attempt to unbundle risks for. public sect9r obligor and 
take run credit risk. 
4.3  Pricing Policies . 
The private market has remained an expensive source of  political risk insurance,  · 
except in particular niches of  the market (low-nsk markets for existing investme.nts).  It  · 
provides ad hoc, market driven/risk-related pricing.  As a result; unlike national schemes, 
premiums vary considerably.  Annual rates'range from as little as 0.1% to as much as 7% or' 
even more.ofthe insured value.  Normally, rates appear to duster between 1% and 3°/o; 
premiums below 1% apply almost exclusively to risks in industrialised countries or to global 
policies and quotations exceeding 5% are frequently intended to discourage coinpani,es from  ' 
seeking insurance at all (cut  -off rates).  Examples quoted are of  some 100 bp for currency 
co.nvertibility risk;  100 bp for war risk; 50-100 .bP for coilfiscation risk 
Premiums do not reflect the mathematical probability of  loss (wbicb is extremely 
difficult to evaluate), but rather the laws of supply and demand  .. More precisely,  th~y are 
determined by underwriting capacity, risk perception, and general business variables. 
Underwriters-usually fix premium rates dependent upon how much b'!lsiness they have already 
ip the respective risk class, trying not to go beyond certain limits for aggregatio~ of  risks. 
Regarding risk assessment, because of  their totaJ. freedom in  accepti~g risks and 
pricing poliCies, private underwriters can give more weight to 'project-related'  variables 
than to host country-related variables as determinants (or: foreign investors• OR".  · 
contractors' vulnerability: 
Private underwriters' risk asses~ment includes the following aspects: 
•  vulnerability of  the specific project:  In that regard, it has been shown that large fixed 
· equity investments are especially vulnerable. 
•  vulnerability of  the sector 
•  fairness of  contractual arrangements 
•  experience and reputation of  the insured /  '  . 
.115.- Annex 10 
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•  political stability of  the host country 
•  '  home country-host country, relationships  ' 
• . ·umbrella factors (i.e., co-exposure with reputable persons or institUtion; in th~ 
project).  · ·  .  ·  · 
•  contingency ·planning 
•  ' prospect for recovery, iri case ofloss (see below u~qer indemnificatipn).  ' 
4.4  Other :Policies 
.  .  .•  . 
'urilike national insurance agencies, private underivriters are not  subje~t to any 
political constraints.  TheirJ.mderwriting, portfolio management, premium rating and risk 
management follow exclusively conunercial rules.  They have to show profits to get the capital 
' res~rves which determine tl;teir underwriting capacity and must meet client's expectations to 
· sell insurance at profitable t~nns:  ·  . . · .  '  ..  · .  : .  ·  ...  .  ·  · ·.·  .  · 
.  I  I 
..  - .• 
t ..  ·  .  .  ..  :  .•  ·  •  '  ..  .  .  - ,•  ·.  .  :  • 
In striking this balanc.e, underwriters do not seek to avoid: p.aying claims. a~ their first 
priority,· .  Th,e underlying  ~ilside:r:ation is to· develop, on a  lpng-tcmt1 and ovetall basis;  tpo~e 
premiums than claims. (Some consider that 40-50% of  prernium revenues should be paid out 
on claims.).'  ·  ·  · 
. .  As a result, risk an~ysis.is. not of  p~ry  conc~rn  to undeiVlriters.  Atthe cor~ of  . 
their management are attemp.ts at balancing th~ir portfolio which means tlie transfonn~tion.df 
unmanageable·contingencies. into calculable co~s  by application of  the la,w oflarge numbers. 
yet, political risks do  no~  len~ themselves to easy probability mathemat~cs  since~  they 
ean aggregate to countlj',.  region~  and even world-wide catastrqphes.  .  . ''  ' •' 
· Portfolio balanciD;g, risk analysis ~nd premium· rating are all closelyintertwin~d  . 
Risk variables determine the categorjes under which portfolios are J?alanced,  In addition,  ·  · 
perceived riskiness has a .bearing 011 underwriters' decision to what line of  business they· 
allocate how much capacity.  Preniiums certainly reflect risk perceptions  ..  But they are.aiso 
function ofavailable capaci~, competition in a particular line of  business, .as well as general 
business  con~iderations.  ·  ·  · 
'  .. 
ro build up a viable package ofrisks, different political risks are aggregate9 into·one . 
portfolio which freqtientiy includes export eredit risks.  Diversification is sought by ,putting 
appropriate ceilings on risks 'which could materialise .as a result of  the· same event or· of 
interrelated events.  The main ceilings retateto host countries, projects and clients,  In 
'addition, portfolios are balanced according to the three main types of  politkal 'risks: 
·confiscation and expropriation, various ,forms of  contract frustration, riot and civil strife..  . 
Consideration is also given to a proper IniX of  sectors and hom_e  countries~.  Country ceifuigs . 
quoted by AIG·are ofUSD 425 mn; other major underwriters arebeiievedto have lower, 
.  cotintry ceilings ..  Ceilings for·individuat projects aie ofUSD .85 mn at AIG and lo._;,;er in other 
major underwriters.  · - 't-9  -
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Risk assessment and underwriting capacity are interdependent.  For instance, in the 
'leading US underwriter, all exposures are graded between 1 and 10 according to the perceived 
risk level, level 1 reflecting the lowest and level 1  0 the highest grade.  The insured amount is · 
the!) multiplied by the risk coefficient so that the highest risks absorb 10 times the capacity of 
the lowest.  ·  · 
.  One of  the important portfolio balancing techniqu~ used in the private market 
is reinsurance through which all or part ofliabilities ~sumed'by  a few underwriters is 
transferred to other insurance companies.  In  fact, the existence of  re-insurance capabilities is 
a sine qua non condition for the existence ofthe Private Market for·poli~ical risk insurance. 
As a result of  reinsurance, a considerable number of  companies (up to 1, 000) can share in the 
insurance of  a single large risk.  The 
11atomisation" of  large risks enables underwriters to 
increase their und.erwritirig limits.  For  instance, CIT! re-insures 87% of  its risks.  Other  · · 
.insurers are believed to retain a  much larger share of  the risk on their portfolio (some 40% 
aceording to some interlocutors).  AIG confirmed that they keep a 
11Substantial share" of  the 
.ri~k on its balance sheet.  However, they needed the a.Ssurance.from their reinsurers that they 
would provide reinsurance for 7-year risks before considering the introduction of  a new, 
longer term fac~ty. · 
An essential element in the evaluation of  risks is recovery.  Regarding 
indemnification, any right which ail insured party. might acquire against a host ·cquntry in 
connection with an expropriatimtlconfiscation are, upon indemnification, being subrogated:to-:·: · 
'the insurer.· As a matter of  business practice, underwriters require investors, under a due · 
diligence·clause, to attempt recovery from the host country before they pay out the claim.'  A 
· waiting period of  usually 12 months between the event 'causing the loss and indemnification· 
aims at facilitating settlements between investors and host governments.  ·  · -<20- Annex 10 
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Distribution  Distribution 
Pakistan  9.7  Chile  3.0 
Argentina·  9.2  CoSta Rica 
"  2:0 
Peru  8.5·  Veneztiela·  ·'  ).~ 
Brazil  '  6.5  Hondura.S·  1.9 
T~rkey  5.1  Ecuador 
..  1.5 
China  4.9  Huilgary  .  '1.4 
Jainaie:a  ..  4.3  VietNam  0.8 
Czech Republic  4.1  Uganda  I  ·0.7  . .  . '·  .  ..  . 
Tunisia  4'.0  . Morocco  0.6  .. 
Banglarlesli  4.0·  Russian.F~eration  0.6 
! 
Poland  3.4·  Ghana  0.6 .. 
Philippines  - ·3.4  South A,friCa.  - 0.5 
Indonesia  3:2  Tanzania  0.5  ' 
Slovak Republic 
I.  3.1  ~  0;3  ., 
· Trinidad_&· Tobag~  . 3.1  Bulgaria  Q.2  '  . 
Uzbekistan  ..  3.1  Madagascar  0:1  . .  . . 
GuYana.  ..  3.1  cameroon  o·.l 
. 
Source:  MIGA 199' Annual Report 
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Information on ·Export Credit Agencies . 
and National Investment Insurance Schemes  \ 
Country  P-age 




Italy  4 
Netherlands ·  5 
·spain  7 
United Kingdom  8 
United States  10 {' ., 






The Compagnie Fran~aise d'Assurance pour le Commerce Exteri~ur (COFACE) was set up n; . 
1946: A joint stock company With a capital ofFRF 300 million, it is  subje~ to the commercial 
code. Most of its shareholders are publi_c  sector companies (banks or insurance companies). 
Its activities fall into two spheres. Its main business is the provision of credit' insurance  ~d 
performance guarantees for commercial and financial transactions and other insurance sernces 
related  to or designed  to. fac!4tate  such  transactions.  It is  also ,empowered· to.  administer  · 
official credit insurance schemes .on behalf ·onhe government, and in this capacity. it provides 
. cover for a nurpber of  ris~s relating to intemationah.i'!-de.  .  { 
:  '  '  .  .  •  .  '  .  .  '.:  '  '  '  .  •  -.  :\'_' •.  ·'!  • 
On  its· own account,  COF  ACE  covers  commercial  ri-sks  world-wide  and  political  risks· in 
OECD countries (excluding Turkey) provided that the credit, risk does last not longer .than 
three years.  As the cover for these risks has riot  been backed -by·a State .guarantee .since  1 . 
January)990, COFACE reinsures them on the privatemarket.  · 
On behalf of.the government COFACE provides cover for all pther ri~ks.  .  '  ·- .  .  . 
RESOURCES·.  .  . 
COFACE-derives its re~ources from premium income, investment mcome, ~d  remuneration it_ 
l  receives from the government for administering the official credit insurance sch.eme.  .  . •  . .  '. 
.  .  .  .  .  . 
RELATIONS· WITH THE STATE. 
For  guarantees  iss~ed on  behal.(  of the . government,  credit  policy .  is  formulateq  .at . the,  · 
beginning of the year. by the :Ministry of  Economic Affairs and Finance.  COF  ACE processes 
. ,  applications  for  guarantees and  submits  then  to  the.  CGCE.  Decisions  are  made  by  the . 
. Director of External Economic  Relations 'upon  receipt of  .  .a  concurriilg  opinion  from  the' 
CGCE. ·  COF  ACE  is.  also  authorised· to ·make  decisions  Within  the  limits  of the  powers 
deleg11ted  to it by  the Director of External Economic Relations  .. COF  ACE issues offers of 
cover and policies, settles claims and recovers moneys on behalf of  the Government. . 
RELATIONS Willi THE PRivATE SECTOR 
.  COFACE  has  concluded a reinsJ.Irance  treaty  with  the  private sect·or  (or the  btisiries·~ if 
.  conducts  .  on  its  own  account. ·.·. In .  special  cases; . it  sometimes  concludes  co-ib.su,:ince 
agreements with other insurance 9omp~es. 
COFACE d(;>es  not have a statutory monopoly. The private  secto~ is free to compete with it, 
for both political and corrimercial risk busines_s, but there is littl~ competition at present  .. 
FOREIGN WVESTMENT GUAR..ANI'EE 
This guarantee covers political risks for a minimum of five  and  ~ ·maxmium of ten years.  It 
· covers the risks of interference with property and  non-transfer of income or dividends  ·~s a 
result of  events of  a political nature.  . ~s­
(_- 3:) 
GERMANY 
ORGANISATION AND STRUCTURE 
Atachment II to Annex 10 
'Onder the official  export credit insurance scheme,  the Federal Government carries both the 
political  and  the -.conunercial  risks.  A mandatary  consortium  is  authorised  to  provide  and 
manage  the insurance  business  in  the  name  and  for  the  account  of the  government.  This 
consortium  consists  of a  private  insurance  coq>oration,- Hermes  Kred~tversicherungs AG 
(Hermes), the leading partner in the consortium; and  Treuiubeit AG,  a corporation in which 
public bodies hold a minority stake. 
.  . 
RESOURCES 
The Federal Government can grant cover only within an exposure limit on total commitments 
. fixed annually by Parliament. The ceiling for export credit insurance 'in the  1991_ budget year 
·was set at DM 165  billion.  Thus,  the  authority  for  new  cover  essentially  depends  on the 
conunitments already existing at the beginning of  the fiscal year (about DM 152 billion·.at the· 
~nd of 1991). Claims are paid from th~ budget, which is credited with premium ·payments and 
any  re~overies from earlier claims. 
RELATIONS WITII 1HE STATE 
The consortium acts only in the name and for the account of  the State. 
In. the Budget Law  provision  on  export  cover,  a  diStinction  is  made  }?etween  cover  for 
promotion  of exports  ~d cover  for  exports  of national  interest.. However,  there are no 
preferential  conditions  either for  cover in  the ·national  interest  or for  exports  destined  for 
developing countries. 
Least-developed countries qualify for genuine aid facilities.  Transactions that are of  particular 
· interest to the government may  involve  greater risks,  as  compared. with normal ·!)tandards. 
They are cl~sified separately but are not subject to special ceilings.  . 
INvESTMENT RISK INSURANCE 
Capital inveStment risks  are not included in the export guarantee system.  There is  a special 
programme  for  capital  investment  risks  that  is  also  handled  by  the  Hennes-Treuarbeit 
consortium. The second-named company is the leading partner in this field.  This programme 
provides  cover against  political  risks  such as  nationalisat~on, expropriation,  war,  rebellion,  · 
payment· moratoria,  inability to convert ·or  transf~r remittances,  and  comparable  actions or  · 
situations.  Cover can  be  provided for  up  to 20 years and  for  at most  95- per cent of the · 
investment. Apart from a flatcharge of0.5 to 1 per cent ofthe amount covered, a premium of 
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:·_· 
The  Sp.eci~ Section  for Export Credit Insurance. (SACE). was  set up  in  1977. 'by an .Act 
regulating export fii!anCing  (ACt No  . .227 .of24 M:'ay  1977), whic};lmadeit responsible for.the 
. admiriistration of  government insurance and export .credit guarantee progra.mrites.  SAC£..is an 
autonomous section oftheistituto~azionale  dell~ Assicurazionl (Natiqnallrisurance Insti~te · 
. - INA).  SACE has its ·own  management and  a5sets. It is  empowered~  to insure· and remsure 
political risks, nanira.I disasters, economic and commercial risks as well as exchange rate risks._ 
RESOURGES 
The resources available for the settlement of claims derive, in principle,. from preq,riuJ!ls  paid, 
r~coveries, reserves and  other  assets,  anq  from~ an 'eridoym'lent  fund. {at  pres'erit  ;L  7 ·271 
. billion); which is fimmced by the State.  r  . 
. RELATIONs wrrn mE STATE  · 
Insurance  liabilities  ~f  SACE are· guaranteed  by the State  within the limits  ·  6f  .a_  rev~lving 
fund  of L 18 000 billion for guarantees not exceeding ~4· months,' and a  ceiling.fixed'~ually 
under. the Act approviiig the State.budget for guarantees 'with a longer ·period. For 1993 this 
ceiling has been fixed at L 12 Ooo billion:  ·  ·  · ·  · 
'  ."':  1'. 
~LATIONS  WITii Tiffi PRN  ATE SECTOR 
Private insurance  comparues· may  insur~ export  credits  indeper1<iently· of  SACE~ The  only  -
private company _with which SACE has signed a:reinsurance agreement is the Socie~ italiaria ·· 
Assicurazio.ne  <::rediti  S.p.A.  (General  Credit  Insurance  Company  ..:  SIAC).  Under  this· 
agreement,  SACE undertakes .to  reinsure 45  per cent of all  short-term commercial risks and 
95 per cent of  short-term political risks covered by SIAC.  SiA.C resources are· entirely private. 
•  '  ol  •  '·  '  •'  '  ,  I  '  '•,  '  f 
:  l 
INSURANCE FOR DIRECT INVESTMENTS ABROAD. 
Insurance for· direct investments abroad  has  been  available  since  July  _1979.  The. schem~ is 
applicable for any dire,ct investment abroad, whether in the form oftransfer of  funds, supply of 
capital goods, technoiogy, licences or patents, or for research and development  ~~iVities:apd 
mineral  produc#on.  T~e risks covered  are:  nationalisation,  expropriation  with  inadequate 
compensa~ion, confiscation, seq'uestration or any other. measufe or de,dsiori· madf' by.f~relgn 
authorities, as well  as  political developments arid· natural disasters that may result 'in Jo.ss- ~r  · 
make it impos·sible for an Italian firm  to-continue its activities  or~  be paid the sums due_to  ~~­
Th~ maximum cover is 70 per cent of investment value plus an annual 8 ·per  ce~i of  mcom~ . 
·_from iJ?.vestments; the p~emium  is 0.8 per cent a ·year  ·  ·  ·  .  ,.  .  .. Atachment II to Annex 10 
NETHERLANDS 
ORGANISATION 
The Nederlandsche Credietverzekering Maatschappij N.'  V.  (NCM) is  a  subsidiary of NCM 
Holding N.  V.  Shareholders ·of NCM Holding  comprise major Dutch banks  and  insurance 
companies,  as  well  as  four foreign  reinsurance  and  credit  insurance ·companies.  NCM has 
provided  export credit insurance since  1925.  An· agreement with the Dutch· government in 
1932, broadened in 1946 and renewed m  1961,  1983 and 1991, provides for reinsurance with 
the Dutch government of non-commercial  risks  and  commercial  risks  that  fall  outside the 
scope of  private insurance. 
NCM inSures commercial-risks for its own account and reinsures -with the Du~ch government 
non-commercial risks  as well as those medium..;  and iong-term commercial riskS  that 'it· can 
take neither for its own account nor for the account of  its private reinsurers.  As the agreement 
\vith the Dutch government is based on a reinsurance arrangement, NCM handles all matters  . 
relating to· credit insurance, iricluding the processing and payment of  claims.  · 
.··  .  .  .  . 
NCM  Credietverzekering  :voor  Oost-Europa. N. V.,  another  sul?sidiary  of ·NCM  Holding, 
rovers.  lease  transactions  for  capital  goods  with  Eastern  European  countries · within  the 
framework-of a special credit insurance facility.  All risks are reinsured with a trust, Stichting 
Economische. Sarnenwerking  Nederland  Oost-Europa  (SENO),  set up  by  the.  :M:inistry  of. 
Economic Affairs.  · 
RESOURCES 
NCM Holding's activities for its own account a;-e supported by its  equity ofNGL 304 million 
(31  December 1992). Technical reserves amount to NGL 690.2  million. 
RELATIONS WI1H 1HE STATI;: 
NCM is authorised by the :M:inister of  Finance to issue policies and addenda to policies if  the 
cover extended is in line with general policy and the maximum liabilitY does not exceed NGL · 
10 million per policy for.buyers m·all counttie's.  For amounts between NGL 10 million and. 
· · NGL 25  million,  approval of the Export and  Import Credits  Guarantee Department of the 
Central Bank is required. For amounts exceeding NGL 25 million the approval ofth.e :M:inister 
ofFinance is required . 
.  Co~operation betWeen the government and NCM is based upon the principle that  comm~rcial 
risks are usually  covered for the account of NCM and  private reinsurers.  Non-commercial 
risks are covered for the account of the government by way of reinsurance ..  The following 
.  risks are covered for the account of  the government:  .  . 
.  . 
political risks (including transfer risk); 
·payment risks attached to transactions with government buyers; . , 
.  '  . .  ~fs" -
(:6) 
Atachment II to Annex 10 
protracted default risks on private buyers in developing countries and .  insolvency 
risks on private buyers in certain developing countries, who cannot be reinsured 
. in the private market;  .  . .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  . 
protracted  defau~t risks  and  insolvency  risks  incurred  with  privMe  buyers  in 
industrialised countries where the cre9it term exce.eds five years;  · 
unfair calling of  bonds; . ·  -
foreign exchange risks;  .  .  . 
political risks in connection with investments in developing and.East~rn  Eu~opean 
countries covering such'risks as expropriation, ttarisfer delays, war, etc.··  · 
INVESTMENT INSURANCE 
Based on an Act of Parliament of 23  April  1969,  ~over. may be given  .fo~ politi~ ·risks  in 
respect of new. investments  or extension of existing  investments  in  develQping  eountries. 
provided  that  ari  investment .  protection  agreement  has  been  concluded "with the country . 
concerned and the investment contributes to the economic development of  that co~ntry. J::~e 
govenunent of the country where the investment is  maqe has  ~o approve the investment. ~­
order (or it to qualify for insurance. investment insurance has a maximum term of  15. yeai:s 
after  completidn. of the  iri~estment or: 20  years. after issuance  pf  ._the  policy.  As a  special 
facility,  investment  insuranc~ is also possible for investments in Eastern European countries . 
. (including the r¢publics of  the former USSR):  ·  ·  · ·  ·. 
.  ' . 
,,·  . 
. .  ~ ' 
·:  ·.· 
i 
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The Spanish Export Credit Insurance Company (CESCE) was incorporated as  a· joint stock 
company in  1970. It ·supports Spanish exporters by means of a System of insurance policies 
designed.to cover both conUnercial risks and political and extraordinary risks, as well•as what 
are known as special risks. CESCE covers commercial risks for its own account and political 
and extraordinary risks on behalf of  the State. CESCE also arranges joint insurance apd  co-
insl,lrance.  It has  concluded bilateral  agreements With  other export  credit agencies  on  joint 
insurance. 
·RESOURCES 
CESCE's share. capital totals ESP 400 million;  including ·a State share of 50.25  per.ceri~. The 
remaining 49.75 per cerit are owned by-the private ·sector. Accumulated reser\res total ESP· 6.9 
billion.  Capital  funds  therefore total ESP  7.3  billion.  For commercial  risks; resources  are 
provided by premiums paid, recoveries, fees and investment income.  · 
For political and extraordinary risks, which are managed on behalf of  the State, the company. 
relies on· reser\res constituted by  premiums paid,: claims recovered;  and  contributions by the . 
State to cover these specific risks.  ·  ·  · 
RELATIONS WTI1I THE STA1E 
CESCE relies on the' reserves described above. Its relationship with the State is governed by 
Law 10/1970 of  4 July 1970, which sets the legal grounds for its incorporation.  · 
RELATIONS :wm1 THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
.  . 
Until  1984,  CESCE had  exclusive responsibility for  commercial  risk insurance.  Since then, 
private companies authorised by the government have been able to opetate in this area. Under· 
the Ley de Ordenaci6n del Seguro Privado (Private .Insurance Act) of2 August 1984, CESCE 
may reinsure its risks with Spanish or foreign reinsur~rs·. 
Foreign.investment policies cover the risks of  expropriation or the impossibility of  transferring 
profits of  Spanish investors in foreign .countries:.  .  ·  ·  · 'i 
. ... a·o··  ... ·.  -· ''\  --.·  Atactiment II to Annex 10  .  .  .  ' 
UNITED KINGDOM 
- .........__.-- . 
ORGANISATION 
FUNCTION  ..  · 
The Export Credits- Guarantee Department's  (ECGD)  main  objectives  are to  facilitate UK  . 
expo~s. by  providing insurance  and  guarantees to UK  exporters  against  the risks  of non-
payment  by  overseas·. buyers  and  to banks  against  non-payment  of the  finance  that  they 
advance to UK exporters and ~o overseas borrowers for goods sold on credit temis overseas. 
1  ...  • 
. ECGD derives its statutory powers:fronl: the Export and  Investrri~nt GUarantees·Act (EIGA) 
of 1991.  Guatantees are' given to  UK "exporters for  exports .Of major.  projects .and  capital 
goods,. construction works projects and  services  contracts. Investment insurance is. covered 
·- ~nder Section_2 of  the Act: Reinsurance is also given to private sector insurers fo~ short-term 
export credits.  · 
ECGD is .expecte_d to. run it's credit insurance operations so as to generat~ sufficient reserves · 
·  to give the··tevel of break-even required by'  UK,  ministers. I;,CGD  publishes cpmmercial.,style · 
. tradmg  a~counts and ' cairies  out  all  the  administrative  work  neceSsary  to'  meet ;these  . 
objectives?·~his' ·'mcludes ·processing  applications. for  cover from· iPitiaf' receipt  to  issuing 
gtiarantee  documents  .and  the  supportmg  taSks  of:  Qbtaining ·, relevant . comrner~al  and 
economic infonriation about buyers, borrow~rs and countries; determiniilg premium rates and 
methods ofrisk;.control; collecting premiums; handling and paying Claims; keeping accounts of 
income~ expenditure and  res~rves; and maintaining relations With  siniilar institUtions m  other 
countries.  ··  ··  ·  ·· 
.·  RESOURCES 
· ECGD derives its income primarily. form premium charges .for its policies.  It invests its  ~ash 
surpluses in,  or as the· case may be; funds its cash deficit from,  the u:K.  Conso~dated Fund. 
ECGD earns or pays interest on the positive or negative' balance -it· holds in the Consolidated 
Fund. Recoveries' of claims payments, interest on Consolidated Fund. batanc~s when in credit, 
and interest receivable under in~ernational debt reschedUling agreements are the main sources 
of  secondary income. There are currently statutory liability ceilings on commitments in respect 
of trading  operations of£ 35  billion  for  stetlin'g  busmess  and  SDR  15. billion  for'  foreign' 
currencybusiness. These ·ceilings.may be·raised to.£ 50 billion ·and  SD~  million by Statutory 
In~ru~m.  ·  ·  ·  ·· 
Interest rate support is  provided from  public funds,  but while it is .not .furuted 'to· an iniruai 
.  ceiling, it is subject to public expenditure control. For the fui~cial year .1992/93, .the total net 
cost to public  funds  of interest support for· fixed-"rate  export  finance. amounted  to £  Ill 
million.  ·  ·  ·.  ·  ·  · 
RELATIONS WnH 1HE STATE . 
..'·' Atachment- II to Annex 1  0 
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ECGD  is  a  government  department  responsible  to  the  Secretary  of State  for  Trade  and 
Industry. The Export and Investment Guarantees Act of 1991  requires ECGD to. obtain the 
consent of  Her Majesty's Treasury for every guarantee it gives.  In practice, the Treasury has 
delegated  authority  to  ECGD  to  transact  routine  business  within  the  constraints  of the 
Department's  risk  management  system.  ECGD  consults  the  Treasury  and  other  UK 
govequnent  departments  that  might  have  an  interest  in  any  busine.ss  that·  seems  likely  to 
_  breach those constraints, or might in any way be considered novel or contentious. 
RELAnONS WI11i 1BE PRIV  AlE SECTOR 
Insurance for non-project short-term export credit is the primary responsibility of the- private 
sector. ECGD does not offer any facilities direct to exporters for this sector. However, ECGD 
does provide a reinsurance facility to private sector insurers for short-term business y;here 
there is insufficient private capacity or where the private sector will not accept particular risks 
or risk on particular markets.  · 
For project business, ECGD has very occasionally concluded risk  .. sharing  arrangem~nts with 
· commercial lenders when it has b~en  necessary to reduce ECGD's exposure.  · 
INvESTMENT ll'l'SURANCE 
ECGD's investment insurance scheme insures UK comparues that invest directly, by equity or 
loan,  in overseas enterprises. Cover is  provided  against the risks of war,  expropriation, and 
restrictions on remittances.  The normal initial  maximum ·period of cover is  15  years,. arid ·a 
premium ofbetween 0.7 and 1 per cent is charged annually on the current insured,amount._In 
addition,  a commitment premium is  charged on any difference between this amount and  the 
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The :Export-Import  Bank  of the  .United  States,  chartered  iil ,1934  as  an  independent 
government agency,  facilitates us  exports by  providing  short- and  medium-term insurance' 
. and  medium- and  long~term loans  arid  guarantees.· The guarantee  and_ insurance  coverage 
offered by Eximbank is designed to protect exporters agairist political and commerdal risks. · 
EXimbank derives statutory authority for  the_ operations of its prog1-ammes  from the ·Export-
Import Bank Act of  1945,_asamended.  . ·  ·  · 
. Through its progi-ainmes,  Eximb~  fills gaps left .  by private-sector sources of export, -credit · 
financing.  For example,  EXimbank  provides l9nger.maturities than commercial bankswhich 
prefer  short terms,  assumes  foreign  credit  risks  that the  private  sector finds  unacceptable 
within the liffiits  of its· information on creditworthiness g1-ounds,  and  neutralises the export 
credit subsidies of  foreign government.  .  .  .....  _.  .  .  i  .  '  •'  .·  . 
·:  '·. 
RESOURCES 
•. 
Eximbank finances  its operations with a combination of appropriated  and  bprrowed funds . 
.  Unq~r the .Credit Reform ·Act of 1990,  .a  subsi~y arriount  is  calculated for  each direct loaD, 
.loan  gtiar~tee .  or. ilJ,~t,mmce 'policy'  b'ased  ori .  the teml.s  of the credit. (grace and  repa)lm~nt 
.penods, fees  and.  inte_res~ rates) and the  e$timated  probabilitY of def~mlt on. the credit.  The 
subsidy component of  the  credi~ is obligated out of a total subsidy appropriation, .  while the 
remainder ofthe cr~dit is borrowed from .the US Tre8:5ury at interest rates based on .Treasury 
securities of  comparable terms.  · 
For fiscal yea! (FY) 1993 (which ended 30 September 1993.), the total subsidy appropnation 
for Eximbank prqg1-ammes\vas USn 757· million.  rhe Cong1-essional Appropriations Bill did 
not  contain  individual  progi-amme  limitatiqns;  however,  this  subsidy  appropriation  could ' 
support loans, loan guarantees and insurance not to exceedUSD 15.5 billion. In FY. 1992,_the 
tqtal subsidy appropriation for Eximbank prog1-ammes was USn 603 millioil, which was used 
to support loans, loan guarantees and insurance with a total value of  USD 12.2 billion. In FY 
1991, the last year before the Credit Reform Act  came into force,'the total face value of 
·  Eximb~  dir.ect loans, ioan guarantees and insurance was  approximate!~  U~D  11.5 billion.  _ 
Th~  subsidy rat.e .for each authorised 'credit is re-estimated each year on the.basis of  changes in 
.·terms,  inte~est rates or default estimates. If  the subsidy increases; aaditional  s~bsidy funds are·  · 
provided  through  a  permanent . indefinite  appropriation.  Losses  on . a.  cre~it are  also .  paid 
through the permanent indefinite appropriation. After each credit is repaid, any profit made on 
the credit reverts to the US Treasury. Credits obligated before credit reform took effect at the 
beginning of FY 1992 continue  ~o ·be funded  out of ihe Eximbank revolving fund,  which is 
now  called  the  liquidating  ac9ount.  Additional  funding  requirements· for. this  account  are. 
obtained  from  the  permanent  indefinite  appropriation.  For FY  1994, .  there  in  no ··o:verall 
activity limit - Eximbank may support as inany exports as its subsidy budget 'will allow.  · 
'  .  \  .  '  '  .  ·.  .  . - ~-­
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Eximbank's  administrative  expenses  are  funded  through  a  separate  adrniilistrative  expense 
appropriation. For FY 1993, this appropriation was USD 45.6 million.  · 
RELATIONS WI1H 1HE STA1E 
PEFCO is a private corporation whose management is responsible to its Board of  Directors · 
and  stockholders.  While  Eximbank  unconditionally  guarantees  all  PEFCO  loans  (thereby 
maintaining a measure of control over its activities), PEFCO· operates as any other financing 
entity whose export credits are guaranteed by Eximbank.  . 
RELATIONS WTIHPRIVA1E SECTOR  ' 
Eximbank encourages PEFCO to participate with commercial banks in export loans.  P}::FCO 
traditionally lends in conjunction with one or more· commercial banks and will'  cover up lo 85 
per cent of  export value.  · 
RELATED ORGANISATION 
·  Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) 
FuNCTION· 
The  Overseas  Private  Investment  Corporation  (OPIC)  is  a US  government  agency  that 
provides project financing,  investment insurance  and  a _variety  of investor  services. in  more 
than  13 5  developing  nations  and  emerging  economies  throughout  the  world.  OPIC 
encourages American  oversea~ private  investment  in  sound  business  projects that  have  a 
positive impact on' the host country's economy and environment. OPJC wa5 authorised by law 
in 1969 and began operations in 1971. 
OPIC assists American investors through three principal programmes: 
Financing of  investments through direct loans and loan guarantee~ 
. Medium- to  long~term financing. for  sound  oversea.S  mvestment  projects  is  made 
available through these two programmes. Direct loans generally range from USD 2 
ririllion to USD  10 million. Loan guarantees generally range from  USD ·10  million to. 
USD 75  rillllion.  OPIC's financing  commitment may range from  50 per cent of total 
project costs for new ventures up to 75  per cent for expansion of existing successful 
operations, with final  maturities c:if five  to  12 years or more.  Additionally,  OPIC has 
created a family  of privately managed direct investment funds in various region$  and 
business  sectors,  Currently these  "growth funds"  cover Africa, ·Asia-Pacific, Russia,  . 
Poland, Israel and the enVironmental  sector. Growth funds ·for Latin Aplerica; South 
Asia, and the Middle East are planned.  · 
Insuring investment projects against a broad range of  political risks .\  ',· 
•  - q'+  -. 
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··.  ~ OPIC offers a· number of programmes to  in~ure US  investments in emerging  ~arkets 
and developing countries agaJnst the risks of:  '  .  ' .  '  . 
~  _  currency inconvertibility:  ·the inability to convert profits,  debt -service  and  other 
m~estmerit-remittances from local currency'into dollars;  .  '.  .  ' 
•  expropriation: .  loss. _of  an· investment  due -to  expropriation,  nationalisation  or 
. co~scatio~  by a. foreign gove~ent; 
•• political violence:. loss' of  assets  ~r income·due to war, revolution,  insurrection~~ . 
.  civil strife. ·  · .  ·  ·  .·  ·  · ·  ·  .  .  · .  .  · 
Coverage is available for  ~ew  investments and for investments to .  expand or modernise 
existing  operations.  Equicy,  debt~ loan  guarantees,  leases  and  most  other forms. of . 
long-term  investment  can  be  insured.  Special  programmes. are  also  available  for. 
contractor and exporters of  oil and gas projects. 
.  .  ;  . 
Providing a variety of  investor services 
'  i' 
OPIC investor services include: investment missions that take groups of  US  ~xecutives 
to seleCted countries to meet host country govemm~nt  officials, _local pusiness· leaders, 
and .  potential. joinr venture partners  who ·can  play  key  roles  in  bringing  proposed 
.- business·  v~ntures  to  fhiition;  reverse  missions,  ·which  bring' gr()ups  of foreign' 
· governinent officials and local businessAeaders to the United States-to meet with their 
American counterparts; and investor conferences that cover· a variety of investment-
related. subjects,  ·  · 
.  '  .  ·~. 
RESOURCES·  ;: ... 
Smce FY 1992, OPIC has' also  r~~eiyed congressional app;opriations to covet the co.sts of  its 
·credit prograinmes in accordance with the  Credit Reform Act  of 1990.  In FY 1993, OPIC  · 
received  tJSD  8.1  million  to  cover the  adrniilistrative  expenses  associated  with  its  credit· 
· · ·programlnes; and USD 8:9 nUllion in subsidy budget authority.  The supsidy budget .authority 
.  ·. -is  available for two years to' supp.ort  some USD ·  400 million in direct and  guaranteed loans. 
· · The Credit Reform Act also authorises OPIC to. borrow from the US Tre~sury such amounts 
· as may be necessary to fund direct loan and guaranteed loan requirements for l~ans  .approved 
pursuant to the Act.  · 
.  . 
. OPIC's insurance a:nd  guaranteed loan prograriunes carry the full faith and  credit of  th~ US 
government . In -addition . to  ·its · .  USD  2.  billion  ·in'  reserves  .ayailable  for  prograinme .. 
· requirements, OPIC also has USD)  bo million in borrowing authority for insurance daims and ·· 
· · stapding authority for.additional appropriations. 
RELATIONS Wrmllffi STATE:  . 
'•  : 
OPIC is a wholly owned ,US government corpor~tion. All of OPIC
1s guarantee and msurance 
obligations are backed by the full  faith and  cre.dit of the U~ted States, as well as  by OPIC's 
own substantial rese~es.  .·  ·  ' ·  ·  · . RELATIONS vvim Tiffi PRIY AlE SECTOR  .. 
"1~ .~· 
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One of  OPIC's legisl~tive mandates is to· encourage developmexrt of  the private sector political 
·risk insurance industry.  For that purpose,  OPIC  works closely  with an  adVisory  group of 
representatives of  the private sector's political risk insurance industry to develop co-operative 
programmes. to enhanc~ the ability of the private political risk msurance industry to meet the 
political·risk insurance needs of  US investors.  ·  · 
A· majority of members of the· Board ·of Directors are from. the private· sector; all  user~ of  · 
OPIC'~  programmes are fro~  the private sector. ·  ·  · 
.··INVESTMENT AND BOND INSURANCE .. 
: \ 
·  · Exj.mbank  does riot  provide any  type of bond ·  insurance.  Exporters are  referred·  .. to private 
ccimpanies extending bond insurance or to OPIC (or investment insurance. 
.  . 
OPIC provides political risk insurance to eligible US business investing in projects located in a 
. developing country in which OPIC ope~ates. The projects must be  d~velopmentally beneficial · 
· to the host country, consisient with the. economic interests .ofthe Unites States, and not have 
:  sigriificant adverse effects on the lJS economy or levels of  einployment ip. the Uhited States  .. A. 
project  sho~.lld also .be  privately Controlled  and  managed, 'but  minority foreign government 
participation .will not ·render a project ineligible ..  :rD.  addition to these criteria, OPIC does not 
insure loans ofless thah three years' average maturity.  ·  · 
. .  .  '  . 
Within  these  constraints,  OPIC  insurance, is  available  to investors  in.  almost  any  type· of. 
projects, a major exception being· projects· that produ.ce armaments. ·In addition to insurance 
f6_r  ~uity or loan inveStments,  special  OPIC  insurance· covera,ge is  available. to protect US  · 
. exporters,  lessors and  construction contractors.  OPIC  insurance is  available  only. for  new 
·  iiwestment in  ·.new or expansion projects  ..  To be eligible,  an investor must be:  a US citizen, a 
business organised in the US and more than 50 per cent beneficiary·- oWned by US citizens; or 
a foreign corporation, partnership or association wholly OWJ:led' by  one or more US citizens, 
corporatiqns, partnerships.  o~r other ·associations. ·.  ·  · 
'.  ' 
O}>IC  insurcmce is  offered  against  three  t)rpes  of politic8.1  risk:  inability  to  convert .local 
currency  earnings  or returns  of capital  into  dollars~  expropriation  or  confiscation. 'of an 
investment~ ·and damage due to· wai,.revolution, or insurrection. OPIC political risk insurance. 
does not offer any flrotection against commercial risks or de:valuations of  local currencies. ANNEX  11 
DEFINITION OF ELIGIBLE POLITICAL RISKS 
CURRENCY TRANSFER: 
.  .  , 
The risk of Currency Transfer is constituted when a Borrower of  the BANK is  unable, .directly 
or indirectly, to convert local currency into a freely convertible currency or another currency 
acceptable to the Borrower, or to transfer outside the- host country the local currency· or the 
currency in which the local currency was converted, in order to ma1<:e  the payment of any 
·sum  due. under a  loan  made. by the  BANK,  as  the· direct  and  immediate  result of  ~ny 
introduction  attributable  to  the  host .Government  of  direct  or  indirect  restrictions  on 
conversion or transfer or any failure by the host Government (or by entities authorized to 
operate in the foreign exchange markets) to act on conversion or tranSfer on behalf of the 
Borrower.  ·  · 
EXPROPRIATION AND SIMILAR MEASURES: 
The risk of Expropriation is constituted when a Borrower of the ·BANK is unable to' make the 
payment-of any sum· due under a loan granted by the BANK or is deprived of its ability to 
control  or dispose  of its  property. or operate  the  (investment)  project or material  parts 
thereof, as the direct and immediate result of any· measure by or attributa~le to the host 
Government and  not limited to  ~xpropriation but including  confiscation,  nationalisation, 
· requisition  or  any· other· measure  equivalent  to  expropriation,  which  constitutes  an 
administrative action or omission or a legislative action which requires no f-urther legislation, 
regulation· pr administrative aCtion for its implementation. 
A series 'of measures which are  integral  parts· of the .same  plan  or ·program  of the  host 
Governm~nt  and ~hich are designed together to be expropriatory shalt be  regarded as  ~ne· 
measure f<?r the purpose of  this definition. 
No  measure  shall  be  deemed  to  be  expropriatory  if it  co.nstitutes  a  bona-fide  non-
discriminatory measure of general application of a kind that governments nonnally take in 
the public interest for the purpose of regulating economi~  activities in their  territories. 
Breach by the host Government of a contractual obligation to a Borrower" of the· BANK shall 
not, in and or itself, constitute an expropriatory measure.  · 
WAR AND CIVIL DISTURBANCE: 
The risk of  War and Civil Disturbance is constituted when a Borrower of the BANK is unable, 
directly or indirectly; to make the payment of any sum due under a loan made by the BANK 
as the direct and immediate result of any military action or civil disturbance in the territory of 
the  host  country,  including  acts  of war. (whether  declared  or . undeclared),  revolution, 
insurrections and coups d' etats, riots and civil commotions ,terrorism and sabotage  .. 
In all cases, acts of  .civil disturbance .must have been  undertaken with the  pri~ary  :intent of· 
achieving a political objective. Acts undertaken primarily to achieve non-political objectives -
(such as labor or student interests) do not constitute civil disturbance for the purpose of this 
definition. 
NB: These definitions, which are based in genera• terms on the risk definitions of the MIGA 
Conventi.on,  provide basic elements of definition of the political risks under consideration 
.They are subject to any revisions, amendments or extensions whicH -may result from further 
examination of the issues at point1 notably with the CommissiOn and with·  pote~al users, 
corporations and banks, on the basis of their needs. For the purpose of  thes'e "definitions the 
term  Borrower. includes the recipient  of a  Bank  loan,  a  Guarantor, another debtor of the 
BANK or even if relevant the BANK itself. 